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Summary 
The thesis addresses the subject of ageing societies resulting from demographic trends of 
population, individual and active ageing. Societies are aging across the world, but the focus of 
this study is the OECD area in general and Norway and Denmark in particular, selected 
because they represent the Scandinavian welfare state. The thesis opens with a description of 
current and projected demographic patterns, and the social, fiscal and political challenges they 
pose, which are relevant to most OECD countries although to various degrees. In responding 
to the challenges of ageing populations OECD outlines seven principles for reform, of which I 
primarily address the ones related to the pension system, pension income and the 
employability of older workers.  
 
The primary focus of attention is responses to the challenges of ageing in light of OECD 
recommendations as reflected in current reforms. In order to better comprehend and 
hypothesise the plausibility that Norwegian and Danish reforms comply with the OECD view, 
I have chosen a normative perspective. I presume that to the extent the normative foundations 
embedded in the OECD recommendations are reflected in the pension systems in Norway and 
Denmark, they may be more inclined to follow the OECD direction, than would otherwise be 
the case. The normative values of the pension systems are considered according to the 
normative foundations of the Scandinavian welfare state, notably public responsibility, 
universality, generosity and full employment. I find that the normative principles of OECD 
and the Scandinavian welfare state diverge, except regarding the aspect of employment. By 
including the actual pension systems, the hypothesis is less clear-cut as both entail elements of 
the OECD view.  
 
 I find that implemented and/or proposed pension reforms primarily comply with OECD 
recommendations, although some recommendations are ignored and/or not adopted 
altogether. I do not as of yet, find indications that either country is moving away from the 
Scandinavian welfare state. In my opinion Denmark, which I consider a forerunner as 
compared to Norway in implementing reforms, appears to have successfully combined the 
“best of two worlds”, by incorporating OECD recommendations within its overall 
Scandinavian welfare state. Whether Norway will follow suit, remains to be seen.        
Preface 
This study is part of a project on “The Normative Foundation of the Scandinavian Welfare 
State” directed and carried out by project manager Nanna Kildal (Stein Rokkan Center) and 
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on the normative perspective of reforms and recommendations for reform in meeting the 
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I Introduction 
Over the last decade or so political and public awareness of the ongoing demographic 
development towards ageing societies has increased, along with requests for profound 
analysis and research on the subject. Early on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development1 (OECD) acknowledged the potential challenges of ageing populations 
ahead, its work on implications of ageing populations dating back to the 1980s. In general, 
OECD designs and promotes policies for attaining the highest sustainable economic growth 
and employment and a rising standard of living in member countries while maintaining 
financial stability, cf. Article 1 of the OECD Convention2. It interprets topical and emerging 
issues, like ageing, addresses their implications and presents recommendations for strategies 
and reforms for adoption 
 
Upon request from its Ministers in 1996 and the Heads of state and government at the 1997 
Denver summit3, OECD furthers analyses on the fiscal, financial and labour market 
implications of ageing. OECD recognises the need for reform and identifies several principle 
guidelines for avoiding major fiscal and social problems, emphasising timing by warning that 
if postponed, reforms will be more severe and difficult4. I would, however, like to point out 
that there may be other solutions5 to the challenges of ageing populations besides the ones 
recommended by OECD, which may be reflected in individual countries’ actual policy and 
reform response. There are probably numerous ways of perceiving and responding to the 
challenges posed by ageing populations. The fact that I base my thesis on the 
recommendations of OECD does not imply that I consider its approach more adequate or that 
I necessarily concur with their views. Measures found to be in accordance with the OECD 
view, does not necessarily imply that they are proposed/implemented on OECD 
recommendation. Any concurrence may be coincidental and unintended.    
 
 
                                                 
1 OECD was established in 1961, replacing its forerunner the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation, OEEC. OECD has currently 30 member countries, of which 20 are original Norway and Denmark 
included (OECD, 1998:2) 
2 (OECD, 2003b).  
3 I.e. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia (OECD, 
1998:3). 
4 (OECD, 1998:2),( OECD, 2003a). 
5 In a report from 1994 the World Bank recommends a universal strategy to avert the “old age crisis” entailing 
replacing traditional public pension schemes with a system of mandated individual accounts (World Bank 1994 
in Pedersen, 2002c:1). 
1.0 The Problem(s)    
OECD (1997a:3) concludes that it is the combined effect of the following demographic trends 
that is of greatest relevance to public policy: population ageing which means increased ratio 
of older people relative to the population at large, individual ageing which refers to the fact 
that people are living longer and active ageing, also referred to as changing life-course 
patterns, which relates to the changes in patterns of activity within different age groups. I base 
my account of future demographic trends and their consequences on these aspects.  
 
One of the major consequences of the above demographic trends is decreasing ratios of 
people of traditional working-age6 to people outside the labour market. This is in part due to 
the fact that people are staying in school longer and tend to retire earlier and partly because 
the labour force alongside the population at large is ageing. Unless some political action is 
taken these trends may render it difficult to maintain growth in production and thus shoulder 
the burden7 of an ageing society, of which the strain from commitments embedded in existing 
pension arrangements is assumed to constitute a heavy burden. 
 
If everyone over the age of 64 (cf. note 6) is treated as belonging to a separate “elderly” 
category, valuable experience, labour and a potential to reduce some of the challenges 
associated with ageing may be lost. It is also a question of equal dispersion of burden. On 
average the wealth position of today’s older people surpasses that of other groups, whereas it 
primarily is the younger generations that will have to shoulder the weight of ageing 
populations, both economically and socially. This raises a question about fairness between 
generations.  
 
Faced with ageing societies, OECD generally regards it inevitably necessary to contain public 
spending on pensions, health and long-term care (OECD, 1998:13). Without reform, projected 
pension benefit levels are expected to exceed projected pension contributions, resulting in 
increased deficits in pension accounts as well as in public finances in general. Public 
                                                 
6 OECD defines the working-age population as 15 to 64 years (OECD, 1997a:10). As I will be using OECD 
projections and calculations I will necessarily have to adopt their definition. This is not to say that people neither 
should nor actually do enter the labour force at 15 or generally exit at 64. The definition reflects a potential 
labour force basis rather than actual labour force participation patterns.   
7 This term may have a derogatory connotation for some. This is not my intention and I do not find that ageing 
per se is a disadvantageous demographic development with mainly undesirable effects, on the contrary. I do, 
however, want to stress the seriousness of the matter, particularly if measures and reforms are not implemented.   
 
provision of health and long-term care for the elderly will only add to the burden. Even with 
the reforms under way, OECD stresses that government budget balances will come under 
strain from about 2010 when the baby-boom cohort starts retiring (ibid:52). As the largest 
pressure is likely to come from public pensions, it is my opinion that commitments embedded 
in existing pension arrangements should be reconsidered and revised. This would imply 
evaluating their financing, benefit levels and eligibility as well as their incentive structures in 
order to attain a sustainable pension system in the longer term8. According to OECD, 
attaining a sustainable pension system will require reducing pension generosity, higher 
contribution rates than currently envisaged and/or reducing the number of recipients relative 
to the number of contributors9 (ibid). Undoubtedly a difficult task is at hand, particularly as it 
may involve reaching some unpopular decisions. Thus, it will be essential to gather and 
distribute information about demographic trends and subsequent challenges in order to raise 
understanding and consolidate public support for reform.  
 
Esping-Andersen finds that the response of a welfare regime10 to emerging risks and, I might 
add, demographic challenges is more likely than not to be normatively path dependent 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999:173). In meeting the challenges of ageing populations one response 
is to reconsider the normative foundation11 of pension arrangements and the transition from 
work to retirement. This will be a part of my object of attention. According to Esping-
Andersen typologies, like welfare regimes, may facilitate the identification of some 
underlying connecting logic of the cases studied and are generally useful tools for generating 
and testing hypotheses (ibid). His assumptions form the basis of my study. Pension schemes 
in Norway and Denmark respectively will initially be addressed in light of normative values I 
find typical of the Scandinavian welfare state12. In this respect the following questions are of 
particular relevance: What normative aspects substantiate the OECD principles for reform and 
to what extent do they correspond/ differ from the normative features of the Scandinavian 
                                                 
8 Many European countries are involved in pension reform processes. In Denmark reforms are being 
implemented and in Norway a “Pension Commission” is currently at work.  
9 The OECD report does not specify by how much pension generosity should be reduced or contributions 
increased. This is for the respective countries’ governments to decide, but in general their objective should be a 
sustainable pension system and government budget balance.  
10 The term welfare regimes “refers to the ways in which welfare production is allocated between state, market, 
and households”, on which Esping-Andersen distinguishes tree distinctive welfare regime types (Esping-
Andersen 1999:73) cf. appendix A.  
11 By normative foundation I refer to standard principles or pattern of principles which welfare measures may be 
considered founded on, are actual implementations of and/or reflect. 
12 My focus on the Scandinavian welfare state/ the Scandinavian model restricts the selection of cases/countries 
for this study.  The selection of Norway and Denmark in particular is addressed in ch. IV section 1.0. 
welfare state? Are Norway and Denmark moving in the direction recommended by OECD 
and if this be the case, does it imply a move away from the normative principles of the 
Scandinavian welfare state? Or put another way: Is it possible to maintain generous universal 
pension benefits while ensuring the sustainability of the overall pension system? How is the 
burden of an ageing population to be fairly distributed between generations?                                                     
 
2.0 Structure and Content 
The thesis opens with a description of demographic patterns, including important tendencies 
and present and future population composition estimates by OECD. The account addresses the 
situation in the OECD area in general, but where country specific variations apply to Norway 
and Denmark, these will be described. This account is followed by a discussion of the 
financial, social and political consequences of the demographic trends and the challenges they 
may thrust on society. The challenges apply to more or less all OECD countries, but they will 
be exemplified by and/or be given an additional perspective from the point of view of the two 
countries of my choice. 
 
Chapter II addresses the OECD proposals for meeting the challenges of ageing populations. 
OECD’s focus ranges over a wide field and promotes guidelines for inter alia fiscal, health, 
employment and strategic reforms, whereas my focus will be on the transition from work to 
retirement and corresponding pension arrangements. Regarding the OECD principles for 
reform, my main attention will be directed towards principles directly addressing the 
transition to retirement, employability of older workers13 and pension arrangements 
respectively. The normative principles reflected in the OECD recommendations will be 
addressed and in the subsequent chapter compared with the stated, implied or alleged 
normative principles of the Scandinavian welfare state. Whether all welfare measures are in 
accordance with the underlying normative values or the means for achieving them are 
effective or not, is beside the point in this context. My interest is the extent to which the 
normative principles of OECD and the Scandinavian welfare state agree and/or differ. Esping-
Andersen stresses that norms are upheld by power, collective action and by the median voter’s 
                                                 
13 To the extent employment rates and patterns may affect the challenge of increased pension expenses, I 
consider employment policies addressing particularly older workers important to pensions and pension policies. 
After all, my focus is on ageing and labour force participation rates among older workers are generally 
significantly lower than the remaining population of working-age.   
      
  
choice, and the greater their hegemony the less power needed to be activated on their behalf 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999:173). On this basis I hypothesise that if the normative foundations of 
OECD and the Scandinavian welfare state concur it would be plausible to assume that the 
Scandinavian countries would follow the OECD guidelines with relatively little political 
conflict and opposition. If they diverge, I assume that OECD recommendations may be met 
only partially and reluctantly, as the OECD direction for reform may be contested and 
protested. 
 
The methodological aspects of my research will be dealt with in the chapter on analytical 
approach. I address my choice and use of methodological design and strategy and any 
weaknesses that may arise. The term welfare state will be defined as formulated by Briggs 
(1985), and types of welfare regimes as distinguished by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). The 
fact that I employ typologies or ideal types, notably the Scandinavian welfare state, helpful 
analytical tools as they may be, are not unproblematic and a discussion of strength and 
weaknesses of using ideal types will precede my analysis. The normative principles of the 
Scandinavian welfare state are outlined and compared with the normative principles of the 
OECD recommendations. The normative principles are further operationalized with regard to 
the extent they are actually reflected in pension systems in Norway and Denmark, which may 
indicate whether or not reforms in Norway and Denmark will comply with the OECD 
principles and/or consolidate the normative principles of the Scandinavian welfare state.  
 
Chapter V presents the pension systems in Norway and Denmark in light of the normative 
principles of the Scandinavian welfare state as defined in the preceding chapter. The intention 
is inter alia to better comprehend actual reforms and reform policies, to be analysed in the 
following chapter. OECD recognizes that there are no “one-size-fits-all” when it comes to 
pension reforms due to historical country specific differences. In order to fully understand the 
path of reform chosen, I will consider the starting-points of my respective countries to attain, 
if possible, indications of whether or not direction for reform is likely to comply with OECD 
recommendations. A more detailed overview and description of public and private pension 
schemes is provided in an appendix. Chapter V also includes an elaboration of various pre-
retirement14 schemes in Norway and Denmark. To the extent these schemes influence labour 
force participation and retirement patterns, they may through reforms, e.g. by removing work 
                                                 
14 Ceasing previous employment activity before the standard age of retirement. 
disincentives and/or implementing incentives to work, become policy measures for increasing 
the average retirement age and the general rate of employment.  
 
 
Chapter VI addresses reforms proposed and/or implemented in Norway and Denmark in light 
of the issues discussed in previous chapters. My findings will be presented and compared. 
This is in accordance with recent OECD proposals which acknowledge that as reforms are 
either taking place or are under way, it is time to look further ahead, monitor changes and 
share experience. This is what I set out to do, only on a small and limited scale, i.e. two 
Scandinavian countries. In discussing the guidelines as recommended by OECD, the 
following questions will be of particular interest: Do the reforms and proposals for reforms in 
Norway and Denmark reflect the OECD principles? With regards to pension and employment 
policy, are Norway and Denmark diverging from or converging towards the Scandinavian 
model?    
 
The thesis closes with concluding remarks on the subject studied and the particular findings. I 
present some thoughts on current events and challenges and suggestions on the scope of 
further analyses. A little though-provoking remainder before commencing: the most 
significant impacts and challenges of population ageing remain as of yet.    
 
 
II Demographic Trends 
In light of recent demographic trends three types of ageing are of particular importance. 
Population ageing entails that there are relatively more people in older age groups compared 
to other groups, mainly as a consequence of the baby boom and the baby bust. Individual 
ageing means that people are living longer, while active ageing refers to changes in patters of 
activity within each age group and a more flexible allocation of time over the life cycle 
(OECD, 1997a:3). The combined effects of these trends will be of relevance to public policy.  
 
The demographic trends are closely interrelated. In other words, the challenges they pose both 
combined and separately will require a coherent response. Without such a strategy 
implemented reforms may not have their intended effects as they may end up pulling in 
different directions. Hence, it will be important to attain a better understanding of the trends 
and their interaction. Within each trend I will first examine the general tendency in the 
OECD-area, and where divergence occurs, the tendencies in the two countries of my choice, 
Norway and Denmark. 
 
1.0 Population Ageing 
The impact of population ageing will be significant in the coming decades when the number 
of people aged 65 and over will increase in both absolute and proportional terms. “Elderly” 
refers to the population aged 65 and over, whereas the “very old” are those aged 75 years and 
over. Both categories will in the near future increase relative to the working-age population, 
i.e. people aged 15-64. According to OECD estimations using a medium fertility variant15 the 
number of elderly in OECD countries is expected to double from the 1980-level by 2040, with 
a particular increase for the age group 80 and over which is estimated to triple (OECD, 
1992:9). Table 3 gives a more detailed account of the share of population sub-groups. 
  
OECD calculations indicate that the number of persons at pensionable age will rise by a 
further 70 millions during the next 25 years, compared to a rise by only 5 millions in the 
                                                 
15 The medium fertility variant entails a pace of fertility changes between the high and low fertility variants and 
can be considered the “most likely” projection as previous Revisions show that medium-variant projections has 
described future world populations growth well, at least for 20-25 years horizons (United Nations, 1998:89). 
Fertility rates are assumed to remain at existing levels until 1995 upon which they are projected to gradually 
reach replacement level, i.e. a fertility rate of 2.1. Mortality rates are assumed to be maintained, or slightly 
decrease. Life expectancy is on average estimated to increase by two years from 1983 to 2030, whereas 
migration rates are projected on the assumption that the present trends will remain at a low level in the future 
(OECD, 1992:39).  
working-age population (OECD, 1998:10). Seen in perspective, in 1960 the ratio of the 
elderly to the working-age population, the elderly dependency ratio16, amounted to 15 per 
cent whereas it is estimated to approximate 38 per cent by 2030, with a particular strong 
growth after 2010 (table 4). Thus we can definitely say that the population is ageing.  
 
Though the phenomenon of ageing is present in all OECD countries, the development within 
each country will vary according to the country’s specific demographic features, such as the 
combined effects of fertility and mortality rates, life expectancy and migration rates.   
 
1.1 Low Fertility  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the number of childbirths increased significantly 
and during the following couple of decades the generation known as the baby-boom 
generation arrived. The baby-boom took place in all of Western Europe, though its timeframe 
and magnitude varies, e.g. in Norway the baby-boom was stronger and took place later, 
between 1955 to 1968, than most other countries (SSB, 1999).   
 
Current total fertility rates17 are generally low in OECD countries, either at or below 
replacement level18 with the exceptions of Mexico and Turkey19. For all countries projections 
using a medium fertility variant assume that fertility in the long run will reach, either by 
increasing or declining depending on current rates, and pause at the replacement level of 2.1 
children per woman by 2030 (United Nations, 1998:92, OECD, 1997a:103). In Norway the 
fertility rate decreases and remains below 2.0 from the mid 1970s, but is expected to reach 
replacement level by 2015-2020 (table 1). The fertility rate in Denmark is somewhat lower 
than in Norway and reaches an all time low at 1.4 in the first half of the 80s. Henceforth it 
increases steadily to 1.8 in 1990-1995 and is expected to reach replacement level by 2015-
2020. Meanwhile fertility rates below replacement level contribute to the ageing of society.  
                                                 
16 Population aged 65 and over to the working-age population (OECD, 1997a:99).   
17 The total fertility rate is one of the most common summary indicators of fertility, defined by United Nations as 
“the average number of children that would be born to a woman in her lifetime, if she were to pass through her 
childbearing years (i.e. 15-49) experiencing the age specific fertility rates for a given period”. It is directly 
calculated as the sum of age-specific fertility rates, or five times the sum if data are given in five-year age 
groups, calculated as the ratio of annual births to women at a given age to the population of women of the same 
age. The total fertility rate is usually expressed as per woman or per thousand women (United nations, 2003). 
18 The replacement level refers to the fertility rate needed to maintain population figures, which is assumed to 
amount to 2.1 children per woman  (United Nations, 1998:92). Women should on average have one daughter to 
maintain population figures. Boys are however, delivered a bit more frequent than girls, hence the replacement 
level is assumed to be just above 2 children per woman (Store Norske Leksikon, 2003).                                                                      
19 Where the fertility rates were 2.4 and 2.5 respectively in 2000 (OECD, 2002e, table GE4). 
 Table 1: Total fertility rates (per woman) 
 1970-1975 1980-1985 1990-1995 2000-2005 2015-2020 
Denmark 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.1 
Norway 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 
Source: United Nations, 1998:275. 
•For the period 1970-1995 historical data is provided, whereas figures for the period 2000-2020 are 
projections based on the medium fertility variant, cf. note 15. 
      
1.1.1 Falling Population Growth 
An OECD study in 1997 reports that the population growth in member countries has fallen 
from 1.1 per cent per year in the 1960s to 0.8 per year in the 1980s. The study projects that the 
figures for the 1990s would show a growth rate at 0.7 per cent per year and a further 
deceleration is estimated to a rate of 0.2 per cent per year in the 2020s. This development 
should be seen in relation to low fertility rates in the last decades. There are, however, country 
differences worth mentioning as some countries are projected to maintain population growth 
even after 202020, Norway being one of them. But even in these countries the population 
growth is projected to slow significantly after 2020 (OECD, 1997a:99). 
 
2.0 Individual Ageing 
The trend of increased longevity is referred to as individual ageing, in contrast to population 
ageing. Life expectancy at birth has increased over the years for both men and women and is 
expected to increase even further in the years to come. In Norway life expectancy at birth in 
1970-1975 was 71.4 years for men and 77.6 for women (United Nations, 1998:325). By 1990-
1995 the figures had risen to respectively 74.2 for men and 80.3 years for women. Life 
expectancy at birth for men in Denmark was 70.9 in 1970-1975 and 76.4 for women. By 
1990-1995 the corresponding figures were 72.5 years for men and 77.8 for women. Life 
expectancy in both countries is projected to continue rising in the future (table 2). Life 
expectancy at all stages of life, not just at birth, has risen due to changes in the pattern of 
mortality. Thus, a person born at a time when life expectancy at birth was 77 years might 
expect to live a couple of years longer when he or she reaches old age as the likelihood of 
                                                 
20Notably Austria, Canada, Iceland, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, United States, Norway and Turkey (OECD, 
1997a:99).  The study does not specify why these countries are projected to experience population growth. Most 
likely it is a result of relatively stable or high fertility rates, low mortality rates, increased life expectancy and 
migration or some combinations of the above. 
growing old increases with age (Foss, 2001:43). In other words individual ageing is closely 
related to population ageing. 
 
Table 2: Life expectancy at birth (in years) 
  1990-1995 2000-2005 2010-2015 2020-2025 
Both sexes 75.1 76.1 77.1 78.1 
Males 72.5 73.5 74.5 75.5 
 
Denmark 
Females 77.8 78.8 79.8 80.8 
Both sexes 77.2 78.1 78.6 79.2 
Male  74.2 75.3 75.8 76.4 
 
Norway 
Female 80.3 80.9 81.5 82.0 
Source: United Nations (1998:325,346). 
• A future course of life expectancy is projected on the assumption that life expectancy will rise 
continuously unless information indicates stagnation or decline during the early 1990s (United 
Nations, 1998:90). 
 
Life expectancy does not only vary between countries but also within each country. This 
means that not only whole countries but also country regions may be facing different 
challenges due to ageing. It is important to be aware of possible regional differences as this 
means that action and reform at the national level may not be enough, some regions may need 
additional support. In Norway life expectancy is for instance higher in the regions of 
Vestlandet, Sogn og Fjordane, Hordaland and Møre og Romsdal than in the rest of the 
country’s provinces. Other things being equal these provinces may be more affected by 
population ageing than the country at large (Foss, 2001:46).        
 
3.0 Active Ageing  
Alongside ageing populations, the fact that labour force participation patterns and lifetime 
allocation are changing will affect individuals as well as society at large. Over the last 
decades a change in the allocation of time spent in and out of employment due to school, 
unemployment, retirement etc. has taken place. This is partly due to the fact that current 
generations spend more time studying, retire earlier and in larger numbers and generally live 
longer than previous generations. These patterns will to some extent vary across OECD 
countries, but the overall tendency is clear; the amount of time spent out of employment is 
increasing. As a matter of fact, in most OECD countries the expected amount of time out of 
employment currently either equals or exceeds time spent in employment (OECD, 1997b:6). 
 
When longevity increases, time spent in employment has to increase accordingly if not to alter 
previous established life-course patterns. Without a corresponding change in the latter, time 
spent outside of employment will increase relative to time spent in employment. This may to 
some extent account for the fact that the amount of time in employment for men has declined 
over the last couple of decades. Another explanatory factor is the extended use of early 
retirement combined with later entry in the labour market due to longer education21. Women’s 
employment patterns have also changed over the same period. Though an increasing number 
of women now achieves higher education22, women’s years in employment have actually 
grown steadily in most OECD countries. However, as life expectancy for women has 
increased, their number of years outside employment has remained more or less the same. 
Consequently, the gap between women and men with regard to years in- and outside 
employment is narrowing, though an approximate equality has yet only been reached in 
Sweden (ibid:6). 
 
Despite the fact that the number of women in employment has increased significantly over the 
past 40 years and working women in many OECD countries have moved from the minority to 
the majority of the female population, they are still outnumbered by men. In 2001 the OECD 
average female share of the total workforce approximates 43 per cent (OECD, 2002c). 
However, the rates of women in employment vary considerably across countries from a low 
40 per cent in countries like Greece, Italy and Mexico to a high 70-80 per cent in the United 
States and the Scandinavian countries (OECD, 1998:16). The number of women having jobs 
outside the home is increasing in most OECD countries. The gender gap in labour force 
participation may be narrowing, but there are other significant employment differences 
between the sexes. Regardless of the actual female employment rate, women are generally 
more likely to work part-time23 than men. Women’s share in part-time employment in 2001 
amounted to an OECD average of approximately 69 per cent, with respectively 76 and 
roughly 67 in Norway and Denmark, cf. section 4.3 this chapter. Measured as a proportion of 
employment 9 per cent of men in Norway and Denmark hold part-time employment as 
                                                 
21 The actual retirement age is below the standard age of retirement in both Norway and Denmark, cf. ch. V 
section 3.  In addition a high percentage of the population aged 25-64 has attained at least upper secondary 
education. In 2002 the OECD-average is 64 per cent, compared to 80 in Denmark and 85 in Norway, the latter 
figuring 2000 (OECD, 2002a).      
22 In 2000 more women than men completed higher education, i.e. at university or university college level in 14 
out of 30 OECD-countries, the Nordic countries included (SSB, 2002a). In Norway 29 per cent of women aged 
25-54 had minimum three years higher education.  This is equivalent to Danish figures for 2001 (SSB, 2002b).     
23 Defined as working less than 30 hours per week in their main job, data including only person declaring usual 
hours (OECD, 2002f:319). 
compared to approximately 32 per cent women in Norway and 21 per cent women in 
Denmark24 (OECD, 2002f:319).  
 
4.0 Consequences of Demographic Trends  
The scenario pictured above, with a smaller share of the total population in employment and 
increased dependence ratios, indicates what to expect ahead if no political action is taken. It 
goes without saying that the demographic development may have far-reaching consequences 
socially and economically and probably politically.  
 
4.1 Increasing Dependency Ratios 
The progressively increasing proportional share of elderly within the population will 
inevitably result in a greater number of people in older age groups being dependent on a fewer 
number of people in younger age groups who are economically active (OECD, 1992:22).  
 
Today many OECD members25 enjoy so-called “favourable” demographics with the baby 
boomers of working-age supporting relatively fewer retirees (OECD, 1997a:10). Whereas the 
ratio between people in retirement and the number of people of working-age has been even 
better, the situation is expected to worsen in the years to come. According to OECD 
calculations there are currently 3 employees to provide support for every older person, 
compared to 4 in 1960. The number is expected to diminish even further as the share of 
elderly increases, leaving only two employees for each older person by 2030 (OECD, 
1998:11).  
 
OECD estimates that by the 2020s working-age populations in the OECD area are falling 
everywhere with the exceptions of Ireland, Mexico and Turkey (OECD, 1997a:99). The 
general tendency is clear, though each country may experience different falling rates. In 
Norway the annual rate of change in the working-population was 0.5 from 1990 to 2000, just 
below the OECD average 0.7, whereas the annual rate of change in Denmark was even lower 
at 0.2. From 2010 to 2020 and 2020 to 2030 the annual rates of change is projected to –0.2 
                                                 
24 It should be noted that part-time employment as a proportion of total employment is a bit higher in Norway, 20 
per cent, than in Denmark (14.5) and the OECD average (15). 
25 In particular Western European countries. But not all countries had a marked “baby boom” after the second 
work war, which makes the use OECD averages as measures of general challenges problematic. Thus I include 
demographic figures for Norway and Denmark as well. 
and –0.4 in Norway and –0.5 and –0.7 in Denmark respectively, whereas the corresponding 
figures for the OECD average is estimated to 0.0 and –0.3 (ibid:100).   
 
As a consequence of the working-age population shrinking faster than the overall population, 
the elderly dependency ratio is increasing (tables 3 and 4). The growth is expected to continue 
with a projected sharp increase after 2010. Between 1990 and 2030 the elderly dependency 
ratio in the OECD as a whole is projected to almost double, from 19 to 38 per cent. In 
Denmark the elderly dependency ratio is estimated to increase from 23 per cent in 1990 to 38 
per cent in 2030, with the corresponding figures for Norway being 25 and 39 per cent 
respectively (ibid:102).  
 
Over the same timeframe the proportion of the very old, i.e. aged 75 and over, is projected to 
almost double from 6 to 10 per cent in the OECD area (table 3). This development is assumed 
to take place in all OECD countries but at various rates. The share of the very old of the total 
population in Norway is estimated to increase from 7 per cent in 1990 to 11 per cent in 2030. 
In Denmark the corresponding figures are 7 per cent in 1990 and 10 per cent in 2030 (ibid).   
 
Table 3. Population sub-groups in per cent of total population. 
 Population aged 65 and 
over 
Population aged 0-14 
and 65 and over 
Population aged 75 and 
over 
 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 
Denmark 15.4 16.4 22.6 32.4 33.9 40.1 6.7 6.6 10.4 
Norway 16.3 15.8 23.0 35.2 34.1 40.6 7.0 7.7 11.2 
Total 
OECD 
12.9 15.6 22.5 33.7 33.6 39.8 5.5 7.0 10.4 
Source: Bos et al. (1994) in OECD, 1997a:101. 
• OECD does not specify whether the total figures are weighted or unweighted, although there may be 
grounds for assuming the former as recent OECD studies on demography generally are weighted. 
 
In addition to the increased elderly dependency ratio, and partly because of it, the total 
dependency26 ratio will increase likewise. As the latter refers to total dependants, i.e. children 
and elderly, to the working-age population, it acknowledges that an increase in elderly 
dependants may be accompanied by a decline in young dependants. Accordingly, the total 
dependency ratio presents a more accurate picture of the actual demographic burden to be 
shouldered by the working-age population compared to the elderly dependency ratio. In the 
OECD area the total dependency ratio on average declined between 1960 and 1990 
                                                 
26 Population aged 0-14 and 65 and over as a percentage of the working-age population. 
whereupon it remained flat at roughly 51 per cent. It is projected that the OECD average will 
rise again after 2010 and exceed 66 per cent in 2030. The pattern in Norway is similar, though 
with slightly higher figures. The total dependency ratio is estimated to increase to 68 per cent 
in 2030, compared to a 54 per cent ratio in 1990 (ibid:102). In Denmark the ratio steadily 
increases from 1990, but with a ratio at “only” 48 per cent in 1990 its starting point is 
somewhat better than its neighbouring Scandinavian country. Nevertheless, Denmark is 
projected to experience a sharp increase after 2010 and reach a total dependency ratio at 67 
per cent in 2030.   
 
Table 4. Dependency and support ratios. 
Elderly dependency ratio Total dependency 
ratio 
Needs-weighted support 
ratio 
 
1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 1990 2010 2030 
Denmark  22.7 24.9 37.7 47.9 51.3 67.0 68.0 66.4 59.2 
Norway 25.2 24.0 38.7 54.4 51.7 68.3 65.3 66.5 58.7 
Total 
OECD 
19.3 23.5 37.7 51.2 50.6 66.4 67.8 67.0 59.5 
Source: Bos et al. (1994) in OECD, 1997a:102. 
• The need-weighted support ratio is the ratio of the working-age population to the total (needs-
weighted) population. In calculating this ratio OECD applies the same weights as Cutler et al. (1990 in 
OECD, 1997a:106), who consider age-specific use of private non-medical consumption, medical care 
and public education and attach an overall weight of 0.72 to people under 20, of 1 to people aged 20-
64 and 1.27 to those aged 65 and over.   
 
The total dependency ratio is by some criticised for not regarding the fact that resources 
respectively spent on a child and on an old person may differ, which the so-called needs-
weighted support ratio takes into consideration. Notwithstanding which ever of the above 
indicators is preferred, the general conclusion remains the same: “the burden on the working 
population will increase significantly in the future” (ibid:103). 
 
4.2 Reduced Growth in Material Living Standards 
If the current trend of ever decreasing numbers of the population being employed progresses 
it may in the end affect the standard of living, which is primarily determined by the goods and 
services produced by the economy. This production depends on the size of the working force 
and its productivity. When the number of the population in employment drops, the remaining 
workers will have to increase their productivity significantly in order to maintain the original 
level of production. The effect of longer working hours and improved technology in order to 
raise the rate of productivity is, however, limited. OECD calculates that if productivity 
continues at its post-1973 average growth rate of 1.5 per cent annually, the decline in the 
labour force participation would mean that the future growth in material living standards will 
be reduced27 from 2010 (OECD, 1998:10).  
 
Once the baby-boom generation reaches the age of retirement, the goods and services 
produced by a relatively smaller working force, will be consumed by themselves and a 
relatively larger number of people not economically active. Consequently, OECD estimates 
that in order to maintain the balance of living standards between people in employment and 
retirement respectively, more income will have to be put aside during working years either 
through individual savings or taxes and contributions (ibid:11). 
   
4.3 The Gender Aspect 
The ageing of society entails a gender aspect as the impacts of ageing trends to a certain 
extent affect women and men differently. Political response and reforms regarding the 
challenges of ageing may thus affect already existent gender differences, notably regarding 
income. If pension reforms take account of gender differences it may be possible to narrow 
gender-based inequalities. On the other hand, if the gender aspect is disregarded, current 
gender bias may not only be maintained but even strengthened. 
 
As previously mentioned, men and women have different patterns of labour force 
participation. The differences may be narrowing as female participation rates are increasing. 
Notwithstanding country specific differences one pattern generally prevails; women still earn 
lower wages (OECD, 1997a:13). As the female share of the labour force has risen, so have 
their wages. Nevertheless, OECD finds that regardless of how the gender gap is measured 
women’s hourly earnings are below male wages, averaging 84 per cent of the latter28. As 
women are generally more likely to work part-time or shorter full-time hours, many women 
would earn less than their male counterparts anyway, even if they were on the same hourly 
rate (OECD, 2002c). The fact that women are more likely to work part-time than men does 
                                                 
27 That is living standards will continue to increase but only by half as much in the decades after 2010 compared 
to preceding decades.  
28 The age gap between men and women in Portugal is only 5 percentage points, whereas the United Kingdom 
has the widest gap with 25 percentage points. OECD finds that countries with higher female employment rates 
also tend to have wider wage gaps. According to OECD this is primarily due to the fact that a higher proportion 
of female employees is low-skilled, i.e. less educated, in countries with high female employment rates, notably 
the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, which causes a wider gender gap in wages 
(OECD, 2002c).  
not necessarily reflect their own wishes. According to OECD labour force statistics the 
majority of involuntary part-time workers29 by total employment in all included countries30 
but one, Turkey, is women. Of the 85,200 involuntary part-time workers in Denmark in 2001, 
65,200 were women, whereas the corresponding figures for Norway were 38,200 out of 
52,40031. 
 
Pension payments are often related to income, contributions and/or previous employment. In 
consequence, lower earnings and lesser labour force attachment may imply that women will 
generally attain lower pensions than men. The fact that women in general earn less than men 
would in my opinion imply that they have lesser opportunities to secure their pensions 
through individual savings. Evidence32 suggests that women are more dependent on all kinds 
of state support, but especially income. To the extent fewer women than men receive 
occupational pensions and/or have individual saving schemes, women will be more dependent 
on public pension income than men. If this is the case women will be more vulnerable than 
men for reduced public pensions, which is one possible response to contain public pension 
expenses as the population ages. 
 
Gender differences also concern the transition from work to retirement and care giving, both 
of which may be related to differences in labour force participation patterns. The rates of 
female employment are increasing, although still relatively small in many countries, but 
women remains the main providers of informal care for family member33. Informal care is 
generally unpaid work, which only in some countries and to a limited extent is granted 
pension rights.   Relatively low employment rates, at least compared to men, and informal 
care giving combined may explain why pension income for women in many countries is 
either low or non-existing (OECD, 1992:29).  
 
As women have longer life expectancy and generally marry men older than themselves, they 
also tend to live alone longer. Hence elderly single person households are predominantly 
female households (ibid:25). In addition, women tend to have longer periods of frailty and 
                                                 
29 Defined as part-time workers working less than 30-usual hours per week because they could not find full-time 
employment.  
30 25 of 30 OECD countries, omitting Germany, Korea, Mexico, United Kingdom and the United States. 
31 Source: OECD online database (OECD, 2003d).  
32Studies of older women in EEC countries (Coopmans, Harrop & Herman-Huiskes, 1989; Harrop, 1990 in 
OECD, 1992:46). 
33 This is not to say that men do not contribute, but the majority of family carers is women. 
poverty near the end of their lives (OECD, 1997a:13). Reduced public pensions would in my 
opinion in particular affect women.  
 
As labour force participation may be related to total pension payments and one of the reasons 
for ageing populations is low fertility rates, I would like to point out that some hypotheses 
link increased female labour force participation with declined fertility. Empirical data from 
the 1980s indicates that the developed (industrialized) countries experiencing the largest 
increase in female labour force participation rates tend to have the largest declines in total 
fertility rates. In the 1990s the changes in both rates have slowed down. Compared with other 
economies and countries34 the pattern is, however, not consistent (Lim, 2002:3-5). Esping-
Andersen, on the other hand, finds that female employment levels are currently positively 
related to fertility35, whereas the relation was negative in 1960. Nevertheless, with regard to 
population ageing he holds the view, reasonably I may add, that if welfare states discourage 
fertility, whether directly or indirectly, they may cut their future financial viability (Esping-
Andersen, 1999:68). It is my opinion that in responding to the ageing trends politicians should 
consider measures to increase labour force participation, particular among women. At first 
glance this may appear to conflict with the aim of increasing fertility to offset ageing. 
However, by promoting family-friendly policies36 to enhance the possibility of combining 
work and family life, both high female labour force participation and high fertility rates may 
be attained37. This view is supported by Esping-Andersen’s study, which indicates that the 
relationship between changes in fertility and female employment will be positive where day 
care and family services or part-time employment are available (ibid:69). To the extent 
adequate day care coverage increases female participation in the labour force, it may also 
increase the overall employment rate. Recent OECD research (OECD, 2003c) indicates that 
the right policy balance between work and family life, i.e. family-friendly policies, will 
benefit society in general by inter alia increase employment and strengthen gender equity.    
 
                                                 
34 Inter alia several of the transition economies, where both rates have fallen and the Asia-Pacific countries, 
which have no clear pattern. 
35 The higher the level of female employment the greater the level of fertility. It should be noted that this 
“deduction” is not necessarily valid beyond the countries included in his study However, he finds the 
Scandinavia countries ranking among the highest fertility levels in Europe and the highest female employment 
rates in OECD, whereas Italy and Spain have the world’s lowest fertility levels and female employment rates 
well below the OECD average (Esping-Andersen, 1999:67)(OECD, 2002f:306).   
36 An OECD study of work and family (OECD, 2003c) includes childcare, child-related leave and tax/benefit 
policies. I would like to add child allowance and granting pension credits for informal care work. 
37 As opposed to “punishing” women pension-wise for bearing and rearing children, which does not strike me as 
the way to improve fertility. 
4.4 Intergenerational Effects 
The ageing of the population will not only affect the various generations, but also their 
interrelations. Such intergenerational changes may take one of two recognised directions. One 
is towards a stabilisation of a new balance in accordance with the changed demography. The 
other may be towards a period of intergenerational tension. Either way the social contract 
among the generations needs to be rethought and updated because it is based on demographic 
and social assumptions that will no longer be valid (OECD, 1997b:12).  
 
4.4.1 The Social Contract 
The social contract among generations is most obvious in the case of education and pension. 
Today everyone contributes to the cost of public education and public pensions regardless of 
whether they themselves or their family members benefit (ibid:26). 
 
The current social contract assumes that the age structure of the population resembles a 
pyramid, implying that there are many people in younger age groups at the base and 
increasingly fewer people in older age groups at the top. Generational relations are mainly 
limited to two generations, parents and children, with more children for the adult generation 
to support. These assumptions may have been sufficiently valid to provide the basis for social 
policies in the 1950s, 1960s and even into the 1970s, but today they are being outdated. In 
many countries the age structure is already beginning to resemble a cylinder rather than a 
pyramid, and there are of yet more parents and grandparents to support fewer number of 
children (ibid:25). The latter is likely to result in an increase of transfers to young people 
inside families.  
  
4.4.2 The Question of Intergenerational Fairness 
The generational contract will also be affected by the fact that it is ultimately the younger 
generation, i.e. those currently under 40 years, who will have to carry the bulk of rising 
pension costs due to population ageing. This raises the question of intergenerational fairness.  
 
According to OECD figures the economic status of older people in many countries has 
generally improved over the past two decades relative to the economically active. This is 
partly due to improved pension benefits and increased coverage and partly due to favourable 
tax treatment (OECD, 1997a:13). On average the wealth position of older people also 
surpasses that of other groups mainly due to the fact that they have had a longer period of 
time in which to accumulate assets. The most important asset for the majority of older people 
is their home and in general more elderly persons tend to own their own homes than non-
elderly households. In contrast to young homeowners, the majority among the elderly home 
owners have paid off their mortgages (OECD, 1992:27).  In addition, many of today’s older 
generation benefited from the increase in property values and the corresponding reduction in 
fixed-interest mortgages in the 1970s and early 1980s (OECD, 1997a:13). Despite wages and 
profits from property and investment, transfers are the major source of income for older 
people in OECD countries, and according to OECD figures a larger number of elderly 
households in OECD countries would be poor if they did not receive benefits (OECD, 
1992:31). The fact remains that even among older age groups some people are living in 
relative poverty, especially the widowed, the divorced and the never-married women.  
 
The younger generation of today also faces disadvantages that rather worsen than improve 
their economical situation as compared to older generations. The combination of attaining 
longer, i.e. higher, education and poor education grants leave graduates with huge debts to 
pay when they (finally) enter the labour market. With rising housing prices, it becomes 
difficult for young people to even enter the housing market not to mention the large down 
payments they face as new homeowners. At times of rising unemployment younger people 
may in particular find it difficult to enter the labour market and/or be among the first to be 
given notice on account of (low) seniority38. This is the reality many young people today are 
facing, the selfsame generation that is likely to shoulder the lion’s share of the burden of 
ageing populations.  
 
The above mentioned aspects have already constituted a relative difference in the economical 
situation between the younger and older generations. As I see it herein lies a latent tension 
embedded, a tension that may be triggered by an unfair allocation of burden between the 
generations and result in a rising intergenerational tension. According to an OECD study 
(1997a:14) there is of yet little evidence to support this view. In my opinion, the establishment 
                                                 
38 In most OECD countries the youth unemployment rate (up to the age of 24) has remained twice or more the 
adult rate (25-54). Previous analyses also suggest that youth employment prospects are particular sensitive to the 
economic cycle and OECD (1996 in OECD, 2002d) found that in percentage-points youth unemployment rates 
tend to rise slightly more than adult unemployment rates during a recession and youth unemployment rates are 
much higher to start with (OECD, 2002d). 
of popular movements advocating senior policies may reflect a future potential for 
intergenerational tension. The DaneAge Association (ÆldreSagen) in Denmark founded in 
1986 and its more recent Norwegian equivalent the Senior Cause (Seniorsaken), formed in 
2002, are both party-political neutral organisations established to ensure the interests of older 
people. The former has currently 435.000 members and one of its main objectives is to act on 
behalf of older people in relation to central and local government and other decision makers 
who may influence the quality of life of older people39. The latter appears more aggressive in 
its campaign. Launched under the motto “we are older, we are stronger, we are dangerous 
[…]” it turns on the age group 25 to 38, accusing it for trying to diminish the role and 
influence of people aged 50+. Addressing in particularly people over 50, it generally intends 
to pursue “the good life” (Bergens Tidende, 2002ab). In contrast one of the objectives of 
Norsk Pensjonistforbund (NPF), The Norwegian Association of Pensioners, is security and 
solidarity between generations. For over 50 years NPF has acted on the behalf of pensioners, 
cautious of turning groups against each other, under the assumption that aims can only be met 
through collaboration across generations40. With approximately 85,000 contributing members, 
NPF is somewhat smaller than the Danish Associations of Senior Citizens, 
Ældremobilseringen, which comprises five out of six senior citizens’ organisations in 
Denmark and has a total membership of 450,000. Although founded in 1992, several of its 
member organisations date back to 1929. As the DaneAge Associations, its main objective is 
protecting members’ interests vis-à-vis public authorities in matters concerning the elderly41, 
which may conflict with the interests of younger generations.     
 
Ageing and life-course patterns are re-balancing the intergenerational social contract. Thus, 
many existing social programmes are based on demographic and social assumptions that are 
no longer valid. The ageing of the population has barely begun and the heaviest effects will in 
most countries not be felt until after 2010. This presents limited time to implement reforms 
inter alia to ensure a more balanced future distribution of the burden associated with ageing. 
For reforms to be successful it may be essential to build up understanding and support in the 
population at large. 
  
                                                 
39 (ÆldreSagen, 2003). 
40 (Pensjonistforbundet, 2003).  
41 (Ældremobiliseringen, 2003). 
4.5 Pressure on Public Finance 
Due to the fact that governments traditionally have borne a major share of social expenditures, 
public expenditures are expected to grow considerably over the next decades as the pressure 
on social policy and health, education, pension and active labour market programmes is 
expected to increase. Admittedly, as the number of children declines the pressure on public 
spending on education and child benefit will lessen, but this will more or less be matched by 
increasing costs associated with lifelong learning and the care of frail older people. The latter 
is expected to rise in accordance with the increasing rate of very old people. At the same time 
the ageing of the population will place strains on public spending, mainly due to the 
commitments embedded in current public pensions (OECD 1997a:15).  
 
According to OECD estimations public pension accounts in the OECD area will generally go 
into deficit in about ten years time and without reforms the growth of pension costs in most 
OECD countries will be increasingly difficult to handle (OECD, 1998:13). With potentially 
increasing pension costs at hand, it is necessary to examine more closely financing, benefit 
levels and eligibility and incentive structures of existing public arrangements in order to find 
room for improvement and reform. For politicians this may be an unpopular task to undertake 
but nonetheless essential, hence the importance of building public support. 
 
The ageing of the population will also result in changed patterns of savings, investment and 
capital accumulation (OECD, 1997a:14). This is especially the case for national savings, 
which ageing population tend to reduce, and government savings due to the increased 
pressure on spending. Current estimates even suggest that if policies are not changed, we may 
witness a dramatic decline in national savings and some countries may experience net national 
savings to be negative. Although the evidence for private savings is less clear, they are 
anticipated to be lower as well. Combined, these predictions should give reason for concern.   
 
5.0 Public Policy  
Though ageing populations are inevitable, the effects of ageing will to a certain degree depend 
on the allocation of time to work, learning, leisure and the giving and receiving of care by 
people of different ages (ibid:10). Formal education is still concentrated among the young, 
work among people in their middle years and leisure and chronic illness among the old. 
However, changes in the age structure of the population can and are likely to have large 
effects on education, the labour market and on the provision of pension and dependent care. 
We are already witnessing an evolution in the use of time patterns as people stay in school 
longer and retire earlier. It is thus the combined effect of ageing and changing life-course 
arrangements, which is of importance for governmental remedial action and public policy 
(ibid). 
 
5.1 Traditional and Existing Public Policy’s Shortcomings 
The main problem of much of today’s existing public policy is that it does not take the above 
mentioned life cycle and ageing considerations into account. Instead, traditional policies have 
assumed that people pass trough three more or less separate stages of life. Education is 
regarded to be for the young, pensions for the old and jobs and family for those in between, 
i.e. in their middle years. As a consequence of this focus, traditional policies tend to have 
various shortcomings. This is particularly profound in situations where the assumed stability 
in jobs or family is absent and at the main transition points in life, i.e. from school to work 
and work to retirement. The model’s simplicity also disregard certain life stages all together 
as well as the fact that action at different stages of life can re-enforce each other like traps 
related to low skills, low income and marginal jobs (ibid:11). 
 
Admittedly, these shortcomings have been recognised and in many countries reforms are 
either being implemented or are under way. Many of the reforms have one feature in 
common; they encourage a more integrated pattern of work, learning, leisure and care-giving 
over the entire life-course (ibid).  
   
5.2 A New Perspective 
In relation to public policy it is the combined effects of population ageing, individual ageing, 
and active ageing that are of importance. Previously only individual ageing and population 
ageing have been the subjects of study, and though these studies have been helpful in 
uncovering the challenges posed for public policy they have hardly been able to point to 
solutions. This shortcoming is, however, a natural consequence of their focus. It goes without 
saying that public policy can only have a very restricted direct effect on population ageing. 
Even enhanced migration would only make a small difference to the age structure of the 
population. By adding the feature of active ageing, a new perspective has been announced 
which may increase the understanding of how policy should respond. After all, government 
policies already influence the way in which people allocate activities over their lifetime (ibid). 
With an improved understanding it should be possible to develop policies in accordance with 
demographic trends and thus ease the challenges society is and will be facing due to the 
ageing of the population. 
 
Whereas current public policy is often supported by and founded on analysis dealing with 
shorter-term phenomena, the active ageing perspective is well adapted to policy analysis that 
includes a longer-term dimension due to its ageing and life cycle focus. It is further 
anticipated that analysis which takes account of ageing and life cycle considerations should 
lead to more coherent policies and an improved recognition of the fact that what happens on 
one stage of life may impact on other stages as well (ibid). 
 
This new perspective has extended the traditional focus on inequalities associated with earned 
income and tax/transfer systems, to also include matters like intergenerational transmittal of 
wealth and care within the family. We have also witnessed a response from public policy, 
most typically in the form of promoting lifelong learning and flexibility in working life 
arrangements and removing disincentives to flexible patterns of work (ibid:12). 
 
 
 
6.0 Summary 
In many OECD countries the period of “favourable”42 demographics is ending. The baby-
boom generation is reaching the age of retirement whereas the size of the working-age 
population is declining. Due to increased longevity and low births and mortality rates 
populations are ageing. The challenge of ageing populations is complicated by changing life-
course patterns. In general, people are spending increasingly longer time outside than inside 
the labour market due to longer education, unemployment, early retirement and longer life 
expectancy. 
 
OECD countries are facing profound social, financial and political challenges due to 
population ageing, of which the heaviest effects will be felt from 2010, when the proportion 
of people in older age groups rises significantly. As a consequence, the dependency ratio will 
increase and public finance be pressured, especially due to heavy pension expenses. How 
heavy and severe the financial burden of pension benefits will be, depends primarily upon the 
extent and implementation of remedial measures.   
 
OECD stresses the need for political action and outlines seven principles for guiding and 
achieving reform. The principles are recommendations on how to respond to the challenges of 
an ageing population with regards to the overall pension system, the labour market, health 
care and finance and how to diversify risks and burden. The principles recommend direction 
for reform rather than stipulating specific measures, although suggestions are given. The 
OECD principles are presented in the following chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Refers to populations where the baby boomers of working age support relatively fewer retirees (OECD, 
1997a:10). 
III OECD Direction for Reform 
The ageing of the population will affect almost all fields of society, and OECD identifies 
several areas for reform, including pension systems, employment, health care and fiscal 
policies. All in all OECD presents seven principles for guiding and achieving reform, of 
which only some will be directly related to my analysis, notably the first, second and fourth 
principles, which address the pension system, job opportunities and retirement income. 
Regarding transition from work to retirement, employability of older workers and general 
pension arrangements, the current trend of early retirement is of importance, both as cause 
and effect.  
 
The chapter opens with identifying various reasons for early retirement, categorised as push, 
pull and jump factors. In order to counter early labour market exit, the influence of these 
factors must be reduced. This notion is reflected in the OECD view of adopting an “active 
ageing policy” and in the OECD principles, which are presented subsequently. As mentioned, 
my focus will be on the principles addressing the pension system, employability and 
retirement income, which will be further outlined and elaborated. Since the publishing of the 
OECD principles43, the awareness of the fact that the population is ageing has increased, and 
the issue is currently high on the political agenda. Initiatives to obtain a better understanding 
of the challenge at hand have been taken, and in many OECD countries reforms are already 
being implemented or are emerging. The progression of reform related to retirement 
incentives, employability of older workers and retirement income in the OECD area in 
general will briefly be mentioned, with references to topical reforms in Norway and Denmark 
elaborated in chapter VI. The chapter closes with a presentation of the normative foundation I 
find to be reflected in the OECD principles for reform.    
 
1.0 Factors for Early Exit 
In order to respond to the trend of early retirement, the reasons for early exit should be 
identified. Whether the decision of early exit is based on a rational individual choice or is a 
result of structural constraints, would affect how to address and counteract this behaviour. The 
factors recognised to influence exit behaviour are commonly categorised into push, pull and 
jump factors (Solem & Øverbye, 2002:3).  
 
                                                 
43 In the OECD report “Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society”(1998). 
Push factors are work-related and address conditions like poor working environments, 
structural unemployment, circumstances that may reduce the work ability of older workers 
and negative attitudes and informal policies towards older workers. These are all factors that 
can push the individual toward early retirement where this is an option. However, once the 
consequences of the beforementioned conditions are recognised, policy measures directed to 
reduce the influence of push factors can be implemented. Accordingly, such measures should 
include improved working conditions, subsidies or tax exempts for employers recruiting or 
retraining older workers, the removal of any disincentives for employers to either recruit or 
retrain older workers and an improvement of older workers’ work ability per se (ibid). 
 
Pull factors on the other hand address conditions outside work, which are pulling towards 
early retirement. Favourable pension arrangements, like pre-retirement and 
anticipatory/disability pension schemes, is probably the most important pull factor. The 
former includes the AFP-scheme in Norway and the post employment wage scheme in 
Denmark. The Norwegian scheme is a negotiated agreement44, not a public legislated 
arrangement like the Danish post employment wage. Nevertheless it is partly state-funded and 
“approved” by government. Generous disability pension schemes with relaxed terms of entry 
which may not facilitate combining work and pension, would be another pull factor. Policy 
measures tightening eligibility rules or lowering benefit levels, granting higher pension if 
retirement is postponed or implementing rules that favour combining work with pension 
would limit the influence of pull factors (Solem & Øverbye, 2002:3). 
 
Jump factors relate to individual choice and indicate a preference to leave work for something 
considered more attractive, like leisure activities, voluntary work, education or spending more 
time with one’s family. The main difference between jump factors and pull and push factors is 
that the former to a greater extent emphasise the individual aspect, recognising that individual 
preferences and choices may be more or less unaffected by present structural incentives45 
(ibid:3). Surveys of older workers and younger retirees imply that a large proportion of 
workers aged 55 to 64 who leave their last job for full time leisure actually do so voluntarily 
(OECD, 1998:42). Policy measures aimed at reducing the influence of jump factors are more 
or less the same as for push and pull factors. Measures to increase the attractiveness of work 
                                                 
44 Based on negotiations between employers and employees. 
45 Hence, the effect or success of policy measures aimed at reducing the influence of jump factors is by definition 
limited.  
would include tightening eligibility rules or reducing benefits, as well as improving working 
conditions. In addition, implementing more favourable tax rules and/or improving the 
possibilities for combining work and retirement, may enhance the attractiveness of combining 
part-time work with partial retirement, rather than opting for full time leisure (Solem & 
Øverbye, 2002:3). 
 
The focus of attention in this thesis is primarily the pension system and how governments try 
to reverse the trend of early retirement and facilitate continued employment after a certain age 
in response to the challenges of ageing populations. It is the policy measures aimed at 
reducing the influence of the above factors I am interested in, rather than the respective 
factors per se. In my case study of Norway and Denmark, I will examine their respective 
pension arrangements and the extent they facilitate current exit behaviour.         
     
In order to maintain labour force participation rates the impact of push, pull and jump factors 
should be diminished. Reducing push-factors would imply improving the working 
environment and employment conditions for (older) workers. In order to decrease the impacts 
of pull factors the overall pension system should be addressed, existing disincentives to 
employment after a certain age removed and incentives to prolonged employment46 enhanced. 
These measures could increase the willingness of older workers to not only remain in but also 
prolong their employment. The OECD recommendations can be considered a mixture of 
measures aimed at reducing the influence of push, pull and jump factors47. I will in the 
following address anti-push policies with regards to employability and a more inclusive 
labour market, but my main focus is pension schemes and initiatives for reducing pull factors.   
 
1.1 Falling Retirement Ages 
OECD emphasises that if people work longer, the material standards of living as well as the 
tax base, which usually finances public pension systems, would be higher (OECD, 1998:14). 
Nevertheless, the number of people opting for early retirement is increasing. In both Norway 
and Denmark the average retirement age is below the standard age of retirement by roughly 4-
748 and 5 years respectively (cf. ch. V). A rising demand for more leisure and a history of high 
                                                 
46 Continue in employment after reaching the standard age of retirement. 
47 It should be noted that the OECD (1998) does not employ the terms push, pull and jump factors.  
48 Depending on the age groups included; by 4 if only counting pensioners over 50, by 7 if young pensioners are 
included.  
and persistent unemployment may have contributed to this tendency. However, there is no 
denying that current public pension and social systems as well as tax systems, separately and 
in interaction, often discourage workers to remain in employment until as well as beyond 
retirement age. As pension incomes on early retirement tend to be higher than they would be 
on an actuarially neutral basis, the attractiveness of early exit should come as no surprise 
(ibid:43). Funded or quasi-funded schemes may also facilitate retirement by allowing early 
retirement and offering little if any additional private pension benefits accruing after the 
“standard” retirement age. All aspects which can be classified as pull factors for retirement. 
 
The exit behaviour of self-employed differ from current retirement trends as they in all OECD 
countries tend to retire at significantly later ages than dependent employees (ibid). This 
tendency may be attributable to the fact that self-employed workers are often entitled to lower 
public pensions than employees and have more flexibility in choosing when to retire. In other 
words, self-employed seem less susceptible to the influence of push and pull factors, probably 
because their push factors are weaker and pull factors less attractive. This indicates the utility 
value of implementing measures to reduce the influence of these factors and thereby also the 
incentives to (early) retirement. 
  
Some countries have, directly or indirectly, encouraged early retirement as a mechanism for 
reducing unemployment. In practice this has entailed relaxing entitlement conditions for 
disability- or unemployment-related benefits (ibid). Though these measures have proved 
useful in the past they are about to backfire at the outlook of an ever-decreasing labour force 
because they at present constitute push factors for early exit. 
 
1.2 Public Income-support Systems 
In order to reduce the incentives to early retirement and disincentives to continued 
employment other public income-support systems besides the national old-age pension should 
be addressed as well. Today many public transfer programmes allow older workers to 
withdraw from the labour force before the standard age of retirement. Not necessarily their 
original purpose in theory, it has become their effect in practice. The importance of such 
programmes as well as their characteristics vary across countries. With this in mind I will 
briefly address the three main types: disability pension schemes, unemployment-related 
schemes and special early-retirement schemes (ibid:47).  
 Several countries have to some extent used disability programmes to facilitate early 
retirement. As a consequence the proportion of elderly of working age drawing disability 
benefits has risen in most OECD countries at a time when the general health status has 
improved (ibid). Although eligibility is based on labour market and medical criteria, empirical 
evidence implies that access is more readily granted when unemployment is either high or 
rising. In addition there seems to be an acceptance for easing conditionality for older workers 
who are approaching the standard retirement age, e.g. in Scandinavia eligibility criteria for 
disability pension have traditionally been laxer for older workers (Øverbye, 1997:12).     
 
According to OECD (1998:48) more than half of OECD countries permit drawing 
unemployment benefit from the age of 55 to the age of retirement. In principle, this is 
facilitated either by the fact that there is no time limit for such benefits or because there exists 
special arrangements for older workers. Job-search requirements may for instance be less 
strictly applied to older workers, as in Denmark. Other countries may permit long-term 
unemployed to access old-age pension at an early age. Relaxed entitlement conditions 
accompanied by generous benefit levels make labour force exit via unemployment-related 
benefit programmes financially attractive. Analysis confirms that such programmes indeed 
tend to depress labour-force participation of older worker (ibid:49).     
 
OECD considers special early retirement schemes, originally intended to facilitate early 
withdrawal from the labour market at times of high unemployment rates, to be of significance 
in a few countries only, e.g. the post employment wage in Denmark. Faced with projections of 
an ever-decreasing labour force, the importance of such means to ease the social cost of 
structural changes in the economy is diminishing. It should be noted that OECD considers it 
possible that such schemes may finance a significant number of early withdrawals in Norway 
in the near future (ibid)49. Denmark, on the other hand, has introduced a post employment 
wage reform50 to decrease the number of participants in the long run, as it over the years had 
become the most dominant path to early retirement for workers over 60  (Bingely et al., 
2001:17).      
 
                                                 
49 OECD does not give grounds for this assumption. I do, however, consider it likely that the introduction and 
the expansion of the pre-retirement arrangement AFP, cf. ch. V, Norway section 3.1, have strengthened 
incentives to early retirement in Norway, which may result in increased pre-retirement rates. 
50 The reform is outlined in ch. V. 
1.3 Active Ageing Policy 
In meeting the challenges of an ageing population, OECD encourages an “active ageing” 
policy. An active ageing policy would imply a higher degree of flexibility in how individuals 
and families allocate their time spent in work, in learning and school and leisure (OECD, 
1998:14). There are several ways public policy can foster such “active ageing”. One is 
removing any potential constraints on life-course flexibility. By ensuring lifelong learning and 
more flexible work-retirement transitions, the range of options available to the individual will 
be widened. Thus, an active ageing policy is consistent with policy measures aimed at 
reducing the influence of push, pull and jump factors. An active ageing policy may counteract 
the tendency of increasing passivity in the labour market and other domains of life as people 
grow older. After all, “there is no biological reason for terminating work in people’s 60s” 
(ibid:83). Active ageing reforms should remove any undesirable constraints on life-course 
flexibility, whether related to health, physics, inflexibility in the work place or public policy, 
and strengthen support to individuals in making lifetime choices. Implementing active ageing 
policies would not only benefit the individual, but society too, especially in the longer run. 
 
An active ageing policy promotes activity of older people in the labour market as well as in 
the broader community. Apparently, how people spend their older years is to a certain extent 
set by how they spend their working years. In other words, focus should be on patterns of 
work and leisure over the course of life rather than on older years only (OECD, 2000:103).  
This would imply that initiatives supporting an active role for older people in the community 
should address people at all ages rather than target older people in particular, as initiatives 
may be more likely to succeed if they influence people’s behaviour before they retire.   
 
2.0 OECD Principles for Reform 
By request at the ministerial meeting in 1996, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development initiated a thorough analysis of the challenges its member countries will be 
facing due to ageing populations. Its work led to the publishing of the OECD report 
”Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society” in 1998. The ageing of the population is well 
documented both for individual countries and for the OECD as a whole, as are their 
challenges described in the previous chapter. The report stresses the need for action, i.e. 
initiating and implementing reform, at an early stage as it finds that if postponed, the reforms 
will end up more severe and difficult than necessary.   
 OECD identifies seven principles for guiding and achieving reform: 
 
1. “Public pension systems, taxation systems and social transfer programmes should be 
reformed to remove financial incentives to early retirement, and financial disincentives to 
later retirement.  
2. A variety of reforms will be needed to ensure that more job opportunities are available for 
older workers and that they are equipped with the necessary skills and competences to 
take them. 
3. Fiscal consolidation should be pursued, and public debt burdens should be reduced. This 
could involve phased reductions in public pension benefits and anticipatory hikes in 
contribution. 
4. Retirement income should be provided by a mix of tax- and transfer systems, funded 
systems, private savings and earnings. The objective is risk diversification, a better 
balance of burden-sharing between generations, and to give individuals more flexibility 
over their retirement decision. 
5. In health and long-term care, there should be a greater focus on cost-effectiveness. 
Medical expenditure and research should be increasingly directed to ways of reducing 
physical dependence, and explicit policies for providing care to frail older people should 
be developed. 
6. The development of advanced-funded pension systems should go hand-in-hand with that 
of strengthening the financial market infrastructure, including the establishment of a 
modern and effective regulatory framework.  
7. Strategic frameworks should be put in place at the national level now in order to 
harmonise these ageing reforms over time, and to ensure adequate attention to 
implementation and the build-up of public understanding and support” (OECD, 1998:18).  
 
The follow-up report “Reforms for an Ageing Society”, published in 2000, concludes inter 
alia that current policy reforms in accordance with the above principles could have large 
effects on the future institution of retirement and its finances. The report also recognises that 
major changes are already underway, at least in some member countries and looks further 
ahead towards the next steps that need to be addressed. Where both reports start off assessing 
policy reforms at the national level, the latter finishes off by advocating initiatives at the 
international level as well.  
 OECD stresses that the change in the institution of retirement itself should be the focus of 
further monitoring and sharing of experiences, as this is where current reforms are supposed 
to have their greatest impact. Consequently, the financing and duration of retirement, the 
work-retirement transition as well as the health, social and economical well-being of 
pensioners and their contribution to the economy and society at large will come under 
scrutiny. As OECD finds that reforms are either taking place or are on their way in many 
OECD countries, it recommends that emphasis now be put on managing and sustaining 
reform. At an international level this could be achieved by focusing on disaggregated policy 
analyses, analyses of reform, monitoring, data gathering and applied research (OECD, 
1998:18). 
 
2.1 Incentives to Retirement 
1) Public pension systems, taxation systems and social transfer programmes should be 
reformed to remove financial incentives to early retirement, and financial disincentives to 
later retirement. 
 
Several studies find that old-age pension systems in practically all OECD countries 
discourage work at older ages (OECD, 1998:43). In actuarially neutral systems the expected 
pension wealth51 would be independent of age. This is rarely the case in actual pension 
systems of today. Instead expected pension wealth usually falls with continued work after a 
certain age, producing another pull factor for retirement. Even private occupational schemes 
tend to discourage continued employment for older workers by not increasing eventual 
benefits of working beyond pension age (ibid:46). On the other hand, workers may change 
jobs and thereby accrue rights elsewhere. Occupational schemes need to be regulated in order 
to remove or weaken any incentives to early retirement. 
 
OECD considers the standard age of eligibility to only modestly effect the actual retirement 
age, and neither expects nor envisages the actual retirement age to rise by as much as any 
increase in the standard retirement age. After all, the majority of workers in most member 
countries have left the labour force well before the standard age of retirement (ibid:44). 
Interestingly, evidence suggests that the standard age of entitlement may actually constitute a 
                                                 
51 Defined as “the discounted value of pension benefits less the cost of obtaining them”(ibid:44). 
barrier to continued employment after pensionable age52. Rising the minimum eligibility age 
may have stronger effects than rising the standard retirement age (ibid). The receipt of early 
pension is often conditional on withdrawal from the labour market. In addition, continued 
employment beyond the minimum age is rarely accompanied with corresponding pension 
gains, although early pension access may result in actuarial reductions. Raising the minimum 
age for pension entitlements may reduce the influence of pull factors and hence influence 
actual retirement ages. This presupposes that other early-retirement paths are foreclosed as 
well. 
 
OECD analysis (ibid:45) suggests that the pension level has little impact on the retirement 
decision of older workers. Hence, reducing the size of pension benefits will not necessarily 
induce future retirees to remain longer in the work force53. Though OECD in part disregards 
the influence of pension levels, it emphasises the importance of pension accrual rates . In most 
countries rights accrue steadily until a maximum number of years of contributions have been 
attained54, after which there is no further increase in eventual pension rights. Relating pension 
accrual rights to employment and contributions throughout working life55 may increase the 
incentives for older workers to remain in employment.  
   
                                                 
52 The opportunity cost of continuing in employment after pensionable age is often very high. Pension systems 
rarely encourage continued employment, some countries even have a statutory ban on combining work with 
pension payments. And in countries where pensions and employment in principle can be combined, the receipt 
of old-age pension is often conditional on leaving current employment (ibid:44).  
53 On the other hand, reducing pension benefits is one alternative for easing the financial burden of larger cohorts 
of pensioners.  
54 In both Norway and Denmark an insurance period of 40 years is required to attain full basic pension. In order 
to receive full supplementary pension in Norway, 40 years in employment is the criterion and prolonged 
employment is not credited further.  
55 E.g. the Swedish pension system reform of1999, introduced contribution-defined pensions based on life-
savings (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:98). 
2.1.1 OECD Recommendations 
In the longer term, OECD advocates the necessity of increasing the effective retirement age  
(ibid:19). This would not only increase the length of time in which contributions can be made, 
but also reduce expenditures. Increasing the standard age of retirement cannot alone, if at all, 
slow or reverse the trend towards ever-longer periods of time spent in retirement. This 
assumption is supported by the fact that the actual retirement age is currently lower than the 
public age of full retirement. Public pension systems interact with other social transfer 
programmes, and hence an increase in the entitlement age will per se not necessarily 
countervail incentives to early retirement present in other transfer programmes. Multiple 
reforms are needed and should according to OECD include: 
 
-“Increasing length of the contribution period for full benefit and generally linking life-time 
benefits and contribution. At a minimum, benefits should continue to accrue with every year 
that is worked. 
 
-Removing pension earnings rules and other penalties for working later. 
 
-Increasing the average age of entitlement to full pension[…] Increasing the lower age limit 
for early entitlement. 
 
-Moving strongly in the direction of actuarial neutrality of pension benefits for people who 
retire earlier or later than the standard age. 
 
-Aligning more closely early retirement ages in occupational pensions and public old-age 
pension systems where the private and social costs and benefits associated with earlier 
retirement differ. 
 
-Phasing out programmes that encourage early retirement for labour market reasons. 
 
-Phasing out preferential treatment for older people in disability, unemployment insurance 
and other social programmes, i.e. ending their role as quasi early-retirement programmes” 
(OECD, 1998:20). 
 
2.1.2 Reform Trends Affecting Retirement Incentives 
In the next decades the number of workers making pension contributions will shrink 
compared to the number of retirees drawing pension benefits, with subsequent negative 
financial and social consequences. The overall situation can be improved by taking measures 
to reverse the trend of early retirement, which many OECD countries currently are 
undertaking. Work incentives in pensions are being strengthened and disability insurance 
closed down or restricted. Denmark offers a premium for workers eligible for post 
employment wage, who postpone entry beyond the age of 62 (cf. ch. VI). 
 
Whereas new pathways to retirement, notably gradual transitions from work to retirement, are 
being adapted, current early retirement schemes are restricted. This is reflected in Denmark 
where access to the so-called transitional allowance scheme, addressing the long-term 
unemployed aged 50-59, was closed for new entrants in 1996. As this decision will not affect 
current recipients, who will continue to receive allowance until they turn 60, it will not phase 
out until 2006. In Norway the government collaborates with labour market partners in order to 
tighten the early retirement scheme, ATP, of which among other changes the rules for part-
time pensioners have been restricted (OECD, 2000:21). Committees evaluating the feature of 
early retirement have been appointed and proposals for restricting current paths to early exit 
have been submitted, e.g. NOU 1994:2 (cf. ch. VI). 
 
Policies to encourage later and in some cases more gradual transitions from work to 
retirement still remain. Evidence implies that the recent trend of ever-earlier retirement may 
have come to a halt in most OECD countries, but rarely indicates a shift towards later 
retirement or a more flexible retirement transition (ibid:87). On the other hand, OECD 
recognises that it may suffice to remove disincentives to continued employment after the 
standard age of retirement, making provision of incentives to positively encourage working 
longer unnecessary. In fact, the so-called “first-wave” reforms are expected to significantly 
slow the current trend of ever-longer retirement, and in some countries even reverse them 
(ibid:13).  
 
2.2 Employability 
2) A variety of reforms will be needed to ensure that more job opportunities are available for 
older workers and that they are equipped with the necessary skills and competencies. 
 
The aim of the former principle of increasing the willingness of older worker to remain in 
employment rather than opting out has to be matched by a sufficient number of job 
opportunities for older workers (OECD, 1998:14). This would include a retraining of older 
workers, as well as a change in attitudes of firms towards hiring older workers and 
recognising their potential and experience.   
 
Today older job losers often face serious difficulties in re-entering the labour market, and for 
many the loss of a job equals long-term unemployment. According to OECD the present 
employment problems of older workers may arise from relative low levels of foundation 
skills, notably literacy and numeracy, as they generally had less opportunity to undertake 
formal education than today’s youth (ibid:85). Any skill disadvantage of older people should 
be reduced as new cohorts of older workers have better skills. Nevertheless, some jobs require 
skills that may diminish or deteriorate with age, like motor skills, and thus cause older 
workers the loss of a job. This may be counteracted by increasing the opportunity for people 
to change careers in mid-life, ensuring that older workers could transfer to occupations where 
the required skills are either unaffected or enhanced by age, notably communication skills and 
experience.  
 
OECD stresses a pro-active approach, advocating the need for adjusting career structures and 
options at all ages. The emphasis should be on the skill base with which workers enter the 
later stages of their careers, rather than initiate remedial training after employment problems 
have occurred (ibid:89). This approach presupposes the existence of learning opportunities 
and adaptable workplaces. 
 
Employment problems of older workers may to some extent result from age discrimination 
among employers as well as unwillingness on behalf of older workers to take lower-paid jobs. 
However, current evidence is ambivalent. Although surveys indicate that people believe age 
discrimination exists and favour anti-age discrimination legislation, experience from countries 
with such legislation implies that their direct effect is limited (ibid:88).  
 An enhancement of the employment opportunities of older workers should according to 
OECD be addressed within the overall labour market conditions (ibid:89). The concern at 
present is a lack of demand of workers in general rather than older workers in particular. If 
unemployment is high and persistent, it will be difficult to employ an increasing labour supply 
of older workers. Without undermining the necessity of ensuring the employment 
opportunities and skills of older workers, it is important to develop and employ reforms that 
can attain high levels of employment and labour market adaptability56.  
 
2.2.1 OECD Recommendations 
According to OECD two aspects are relevant in enhancing job opportunities for older 
workers, namely the overall demand for labour and special factors that disfavour older 
workers’ employment opportunities. It advocates that the general directions for reform 
include: 
 
-“Increasing the priority to lifelong learning for all – the operational means of investing in 
human capital.  
 
-Increasing labour market information, including that related to means of achieving 
employability for longer working lives. 
 
-Providing comparable information to support retirees in playing a more active role in the 
economy and society. 
 
-Developing effective Active Labour Market Programming to help older workers find new 
jobs. 
 
-Removing discrimination against hiring older workers. 
 
                                                 
56 In the following only the former, i.e. reforms ensuring the employment opportunities of older workers, will be 
addressed further. 
-Maintaining and increasing action in response to OECD Job Strategy recommendations, 
which will contribute to the overall health of the labour market, including that for older 
workers” (OECD, 1998:20). 
 
2.2.2 Reforms Enhancing the Employability of Older Workers 
In my opinion, the employability of older workers should be addressed before attention is 
directed to work incentives and disincentives, as their employability (or lack thereof) may in 
some cases per se constitute push factors. As it were, this could diminish any affects of 
removing work disincentives embedded in the pension system and/or the strengthening of 
work incentives. If older workers do not posses the required skills, there are few jobs 
available in general and/or for older workers in particular57, how can pension reforms increase 
the employment of older workers be effective in practise? Employers may be reluctant to hire 
older people, either due to general prejudice or prejudicial regulations that increase the costs 
of employees in proportion to age. A disfavouring labour market may be as important, or even 
more, for the individual worker’s retirement decision as pension schemes’ 
incentives/disincentives to work. To the extent employability is influenced by demand, the 
success of ageing reforms will depend upon the overall unemployment situation. There is a 
relation between the labour force participation rate for people over the age of 55, and the 
extent employability of older workers is seen as a policy priority58 (OECD, 2000:25). I 
question how initiatives to strengthen work incentives can be successful, if the rate of 
unemployment generally is high and older workers experience a reluctant labour market.   
 
Various measures are directed to enhance the employability of older workers, but on balance 
most reforms address the removal of work disincentives rather than the employability of older 
workers per se (ibid). However, the Danish government initiated a Senior Policy Initiative 
Committee in 1997 to ensure that the labour force participation rate of older workers is 
maintained and measures to help older people find new employment were, i.e. Senior Jobs 
and “flex jobs”, were adopted. The former provide older long-term unemployed a foothold in 
the labour market through targeted subsidies, whereas the latter are created on special terms 
by the government as a means to integrate weaker groups. In addition efforts have been made 
to re-integrate long-time sick leave recipients into the labour market. 
                                                 
57 For instance jobs that may facilitate physical fatigue or a need for working reduced hours.  
58 Analysis of national questionnaires indicates that countries with low participation rates of older workers tend 
to identify their employability as a particularly important challenge for policy (ibid).  
 Lifelong learning is a central policy in attaining a workplace for all ages. Several countries, 
Norway included, has implemented special reform in the education system addressing adult 
education (ibid:31).        
 
2.3 Retirement Income   
3) Retirement income should be provided by a mix of tax- and transfer systems, funded 
systems, private savings and earnings. The objective is risk diversification, a better 
balance of burden-sharing between the generations, and to give individuals more 
flexibility over their retirement decision.  
 
If the structure of retirement income is not reformed, public pension accounts in most member 
countries will go into deficit in about ten years time (OECD, 1998:13). OECD recognises that 
existing public pensions systems, usually financed by payroll taxes, are likely to remain the 
major source of income for pensioners, but it stresses the need to take other resources into 
account as well, like private pensions, earnings and assets. Such reforms necessitate the 
establishment of a sound regulatory framework for private pension funds, including 
occupational pension schemes. If implemented, these reforms would probably attract greatest 
response from middle and high-income earners, as a way of supplementing their public 
pension. Were middle and high-income earners to receive most of their retirement income 
from sources beyond public pension, they may prove reluctant to contribute to the 
maintenance of public pensions. An income gap between retirees with public pensions only 
and retirees with additional income sources may progress and develop. Hence, the importance 
of implementing reforms with enough warning and timeframe to allow people to adjust to the 
new conditions. There are limits to how soon such reforms can be implemented due to inter-
generational equity consideration as current workers will be “paying twice”, both for the 
pensions of current retirees as well as their own pension funds (ibid).   
 
OECD emphasises the necessity of combating poverty among older people, as this is a central 
goal, as well as an indication of success, of pension policy. The economic position of older 
people has been improving in most countries, and it is considered unlikely that recent reforms 
will negate these gains. The economic situation of older people in general is stable or 
improving, both absolutely and in relation to the rest of the population, but poverty in old age 
remains to be eliminated in OECD countries (OECD, 2000:56). OECD infers that current 
reforms, even those reducing the overall generosity of public pensions, will not necessarily 
weaken the position of low-income groups if reforms especially assert low-income groups, 
single elderly and women in particular, as well as ensure that the progress of recent decades is 
not being undermined (ibid:59). 
 
Public pay-as-you-go pension systems must according to OECD probably reduce their current 
generosity if their future sustainability is to be maintained. Lowering public pension 
replacement rates will most likely not affect the majority of retirees significantly, as 
international studies imply that the living standards of older people do not depend directly on 
the generosity of public pensions (OECD, 1998:51). For many the standard of living actually 
rises when they retire, but maybe more importantly, for most it does not drop. In fact, the 
income of older people has been growing relative to the rest of the population in most 
member countries, and if current trends continue, the average income of older people may 
exceed that for the general population in a number of OECD countries (ibid:56-59). 
Admittedly, the level of public pension is still critical for low-income households, notably low 
earners and people with marginal attachment to the labour force. A lowering of public pension 
levels may have to be accompanied by greater targeting, e.g. by stipulating high floors and 
low ceilings on pensions, features already common in pay-as-you-go schemes (ibid:60).    
 
A lowering of public pension implies placing greater reliance on other “pillars” beside the 
public pension system, notably private pensions like labour market and individual pension 
schemes. However, increasing the reliance on private pension schemes calls for adequate 
regulatory framework including inter alia non-discriminatory access to pension schemes. It 
may also necessitate making some minimum contributions to advance-funded private pension 
schemes mandatory. Alternatively, pay-as-you-go systems can shift their benefits to a 
defined-contribution basis, and thereby mimick some of the features of advance-funding. It 
should be noted that defined-contribution plans entail transferring risks to individuals 
(ibid:61). 
 
OECD envisages a future retirement income system consisting of a mixture of “pay-as-you-go 
and advance-funded, defined-benefit and defined-contribution, public and private, mandatory 
and voluntary, saving and earning” elements (ibid:62). Due to demographic and fiscal 
pressures the second element in each pair are expected to play a larger role in the coming 
years, which may ensure an overall better balance between individual and collective 
responsibilities.  
 
Basically, OECD advocates a pension system with comprehensive coverage, sustainable 
financing and a mix of public and private components, what OECD refers to as a “modern” 
pension model59, as opposed to systems that “over-rely” on a single pillar, notably a large 
pay-as-you-go public pension (OECD, 2000:46). OECD generally favours a strengthening of 
private pensions as this is supposed to not only create more balanced pension systems, but 
also compensate for declines in the size of public pensions. Reform trends in some OECD 
countries are moving beyond policies that only focus on pensions and may for instance 
include the role of taxation and public transfers related to health and long-term care. From this 
may be gathered that policies should focus on the range of resources that support older 
people, rather than pensions alone (ibid:47). 
 
2.3.1 OECD Recommendations 
OECD recognises that there are no “one-size-fits-all” when it comes to pension reforms due 
to country specific differences. Countries will choose different routes because their starting-
points differ and, I might add, because values and preferences presumedly differ. 
Nevertheless, OECD emphasises moving in the following directions: 
 
-“Increasing the size of advanced-funded elements in countries where pay-as-you-go systems 
now dominate” (OECD, 1998:22). This could include increasing advance-funded elements 
within public plans, encouraging advanced-funded occupational schemes, introducing 
mandatory individual accounts, reducing benefit levels in pay-as-you-go public plans in order 
to make room for other sources of retirement income, or some combination of the above. 
 
-“Reducing the size of public pension benefits where these are now unnecessary high” (ibid). 
OECD stresses that public pensions should only aim at meeting poverty alleviation goals60. 
Once these have been met the individual retirement income should reflect individual choice 
                                                 
59Whether intended or not, the use of the term “modern” indicates in my opinion a stand that other systems, 
notably pay-as-you-go and systems entailing many uncoordinated elements and large gaps in coverage, are 
outdated or less developed.     
60 Ch. IV addresses the somewhat higher ambitions of the Scandinavian welfare states, cf. the principle of 
generosity.  
based on all available resources on retirement, and not public pension alone. Hence earnings, 
private savings or the use of assets like reverse-mortgages for housing should be included. 
 
-“Adjusting earnings-related pensions so that there is a direct link between life-time benefits 
and contributions in those countries where this is not yet the case” (ibid). Within pay-as-you-
go systems this could include calculating benefits or shifting to defined-contribution, and 
generally encouraging the use of advanced-funded accounts by individuals and private sector 
employers. 
 
-“Providing significant voluntary and mandatory elements in earnings-related pensions” 
(ibid). 
 
-“Funding pensions aimed at anti-poverty objectives out of general revenues” (ibid), where 
this is not already the case. 
 
-“Separating out the anti-poverty and income-replacement elements of public pension into 
different programmes” (ibid). The respective programmes should have their own objectives 
and characteristics and should be a long-run target. 
 
-“Targeting in anti-poverty programmes” (ibid) by employing means that operate 
unobtrusively and at a low cost, notably refundable tax credits. It should, nevertheless, be 
admitted that a low basic minimum also has merits as it entails fewer work disincentives. 
 
-“Abolishing pension benefit arrangements that are obsolete or inconsistent with stated policy 
objectives” (ibid) by inter alia subjecting pensions to income tax and either phase out or target 
subsidised privileges for seniors like various public senior discounts. A reduction of excessive 
preferential tax treatment for occupational pensions and individual pension arrangements61 is 
also suggested. 
                                            
-“Maintaining the confidence of both beneficiaries and the public at large in private pension 
schemes by upgrading the regulatory framework” (ibid). It should safeguard non-
                                                 
61 In my opinion this recommendation appears to be inconsistent with the OECD policy of a mutli-pillar pension 
system as preferential tax treatment may constitute incentives to private pension participation, which could 
enhance the importance of labour market and individual pensions. On the other hand I realize that it may comply 
with the notion of subjecting pensions in general to (income) tax as it would increase general tax revenues.     
discriminatory access to pension schemes, the protection of vested rights, as well as the 
transferability of pension rights.   
    
2.3.2 Retirement Income Reform 
Several OECD countries are currently reforming their retirement income systems by 
increasing contribution rates, reducing benefit levels and rising the effective age of retirement. 
According to OECD assessments these reforms have so far only modestly reduced 
disincentives to work after a certain age (ibid:51).  
  
In Norway proposals for introducing actuarially early pensions and actuarially increased 
postponed pensions have been motioned and a Pension Commission is appointed to address 
the future pension system. In Denmark several reforms restructuring the pension system have 
been introduced, and labour market pensions and the ATP schemes have become more 
prevalent (cf. ch. VI).  
 
OECD concludes that a rapid evolution towards a more diversified, multiple-pillar system of 
pension provision for older people is progressing. As of yet empirical evidence do not indicate 
any convergence towards a common model, although current reforms seem to reflect certain 
common objectives that comply with OECD recommendations. 
 
2.4 The Normative Foundation of OECD Recommendations 
OECD does not directly advocate distinct normative principles, but its recommendations seem 
to reflect certain underlying values. Below I will in general comment the normative values I 
find embedded in the OECD recommendations and some of their implications. In the 
following chapter, to which references are made, these values are compared with the 
principles of the Scandinavian welfare state.  
 
OECD recommends increasing the role of second and third pillars, i.e. occupational and 
individual pension schemes, to attain a sustainable pension system as the population ages. 
Occupational and individual pensions are savings-based schemes and are as such not as 
exposed to demographic changes as pay-as-you-go systems62. On the other hand, funded 
                                                 
62 Cf. (OECD, 1998:56), (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a,p.2).   
schemes are vulnerable to financial market developments and may default at the expense of 
the individual (OECD, 1998:56,61). Private pension schemes entail transferring risk, which in 
public schemes is often shouldered by the state or the collective community, to individuals. 
The OECD principles thus seem to emphasise individualism rather than collectivism, and 
individual responsibility compared to public responsibility. In my opinion this could 
undermine public support for the public pension system and the Scandinavian welfare state, 
which is characterised by its emphasis on public responsibility (cf. section 3.2 ch. IV). To the 
extent private pension provision63 diminishes the role of the state as (main) provider of 
pensions, public support for the latter may decrease as reluctance towards contributing to 
benefits of minor personal relevance64 surfaces and/or increases. It is also possible that 
individualism begets individualism, i.e. a stress on individuals and individual responsibility 
within pension systems may raise a demand, by politicians and/or segments of the population, 
for increased individualism in other sections of society. Admittedly, OECD does not reject 
public responsibility altogether. It considers eliminating poverty to be a public 
responsibility65, but stresses that individual retirement income otherwise should reflect 
individual choices and basically be the responsibility of the individual. 
    
The OECD principles further reflect a pro-active approach according to which it should 
always pay to work, pension-wise. Benefits should at least continue to accrue with every year 
that is worked and contributions paid, both before and after the standard age of retirement. 
Employees, who nevertheless choose early retirement, should not receive any gain in output 
or material living standards. By introducing actuarial pension benefits and income-related 
pensions based on life-earnings and –savings, early retirement would imply reduced pensions 
whereas postponed retirement would entail increased pension compared to retiring at the 
standard age of retirement. The approach also includes stimulating employment through 
general schemes for attaining high levels of employment and targeted programmes addressing 
older workers in particular. OECD advocates a more inclusive labour market and lifelong 
learning for all.   
 
OECD advocates stricter public pension benefits, both with regards to eligibility and pension 
level, generally linking life-time contributions and benefits and increasing the extent of 
                                                 
63 That is occupational and individual pension arrangements, cf. ch. IV section 3.2.1. 
64 I.e. benefits received are not in proportion to contributions made. 
65 OECD considers combating poverty to be an essential feature of pension policy (cf. section 2.3 this chapter).  
individual pension accounts, measures that may strengthen incentives to work. OECD 
generally recommends increasing elements of targeting in public pension benefits; Public 
pensions should only aim at meeting poverty alleviation goals, and eligibility should therefore 
be means-tested. Per se targeting and means-testing challenge the principle of universality66, 
and the (unknown or immeasurable) “impact” it may have on society, like perhaps enhanced 
spirit of community and collectivism. An “equivalent”67 impact of means-testing may be 
stigmatisation, as it is generally assumed that means-tested benefits may stigmatise recipients, 
compared to universal schemes where everyone benefits. The generosity of means-tested 
benefits may over time decrease if the average voter is reluctant to support benefits of little or 
no personal relevance, particularly if they have to fend their own pensions in addition. If this 
is the case, income and social status inequalities between pensioners of public and private 
pensions may increase, compared to if benefits were universal. I would also like to point out 
that compared to universal benefits, means-tested benefits entail increased bureaucracy, and 
thereby increased administration costs and arbitrary “gate-keeper” decisions.  
 
Decreasing public benefit levels and increasing age of eligibility should reduce public pension 
expenses. OECD advocates increasing the importance of occupational and individual pension 
schemes in order to reduce public pension provision. Although increased private pension 
provision may reduce public expenses, I question whether it would actually reduce the total 
pension expenditures. In my opinion the difference is who shoulders the burden, not the total 
weight of the burden itself. By reducing public pension expenses pension costs are basically 
transferred to individuals more directly through increased personal savings, as opposed to 
indirect general taxation. OECD recommends introducing elements of funding within pay-as-
you-go systems and that defined-contributions rather than defined-benefits be emphasised. In 
my opinion lower public pensions and increased private pension provision may increase 
inequalities among pensioners, particularly regarding income and standard of living. 
Economic disparities during working years will be maintained after retirement as low-income 
earner groups are likely to receive no or low private pensions and hence primarily rely on 
decreased public pensions, whereas high-income earners may attain relatively high private 
pensions (to top of any public old-age pension). Increased private provision at the expense of 
public provision may accordingly challenge the principle of redistribution, embedded in some 
pension systems.  
                                                 
66 According to which public benefits should include the population at large, cf. ch. IV section 3.3. 
67 In the sense that causality may be assumed but not proved. 
  
Whether or not the notions of individuality, limited public pensions, targeting and the pro-
active approach reflected in the OECD principles comply with the normative foundation of 
the Scandinavian welfare state, and the normative values reflected in reform initiatives in 
Norway and Denmark, will be addressed in subsequent chapters.  
 
2.5 Policy Requirements 
OECD (1998:49) indicates that the retirement decision is strongly influenced by policy. In 
other words policy measures should be able to slow or, preferably68, reverse the current trends 
of early retirement. OECD acknowledges that rising the standard retirement age alone is 
unlikely to suffice. To the extent reforms only address the national old-age pension, other 
sources of public transfer income, notably disability pension and unemployment allowance, 
may provide older workers the opportunity of early retirement. Thus, reforms must assure 
consistency and coherence between public and occupational pension schemes respectively as 
well as topical social programmes. As reforms are needed across numerous departments and 
programmes at multiple levels of government, co-ordination is essential. It may also be 
necessary to consider some form of particular political responsibility due to the fact that 
ministerial time is limited (ibid:109). OECD argues that ensuring public support and 
understanding and monitoring the progress of ageing reform strategies will be important for 
achieving reform. OECD further advocates sharing information on results and experience 
across countries, which is partly my intention. 
 
                                                 
68 To which I concur with OECD. 
3.0 Summary 
In meeting the challenges of an ageing population OECD considers it necessary to increase or 
at least maintain the labour force participation rate by raising the actual age of retirement, 
especially as the average age of retirement is currently below the standard retirement age and 
generally falling. Exit behaviour is primarily influenced by push, pull and jump factors, 
relating to work, pension schemes and individual choices respectively. In order to affect the 
trend of pre-retirement, the impact of these factors needs to be diminished by removing work 
disincentives and/or increase incentives to (prolonged) employment. 
 
OECD advocates the need for reform due to individual and population ageing and changing 
life-course patterns. In this respect OECD recommends seven principles for reform, of which 
my main concern primarily is the principles addressing the overall pension system, 
employability and retirement income. These recommendations can be considered a mixture of 
measures aimed at reducing the influence of push, pull and jump factors respectively. In 
subsequent chapters I will address anti-push policies with regards to employability and a more 
inclusive labour market, but my primary concern will be pension schemes and initiatives for 
diminishing pull factors.   
      
OECD recognises that there are no “one-size-fits-all” solutions when it comes to pension 
reforms due to country specific differences. The extent and severity of the challenges of 
population ageing may differ across countries, as may the overall pension systems and 
specific schemes and the normative principles they are based upon. Accordingly, the OECD 
recommendations may be more or less in conformity with existing policies and values in the 
respective member countries. The extent to which the OECD principles are compatible with 
the normative principles of the Scandinavian welfare state will be addressed in the following 
chapter.   
 
IV Analytical Approach 
1.0 Strategy and Country Choices 
The distinct welfare regimes are perceived to pursue various policies, for different reasons 
and with different means (Esping-Andersen, 1990:26). I therefore find it plausible to assume 
that their response to the challenges of the ageing population may differ likewise. The OECD 
principles are meant to assist and guide member countries in meeting theses challenges, and 
do so irrespective of type of welfare regime. The path of reform and the implications of 
changing social policy in accordance with the OECD guidelines may differ from country to 
country depending on their respective type of welfare system. As the essential features of the 
OECD guidelines may be more or less in compliance with the respective type of welfare 
regime, the progress of reform may run more or less smoothly. In the former case changes in 
social policy may not constitute many obstacles or serious difficulties, whereas in the latter 
case the implications and hence the objections, may prove extensive.  
 
This chapter addresses the methodological aspects of my research, my choice and use of 
methodical design and strategy and any weaknesses that may arise. I have chosen a 
comparative approach, as this appears the most fruitful approach. A comparative case study of 
two countries is likely to provide better knowledge of my focus of attention than a single case 
study would. It also allows more in-depth analysis than a study of many countries, although a 
combined design would be preferable with more time at disposal.  
 
My thesis is restricted to two countries only, in part of practicality. The focus on the 
Scandinavian welfare state limits the number of OECD countries suitable for my analysis by 
definition. The Scandinavian welfare state is generally considered to cluster four Nordic 
countries; Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland (Esping- Andersen & Korpi, 1987:69), 
(Leibfried and Ferrera in Arts & Gelissen, 2002:149), of which any of the four could have 
been chosen for analysis. As my scope of analysis is rather extensive69, I will confine my 
analysis to two countries only for practical reasons. My reason for selecting Norway and 
Denmark is a personal interest, partly aroused by the findings of Eitrheim and Kuhnle 
(2000:45). In their analysis of the Nordic welfare states in the 1990s, they find the basic 
pension structure in Norway and to a certain extent Denmark to be unaltered, compared to 
Finland and Sweden. Reforms in social security are most marked in the two latter countries, 
                                                 
69 Including the transition from work to retirement, the pension system and current reforms. 
whereas changes in Norway and Denmark are considered few and modest. They conclude that 
Nordic welfare state developments in the 1990s are slightly divergent, with Finland and 
Sweden on one side and Norway and Denmark on the other70. The similarities of the four 
countries are often emphasised, but country specific differences do exist. To illustrate, 
Denmark is the Nordic country first to enter the European Union, whereas Norway twice 
through referenda has declined entry, which may indicate differences in their respective 
normative values. This is an interesting thought, although beyond the object of this analysis, 
which further aroused my interest.  
 
It would undoubtedly be easier to study only one of the four countries. However, by including 
two any deductions may be substantiated or weakened depending on whether or not my 
findings prove valid in both countries. The approach allows me to analyse whether or not the 
OECD principles are similarly reflected in Norwegian and Danish reforms. Using ideal types 
like the Scandinavian welfare state may be problematic, a subject that will be discussed 
subsequently. In addressing the pension systems in Norway and Denmark, I intend to 
envisage the extent to which their systems comply. That countries are classified as belonging 
to the same welfare regime does not necessarily imply that their welfare schemes and benefits 
are identical. Countries may vary in degree if not in kind, and common normative values may 
find various expressions perhaps particularly at times of reform.  
 
This study aims at answering the following questions and thereby contribute new knowledge: 
Are Norway and Denmark moving in the same direction regarding pension reform? Do their 
reforms reflect the normative foundation of the OECD principles or the Scandinavian welfare 
state? And are any of the two countries becoming less “Scandinavian” with regards to their 
type of old-age welfare?71 To illustrate, previous findings of Esping-Andersen and Korpi 
indicate that Denmark is moving away from the ”Scandinavian model” due to, at that time, 
current welfare state cutbacks and changes in legislation (1987:55). They regard Denmark a 
more liberalistic outlier, compared to Norway Sweden and Finland, especially in pension 
                                                 
70 Eitrheim and Kuhnle stress that their observations should not overshadow the stability of the Scandinavian 
type of welfare present, albeit to various degrees, in all four countries. 
71Analysing reform of welfare for the elderly with regard to universality and generosity of pensions and the 
extensiveness of social care, Kvist (1999:249) concludes that Norway is moving closer to the Scandinavian type 
of welfare and today has the most ”Scandinavian” welfare for the elderly. Kvist actually refers to the Nordic 
model, but it is mainly the label that distinguishes his Nordic model from my Scandinavian model.   
policy72. Eitrheim and Kuhnle (2000:54) consider Norway the strongest representative of the 
“Scandinavian welfare model”, but they do not restrict their scope to pension policy only 
although this aspect is included. The question of interest is whether my findings will support 
or run counter to the conclusions of these previous studies.   
 
 
I will further clarify the term “welfare state” in general and the Scandinavian welfare state in 
particular. The latter is an ideal-type and the use of ideal-types, their merits and inherent 
problems will be discussed. In outlining the normative principles of the Scandinavian model 
the focus will primarily be on pension systems rather than the welfare state per se73. 
 
2.0 What is the Welfare State? 
As previously mentioned, the OECD principles do not accommodate the Scandinavian 
welfare state in particular, but rather welfare states in general regardless of regime. This 
would imply a welfare state definition general enough to cover the OECD recommendations 
and their original range of coverage and the OECD member states, although my primary 
concern is the Scandinavian type of welfare.  
 
According to the historian Asa Briggs “a welfare state is a state in which organised power is 
deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of 
market forces in at least three directions – first, by guaranteeing individuals and families a 
minimum income irrespective of the market value of their work or their property; second, by 
narrowing the extent of insecurity by enabling individuals and families to meet certain social 
contingencies (for example sickness, old age and unemployment) which lead otherwise to 
individual and family crises; and third, by ensuring that all citizens without distinction of 
status or class are offered the best standards available in relation to a certain agreed range of 
social services” (Briggs, 1985:183). 
 
Briggs’ definition thus distinguishes the welfare state from the so-called social services state  
“where communal resources are employed to abate poverty and to assist those in distress” 
(ibid), as the objective of the former goes beyond the aim of the latter in bringing in the idea 
of the optimum rather than the older idea of the minimum. The welfare state stresses the 
                                                 
72 At the time of analysis Denmark still had no earnings-related superannuation, i.e. ATP, and private and 
occupational pension play an important role (cf. ch. V). 
73 After all, my object of attention is primarily pension schemes and incomes and to a certain extent 
employability, not the overall welfare state.    
notion of equality of treatment in addition to the fight against class differences or the needs of 
particular schedules` groups.  
 
So far I have stressed the notion of the state and its responsibility for the overall welfare, at 
least at a minimum level, of the population without explicating or stipulating the extent of 
state responsibility. The level of welfare and its coverage may thus differ across various 
welfare states.  In compliance with the above definition, the term welfare state may be 
perceived as referring to a state’s constellation of socio-economic institutions, policies and 
programmes intended to promote people’s welfare in general (Goodin et al., 1999:5). In order 
to distinguish the welfare state from other modes of welfare provision, the welfare state is 
stipulated as “a system of compulsory, collective and largely nondiscretionary welfare 
provision which intervenes in a market economy to meet certain of people’s basic needs” 
(Goodin, 1988:11-12). Further, the welfare state is a system for the allocation of goods and 
burdens on the basis of principles related to human worth (Eriksen, 1996:55). In my opinion 
both the future allocation of goods and burdens are susceptible to policy changes due to the 
challenges of ageing populations, to which the OECD principles offer several responses. This 
is not to say that other options and means may not prove as feasible and effective, but that is 
not the object of this analysis to determine. Rather than discuss the efficiency and 
sustainability of the OECD principles themselves, I conceive them to be guidelines for action 
member countries are recommended to take at the demographic outlook.  
 
2.1 Types of Welfare States 
The above definition of the welfare state is purposely broad in order to cover not only the 
OECD principles, but all of its member states as well. This leaves a definition that allows 
distinct welfare states to range differently on a variety of dimensions. Coverage and extent of 
available social services may vary considerably, as may public policy and the way it is put 
into practise. In welfare policies a distinction is often made between universalism and the 
selective principles of residualism and reciprocity (Kildal & Kuhnle, 2002:3). The principle of 
universalism implies that social rights are based on citizenship or residency. As a matter of 
right, all members of a population category are eligible for benefits provided to cover certain 
politically defined need situations. Selective programmes may either be of a residual means-
testing kind, targeting the poor, or insurance-based reciprocal, targeting individuals who 
cannot provide for themselves and the working population in general74. Depending on the 
different objectives, goals and values underlying the individual welfare state, so-called 
regime-types can be distinguished (cf. appendix A). 
 
There are various reasons for applying regime-types in analyses of welfare states and welfare 
policy. In this study regime-types are employed to cluster nations according to their welfare 
regime and thereby clarify the overall normative foundation of the welfare state in Norway 
and Denmark respectively without entering into country specific details. Esping-Andersen 
(1999:73) stresses clustering cases according to typology may help identify some underlying 
connecting logic. Besides, typologies are helpful tools for generating and testing hypotheses. 
  
Gösta Esping-Andersen distinguishes three distinctive regime-types; a liberal, a social 
democratic and a corporatist welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990:26), outlined in 
appendix A. According to this distinction, the Scandinavian type/model of welfare falls under 
the heading of the social democratic welfare regime. Stephan Leibfrid on the other hand, 
distinguishes four different regimes of welfare with the Scandinavian countries constituting a 
regime-type of their own75. Both typologies, as well as several others, are founded on 
Titmuss’ (1974) ideal types, respectively the institutional redistributive model, the residual 
welfare model and the industrial achievement-performance model (Kuhnle, 2001:53).  What 
is of particular interest is that in addition to their compatibility, the various typologies all 
classify the Nordic countries as belonging to the same regime-type (cf. Ferrera, Bonoli, 
Siaroff in Arts & Gelissen, 2002:149). Alongside their geographical and cultural closeness, 
this makes a strong case for treating them together in discussing their welfare state’s 
normative foundation. After all, the welfare policy and system in the Nordic countries are 
rather similar as compared to welfare states belonging to other regime-types. Nevertheless, I 
simplify at the expense of accuracy. In the following I will for the sake of simplicity and 
accuracy refer to the Scandinavian welfare state, alternatively the Scandinavian model, 
                                                 
74 Universal and selective programmes also differ in their allocation of benefits, or kind of needs. In universal 
programmes need is defined according to professional norms, irrespective of the economic circumstances of the 
individual. In selective programmes the criterion for receiving provision is financial capacity, that is the lack of 
means or the ability to pay. The former targets the economic weakest, whereas the latter targets the economically 
active population (Kildal & Kuhnle, 2002:3).    
75 I would like to note that Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1987:71) find evidence suggesting that Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland forms a distinctive “Scandinavian welfare model”. In ”The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism” (1990) Esping-Andersen does not regard the ”Scandinavian welfare model” a distinct 
welfare regime, but as included in the social democratic welfare regime. In a recent revision he denotes that this 
regime is “virtually synonymous with the Nordic countries” (1999:78).     
although its elements mainly are mainly derived from Esping-Andersen’s social democratic 
regime-type76. It should be noted that although Esping-Andersen finds the Scandinavian 
countries to primarily be “social democratic”, or having a Scandinaivan type of welfare in my 
case, he acknowledges that they also have certain liberal elements (Esping-Andersen, 
1990:28). In other words, welfare states do not have to be “pure” types in order to be 
classified. 
 
2.2 Ideal Types 
At this point it is necessary to stress that the respective regime-types are only to be regarded 
as prototypes or what Weber labelled ideal types (Weber, 1971). This means that they are 
intellectual constructions modelled on certain aspects of actual conditions. In so far as ideal 
types only extract some essential characteristics whereas omitting others, they are not a 
description of reality. They are utopian and do not exist empirically in their entirety.  
 
In social science aspects of reality are often compared against typologies in order to attain a 
better understanding of actual empirical conditions. However, typologies are neither to be 
regarded as the “ultimate truth” nor used as a foundation for evaluating reality. Creating ideal 
types is not an object but a means to measure and describe factual situations (ibid:201). 
Nevertheless, they are useful as tools for forming more parsimonious conceptions77 of a 
conceivably complex and disordered reality. My purpose of presenting and applying regime-
types is to attain a proper comprehension of the welfare state in Norway and Denmark, in as 
much as regime-types operate to cluster nations according to their type of welfare regime and 
of generating and testing my hypotheses regarding pension reforms.  
 
Still, the creation and use of ideal types are both questioned and disputed and even critical use 
may be contested. It is necessary to be aware of the pitfalls of applying typologies and the 
problems, which may arise. Arts and Gelissen (2002:137) conclude that real welfare states in 
general are not pure types but rather hybrid cases, but find reasons for continuing to work on 
and with the original or modified typologies of Esping-Andersen. They consider typologies 
                                                 
76I consider the Scandinavian welfare state to fall under the heading of his social democratic welfare regime, 
with the former a subordinate/secondary category that inherits the characteristics of the more generic social 
democratic welfare state, whereas the inverse will not necessarily be true. This discussion is continued in section 
2.2.1. 
77 Or categories. 
 
fruitful to empirical science in its infancy, as a means to represent reality. To the extent the 
comparative macro-sociology of welfare states can be described as being in “statu nascendi”, 
they regard the formulation of typologies useful.  
 
2.2.1 Parsimony versus Complexity 
The respective welfare regime-types are parsimonious versions of the world and only extract 
some aspects of a more complex reality, whereas actual welfare states may have elements 
from more than one regime-type. This may constitute a problem in the classification of 
welfare states. However, this obstacle is mainly related to classical categorization, where the 
actual welfare states have to fulfil all aspects of a respective regime-type in order to be 
classified as belonging to a specific type (Collier & Mahon, 1993:848). As a consequence the 
scientist may very well end up with no real members in either of the respective regime-types, 
in which case there would hardly be any point in using regime-types for classification 
purposes. A strict application of the classical principle of classification may lead to a 
premature abandonment of still potentially useful categories. It may be too early to reject 
regime-types all together just yet. Typologies in general, regime-types in this case, can still be 
useful means for classifying empirical cases if the less rigid approaches of either family 
resemblance or radial category are considered.  
 
According to the principles of family resemblance there is not necessarily one single attribute 
that all category members share. Instead family members are recognised by their contrast to 
nonfamily members by acknowledging the attributes the former share to varying degrees, 
although there may be no trait that all family members have in common (ibid:846). This 
classification procedure makes it possible to classify and compare welfare states that differ in 
one or more aspects but nevertheless have essential similarities. Radial categories also allow 
for the possibility that two members may not necessarily share all of the conceivably defining 
attributes. In contrast to family resemblance the overall meaning of a radial category 
corresponds to the “best” case, or a prototype of the category78. This primary category 
                                                 
78 Collier and Mahon (1993:853) emphasise that a category is an analytic construct, an ideal type, of which each 
specific case should only be expected to be a partial approximation. They refer to Burger’s interpretations of 
Weber’s theory of concept formation, which recognises commonalities between family resemblance and radial 
categories on one hand and Weberian ideal types (1976:115-16, 156-57). According to Burger Weber recognised 
that concepts are usually not based on defining properties shared by all cases to which the concept refers, hence 
they do not follow classical categorisation. In contrast to strict classical categorisation, Weber emphasised the 
use of ideal types in which the key attributes were expected to be present to varying degrees.  Collier and Mahon 
consists of attributes that are understood and recognised when found together, of which the 
secondary subordinated categories are variants. Whereas the secondary categories share 
defining attributes with the primary one, they do not necessarily share the full complement of 
its attributes, nor the attributes of each other. This means that if the procedures of family 
resemblance and/or radial category are accepted and pursued the potential pitfall of classical 
categories, i.e. failing to classify real, complex cases according to analytical, parsimonious 
concepts, may be avoided. In which case regime-types may be applied as the basis for 
classifying welfare states, though it means that the latter may not share all of the defining 
attributes of the former.        
 
2.2.2 “Conceptual Stretching” 
Whereas typologies are static in nature, situations and conditions in the world are in constant 
alteration. This constitutes another potential problem because ideal types may become 
outdated and out of touch with reality. This problem is related to the notion of “conceptual 
stretching” or what Collier and Mahon refer to as “the distortion that occurs when a concept 
does not fit the new cases”(1993:845), but it may also arise from changes over time within 
cases. If welfare states undergo more or less essential changes, they may no longer “fit” the 
regime-type they originally were classified as belonging to. It may be necessary either to re-
evaluate their membership, or reconsider the overall categories all together.  
 
Welfare states may and do change over time, which could present a problem in clustering 
them, perhaps in particular when a geographical term such as the “Scandinavian” welfare 
state is employed. The fact that a typology or ideal type has a geographical label does not 
necessarily imply that it (only) fits its geographical point of reference in the longer term. The 
Scandinavian countries should therefore not uncritically be classified as belonging to the 
Scandinavian type of welfare. Further, Finland is usually classified as a Scandinavian welfare 
state (Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1987:42), (Ferrera and Leibfried in Arts & Gelissen, 
2002:149).   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
conclude that the procedures for making generalisations with family resemblance and radial categories are of 
relevance to ideal types as well. 
Several welfare states have over the last decades to a certain extent incorporated features from 
another regime-type than the one they are classified as belonging to. True, most welfare states 
have always had elements from more than one regime-type, but I think it is safe to presume 
that the mixture of regime-type attributes now are more pronounced79. By applying the 
principles of family resemblance and/or radial categorisation instead of the more rigid classic 
classification, this obstacle may to a certain extent be surmounted. There is still no denying 
that typologies ignore the fact that most welfare states are a mixture of various regime-types 
(Kuhnle, 2001:54). From a strict classical classification’s point of view, when reality no 
longer “fit” or “fit” more poorly with existing typologies, there is good reason for questioning 
their utilitarian value as well as their intrinsic aspects and headings. 
 
2.2.3 Contested Headings  
I especially want to address the labelling of Esping-Andersen’s regime-types. A potential 
problem with ideal types in general is that they may be given political or normative headings, 
and as such be ascribed particular and unfortunate values and connotations. In other words 
contested labels may draw attention away from the subject matter. To illustrate I will address 
the heading of the “social democratic” regime-type. The term “social democratic” may leave 
the impression that it mainly was social democrats who developed the welfare state in these 
countries. Admittedly, social democrats have pursued and promoted equality of the highest 
standards, in contrast to equality of minimal needs (Esping-Andersen, 1990:27). But 
conservative parties have supported and consented to the development and maintenance of the 
welfare state as well. The social policy laws at the end of the 19th century in Denmark were 
for instance motioned by conservative governments (Kuhnle, 1983:78). And contrary to what 
might be perceived as “common knowledge”, the welfare state as such has neither been 
threatened nor curtailed under periods of conservative and liberal rule.  
 
Kuhnle (ibid:81) argues that conservative, liberal and social democratic parties can represent 
the social democratic tradition of inter alia emphasising the importance of the state for social 
policy. Public engagement in social policy progressed through coalitions across party politics 
and a social political active state is advocated in both socialistic and non-socialistic circles. In 
                                                 
79 To illustrate, the Norwegian welfare state has since the 1980s incorporated features of the corporatist regime-
type, like work related benefits and private insurance schemes, whereas several European countries are 
approaching the Scandinavian model by extending their benefits to larger segments of the population (Kuhnle, 
2001:54). 
a paper on the principle of universalism, Kildal and Kuhnle (2002:19) preliminary conclude 
that they have not found a “clear social democratic vision behind the political initiatives 
towards universalism”.      
 
In addition the meaning of the term “social democratic” has changed over time. The social 
democracy of today differs from the social democracy of previous times. The policy of social 
democrats has changed and will continue to change, both in regard to welfare and social 
policy as well as in other aspects. Hatland (1992:99) states that a universal social policy is 
currently considered an essential element of the social democratic ideology in Scandinavia. 
Nevertheless, the Social Democratic Party in Norway actually contributed to means-testing of 
social insurance benefits in 1923 and 1936 (ibid:62), whereas the Conservative Party was the 
first party to include the principle of universalism, with. the aim of a universal pension 
scheme, in its programme. True, the Norwegian social democrats supported abolishing the 
means-test in 1957, as motioned by the conservatives, but not without internal dispute. In 
Denmark a social democratic government in 1976 means-tested the child benefit, but the 
means-test was abolished in 1986 by a coalition of non-social democratic parties. Henceforth 
the Danish child benefit is universal (ibid:100). The above examples may to a certain extent 
reflect pragmatism, but pragmatism is historically and currently not limited to non-social 
democratic parties: Social democrats may and do advocate both means-testing and earnings 
related pensions, elements traditionally considered as belonging to the liberal and corporatist 
welfare regimes respectively.  
 
Though the criticism of the labelling of regime-types is justified, the pitfall of rejecting still 
potential useful typologies should be avoided. The elements inherent in each regime-type 
should be considered apolitical by not giving individual parties or ideologies exclusive 
property rights to particular regime-types or the concepts they are founded on. The respective 
regime-types are based on the different ways social welfare is actually put into practice and 
are as such to some extent independent of both political ideologies and alternating ruling 
parties.  
 
As stated earlier, I will refer to the Scandinavian welfare state/model to avoid the political and 
normative values connected with the heading of Esping-Andersen’s social democratic regime-
type. However, a simple change of name does not alter the fact that I apply an ideal type with 
its subsequent pitfalls and shortcomings. Besides, I have already stated that employing the 
geographical term Scandinavian may in itself be problematic. Geographically Scandinavia 
refers to Norway, Denmark and Sweden, whereas the typology Scandinavian model includes 
Finland as well. The countries are geographically and culturally close and in many respect 
rather similar80. Still, I simplify at the expense of accuracy as an ideal type by and large 
highlights similarities as compared to differences. The Scandinavian welfare state may reflect 
underlying normative foundations shared by the countries it clusters, but this does not imply 
that their respective welfare regimes are identical. 
 
3.0 The Normative Principles of the Scandinavian Welfare State 
In the following I will elaborate the normative aspects of the Scandinavian welfare state. The 
Scandinavian welfare state is henceforth to be regarded as a theoretical device only, used to 
assess the plausibility and suitability of the Scandinavian countries to meet the OECD 
principles for reform from a normative perspective. By normative foundation I refer to 
standard principles or pattern of principles, which welfare measures may both reflect and be 
factual implementations of. Whether or not all welfare measures are in accordance with the 
underlying normative values or the means for achieving them are effective, is beside the point 
in this context. The question is whether or not the normative guidelines of OECD are in 
conformity with the overall normative foundation of the Scandinavian model. If this prove to 
be the case, it may be plausible to assume Norway and Denmark to follow the OECD 
direction and that the process may run relatively smoothly, i.e. with little political conflict and 
opposition. If the opposite prove to be true, I assume that the OECD principles of reform may 
be met only partially and reluctantly, as the process itself may be contested and resisted. In 
order to discuss compliance the normative foundation of the Scandinavian welfare state has to 
be elaborated.  
 
3.1 How to Outline the Scandinavian Model? 
The welfare state as it historically develops in Scandinavia places great emphasis on the fact 
that goods and burdens are to be distributed according to the universal principles of justice 
and human dignity (Eriksen & Loftager, 1996:2). This implies that the security of the 
                                                 
80 A comparative study (Castel, 1993 in Kautto et al., 1999:5) features the Scandinavian group of nations most 
conspicuously as a distinctive group. 
individual’s life and well-being are no longer the sole responsibility of individual capacity and 
accidental circumstances as each citizen is guaranteed at least minimum standards of income, 
livelihood, housing accommodation as well as education. Entitlements are given as legal 
rights and perceived as means to provide equal chances to employ civil rights. The public 
sector is designed to counterweight the shortcomings of the market by compensate its 
negative by-products and substitute its failures. Already from the outset the development of 
social rights is closely interrelated to the notion of solidarity and shared standards of moral 
outlooks (ibid). In other words, the welfare state both expresses and depends on normative 
processes and moral values. 
 
Though the social democratic welfare regime arose in reaction to the social consequences of 
free market economics and liberal politics, it still remains a dominant model, particularly in 
the Scandinavian countries81. The question is how to characterize this type of welfare. Kuhnle 
(2001:53) states that the Scandinavian welfare state is well known for its large public sector, 
extended social security and egalitarian principles. Benefits are financed through general 
government revenues and based on citizenship. Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1987:42) 
primarily emphasise four key features, which set the Scandinavian approach apart. Its stress 
on public responsibilities have marginalized and to a certain extent superseded private 
provision of welfare. Only in Denmark do private pensions play a significant role82. 
Generally, it entails a commitment to universalism and equality of status in the pursuit of a 
more egalitarian society and benefit levels and the standard of social service are very high. 
The Scandinavian type of welfare is considered strongly de-commodifying, securing citizens 
a significant degree of personal independence from the labour market. Kautto et al. (1999:13) 
list several aspects characteristic of the welfare state in the Nordic countries83, like a 
comprehensive social policy and a commitment to full employment, accompanied by active 
labour marked measures. The welfare system is based on a high degree of universalism 
though there exist some targeted measures as well. Generally all citizens are entitled to the 
same basic social services and benefits. Taxation is relative high and income security is based 
                                                 
81 Esping-Andersen (1990:73) ranks the Scandinavian countries as strong social democratic welfare states as 
measured by their “average universalism” and “average benefit equality”. The former being indicated by the 
proportion of the population covered across pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits, and the latter by the 
differential between basic and maximum benefits across the three programmes. One might, however, question, 
whether his “average benefit equality”-criteria is the most meaningful measure of equality. 
82 With regard to private pension schemes, Denmark clusters with countries where these are very important, 
whereas Norway and Sweden cluster at the other extreme (Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1987:76).  
83 Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland. 
on a flat-rate basic security with an additional earnings-related part. Income distribution is 
relatively even as compared to other countries, both with regard to wage dispersion and 
disposable income. Poverty rates as well as differences in levels of living are considered to be 
relatively low. A gender equality aspect, typical of the Nordic countries, is reflected in the 
broad participation of women in wage labour and the fact that most families are two 
breadwinners.  
 
So far I conclude that the characteristics of the Scandinavian welfare state are numerous. 
Social scientists may emphasise different aspects in their analyses, but certain features reoccur 
and may reflect underlying principles and values. For instance, the notion of universalism 
may be regarded as an essential normative principle of the Scandinavian welfare state, inter 
alia reflected through various measures of income security and equal income distribution.   
 
I have chosen four features I consider both intrinsic of the normative foundation of the 
Scandinavian welfare state and of importance in meeting the challenges of the ageing 
population. The aspects, which will be elaborated and operationalized, are state/public 
responsibility, universalism, generosity and the fusion of welfare and work, as reflected in the 
pronounced commitment to full-employment. The latter may be distinguished from the others 
by not being directly related to the pension system per se, but the right to work has equal 
status to the right of income protection and the Scandinavian welfare state depends on its 
attainment (Esping-Andersen, 1990:28). Besides, employability, i.e. maintaining or increasing 
the rate of employment, is of importance to national economy, general welfare and pension 
systems irrespective of welfare regime, in particular as population ages. 
 
3.2 Public Responsibility for Welfare Provision 
One of the characteristic features of the Nordic countries is the dominant role of the state and 
the public sector (Eitrheim & Kuhnle, 2000:55). The Scandinavian type of welfare84 assigns 
the state both an active role and the responsibility of promoting the welfare of its citizens. In 
                                                 
84 In the study of Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1987) the focus of attention is the social democratic welfare 
regime. Hence, it is the social democratic welfare regime that advocates state activity and responsibility 
according to Esping-Andersen and Korpi.  As I consider the Scandinavian welfare state a subcatergory of the 
social democratic welfare regime their findings apply as well.  Nevertheless, it should in all fairness be stressed 
that the denotation of the social democratic welfare regime is more extensive than in the case of the 
Scandinavian model of welfare.  
the Scandinavian countries this emphasis on public responsibilities has even lead to an almost 
marginalization of private provision and the market mechanisms (Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 
1987:69). The Nordic countries have of recently opened up for private initiatives as welfare 
provision is concerned, especially in the fields of health and social care services and social 
insurance (Eitrheim & Kuhnle:54). Nevertheless, Eitrheim and Kuhnle find the importance of 
the state in absolute terms has actually increased and remains the dominant provider of 
welfare. This is not to say that welfare provision is a zero-sum game with a clear-cut 
substitution/crowding in quantitative terms between public and private pensions. Both public 
and private provision may increase simultaneously, although their relative interrelation may 
be displaced85. In general the state has a larger role vis-à-vis the market and civil society than 
in other countries (Kvist, 1999:232). Hence, I emphasise state responsibility for welfare 
provision as one of the normative principles of the Scandinavian model. 
 
3.2.1 Public versus Private Pension Provision 
Regarding pensions, Esping-Andersen (1990:102) considers the state the principal link 
between inputs and outcomes and the state is central in defining regime types. In his opinion 
the universalist social-citizenship model is only possible where the state crowds out both the 
market and corporatism. Hence, welfare states should be identified according to their 
interaction with the market and alternative private arrangements respectively. 
 
Pension systems are generally regarded as based on three pillars, national pension schemes 
constituting first pillar, labour market or occupational pension schemes second pillar and 
individual pension agreements as third pillar. The two latter pillars are considered private 
pension arrangements. With regard to state responsibility for pension provision, the main 
distinction is between public and private provision. The extent and importance of the different 
pillars varies across welfare states. Norway and Denmark have a mix of public and private 
arrangements, with the state-funded old-age pension as the dominant pillar both in coverage 
and as a source of income. It should be noted that private pension schemes play a more 
significant role in Denmark than in Norway (Esping-Andersen, & Korpi, 1987:55), (Esping-
Andersen, 1990:102), (Pedersen, 1996: 8-14). 
                                                 
85 Some advocate a complementary relationship where the expansion of public pensions may cause growth in 
private pensions (Hannah, 1992, Dobbin and Boychuch, 1996 in Pedersen, 2002c:3). Others assume private 
pensions to be primarily independent of public pension systems and rather related to institutions and processes in 
the labour market and the capital market (Von Nordheim-Nielsen, 1988; 1991 in Pedersen, 2002c:4).  
 In addressing the pension system, I will primarily focus on the distinction between public and 
private pension schemes, whereas the differences between second and third pillar, although 
significant, will be less emphasised. In general, the presence of laws distinguishes public 
schemes from contractual arrangements. Public schemes include pensions directly legislated 
and administered by the state or pensions provided by private sector through an explicit 
government mandate (Esping-Andersen, 1990:81). Civil-service pensions are labour market 
pension schemes for public sector employees. They generally reflect the government’s role as 
employer and are thus regarded as second pillar pensions, although they admittedly have 
features in common with first pillar, notably being financed by and paid out of government 
budgets and prescribed by statutory law. The Danish ATP, SP and SAP86 are all statutory, 
supplementary pensions and are regarded as public pensions accordingly (cf. ch. V).  
 
Private pensions include both occupational and individual pension schemes. The former is 
primarily a form of group insurance or of trade-unionism and is generally mandatory, whereas 
the latter rather reflects the notion of self-reliance within competitive contracting and is 
voluntary. In Norway there are important differences between occupational pensions in the 
public and private sector and a distinction is made between the two. In employing the labels 
public and private occupational pension, I refer to the respective sector and not type of 
pension provision. Public and private occupational pension are first and foremost labour 
market pensions, constituting second pillar and are considered private pension arrangements 
henceforth87.  
 
State provision of pensions can be measured by the relative importance of public and private 
schemes. To the extent reform measures increase the importance of second and third pillar 
and/or reduce first pillar in extent and as a source of income, this may be indications of 
reduced public provision. Extent addresses the schemes’ population coverage, whereas the 
aspect of income source is related to the relative portion public and private pension benefits 
respectively constitute of the total pension income of individual pensioners.      
 
                                                 
86 The additional labour market pension (ATP), the labour market-like supplementary pension scheme (SAP) and 
the special pension scheme (SP).  
87 Although, public occupational pensions are regulated by law (cf. appendix B). 
There are primarily two types of national pensions, universal flat-rate pensions and actuarial 
pensions based on previous contributions and employment (Esping-Andersen, 1990:93). The 
former correspond to the minimum pension in Norway and Demark, whereas the latter is 
reflected in the earnings-related supplementary pension in Norway and the ATP scheme in 
Denmark. Private pensions are usually fully funded, contribution-defined, premium-reserve 
schemes, e.g. labour market pension schemes in Denmark, although in Norway occupational 
pensions are defined benefit arrangements (cf. appendix B). 
 
One question of interest in the following is whether the emphasis of state responsibility for 
welfare provision embedded in the Scandinavian model complies with the normative 
foundations of the OECD principles for reform. Another question is whether or not Norway 
and Denmark will experience a change in the provision of welfare due to their ageing 
populations. Do pension reforms in either country suggest replacing the currant dominance of 
the first pillar with a multi-pillar system, by increasing the role of private pension schemes? 
Already in 1981 OECD states that in light of future demographic and economic challenges, 
new agents of welfare beyond the state ought to be developed and the relationship between 
private action and action by the state readdressed (Kuhnle & Alestalo, 2000:9). On the other 
hand, the Nordic countries enjoy “widespread political consensus, both among political elites 
and the electorate, about the continued public responsibility of welfare provision”(Eitrheim & 
Kuhnle, 2000:49). 
 
3.3 Universality 
According to Esping-Andersen’s analysis (1990:75) universalism is the reigning principle in 
the Scandinavian welfare state. He measures the degree of program universalism as the 
average percentage of population, aged 16-64, eligible for sickness, unemployment and 
pension benefits respectively. My focus will primarily be national old-age pensions 
addressing the elderly. I will assess the aspect of universality according to coverage and 
allocation criteria of national basic and national supplementary old-age pensions88. In addition 
I will address the Danish ATP in particular, as it is a statutory pension currently covering 60 
per cent of old-age pensioner. Of the statutory pension schemes it is the most prevalent and its 
future coverage is estimated to amount to 92-96 per cent (ATP, 1995:7) 
 
Generally, benefits are either universal or conditional/selective of a residual or reciprocal 
kind. Residual benefits refer to transfers that are income- and/or means-tested, whereas 
reciprocal benefits are premised on previous contributions, earnings and/or employment 
performance. In the following benefits will be regarded universal to the extent they include all 
residents89 of Norway and Denmark, irrespective of previous income, contribution and labour 
market affiliation. Universal schemes incorporate the entire population, and recipients are not 
required to justify their claims as benefits are given as a matter of legal rights. With regard to 
the pension system in Norway and Denmark, the normative principle of universality is 
reflected in the provision of public minimum pensions. 
 
The amount recipients receives from national old-age pensions may be affected by any 
additional income he or she may have. To some extent pensioners are allowed to earn 
additional income while receiving pension, but once a certain fixed level is exceeded, the 
pension payments will be reduced. This is means-testing of a residual kind as it is related to 
current income and not previous earnings. I argue that this graduation does not diminish the 
universal aspect of the national old-age pensions in Norway and Denmark. As old-age 
pension is related to retirement, although mainly premised on age, the argument can be made 
                                                 
88 This concurs with Kvist’s assessments of the universality of national old-age pensions (1999:238). His 
findings result in the trichotomy of universal, selective and residual pensions, with the conclusion that the 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have retained universal pension benefits.  
89 Membership of the Norwegian national insurance scheme requires a minimum residency of 12 months cf. 
Trygdeloven §2-1. A membership period of 3 years is required for basic pension entitlement §3-2 (Kjønstad, 
1998:58). Denmark has three criteria for pension entitlement; citizenship, permanent residency currently and at 
least 3 years between the age of 15 and 65.  If the latter amounts to 10 years of residency, the criterion of Danish 
citizenship is disregarded cf. Lov om social pension §§1-4 (Retsinfo, 2003).  
that if additional earnings on retirement exceed a certain level the recipient has not really 
retired.   
 
Universality is an essential feature of the Scandinavian welfare state, but to what extent is it 
reflected in the pension systems in Norway and Denmark? I have hinted that both entail 
selective features, the question is whether the OECD direction for reform would diminish the 
aspect of universality further. Whether it is at all possible to maintain universal pensions and 
attain a sustainable pension system with population ageing remains to be seen. Meanwhile 
reforms and motions may indicate whether or not politicians consider universality a likely 
and/or desirable feature of a future pension system.   
 
3.4 Generosity 
Benefits in the Scandinavian welfare state are generally considered generous, especially for 
low-income groups, as they provide the opportunity of a ”normally” accepted standard of 
living (Kvist, 1999:232). Without further specifications it should be noted that benefits in the 
Scandinavian welfare state have to maintain a certain level of generosity to be “acceptable” 
even to the better-off citizens (Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1987:70). Otherwise they would 
most likely choose (supplementary) private schemes and be less inclined to accept additional 
obligatory payments for public benefits.   
 
As already stated, I find the aspect of universality in the pension system to be primarily 
reflected in the provision of a basic pension, ensuring economic security for all citizens. In my 
opinion generosity is related to the level of basic pension and the emphasis on attaining a 
“fair” compensation level where pension income reflect pre-retirement income levels. I regard 
the level of compensation as fair when it provides the opportunity of maintaining a standard 
of living not far from the accustomed pre-retirement mode of living. Whereas economic 
security in the Scandinavian welfare state is provided by the state, the compensation level is 
related to national pension supplements, labour market pensions and individual pensions. 
With regards to the aspect of generosity, my focus will primarily be the pension rate and 
compensation level of national pensions.  
 
The question is how to measure whether national pensions are becoming more or less 
generous. Kvist measures the generosity of national old-age pensions by their average net 
replacement rate (1999:238). He concludes that Danish public pensions are still generous, 
although they become somewhat less generous towards the end of the period studied90. Table 
3 ch. V reflects national pension benefits in Denmark and Norway. The table indicates that 
after taxation pensioners in Norway enjoy higher benefit levels than their Danish equals. If 
current pension levels in both countries are considered relatively generous, decreasing 
benefits will be an indication of decreasing generosity. Besides reducing benefit levels, the 
generosity of benefits can be reduced by introducing or expanding income-testing and/or 
increasing the relative size of income tested pension supplements, neither of which generally 
attract much attention (ibid:249). Other indications of decreasing generosity are shortened 
benefit periods and prolonged waiting periods and tightened eligibility (Eitrheim & Kuhnle, 
2000:54).   
 
Does the generosity of the Scandinavian welfare state comply with the normative foundations 
of the OECD principles? And how is the principle of generosity reflected in pension reforms 
and proposals in Norway and Denmark? In meeting the challenges of an ageing population 
will the current, generous pension benefits be reduced as measured by benefit levels, benefit 
periods and/or eligibility?  
 
3.5 Full Employment 
I include the fusion of welfare and work, reflected in the commitment to a full-employment 
guarantee, in the normative foundation of the Scandinavian welfare state as the right to work 
is given equal status to the right of income protection. To a certain extent the Scandinavian 
welfare state depends on its ail of full employment. Due to the enormous costs embedded in 
maintaining this welfare system, revenue income must be maximized and the number of 
people living off social transfers minimized, both of which could be obtained by 
endeavouring full employment (Esping-Andersen, 1990:28). Without a high level of 
employment91 it would be difficult to preserve the structure of the public welfare system in 
the future.    
 
The normative principle of full employment is inter alia reflected in so-called “active labour 
market” policies, i.e. political labour market interventions. These policies include efforts to 
                                                 
90 The period from 1990 to 1997, cf. ch. V section 2.3. 
91 Attained trough measures like education, job training and rehabilitation. 
increase the demand for labour, programmes intended to affect the supply of labour and 
measures facilitating the matching between the two, that is job-seekers and jobs respectively 
(Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1987:56). “Active labour market” policies also include the 
protection of individual workers by regulating working hours, conditions and wages, not to 
mention providing education and training to assist those out of work (Goodin et al., 1999:47). 
The Nordic governments have been proclaiming the goal of full employment since the Second 
World War, which is also reflected in their embrace of the so-called “work-line” (Eitrheim & 
Kuhnle, 2000:56). The approach has resulted in modifications of several security 
programmes, where the incentives for beneficiaries, both actual and potential, either to be in 
or find work are strengthened. 
 
With respect to the normative principle of full employment, I will confine my analysis to 
policies and measures either embedded in or directly related to the overall pension system. I 
will not focus on measures for increasing the overall labour demand or programmes directed 
at the unemployed in general. Rather, I will address policies and measures directed to 
decrease the rate of early retirement and increase the employment rate among the old and to a 
certain extent welfare recipients, e.g. disability pensioners.  
 
Some considers the full-employment guarantee the most exposed aspect of the Scandinavian 
welfare state with regard to domestic and external economic challenges (Eitrheim & Kuhnle, 
2000:56). But the challenge is also related to demography. The share of the population of 
working-age is decreasing, both in absolute and relative terms, whereas social expenses are 
expected to increase significantly. From the outset, population ageing does not per se seem to 
create any obstacles for pursuing the goal of full employment, rather to the contrary. The 
question is whether the aspect of full employment is consistent with OECD recommendations. 
In chapter V I address whether or not incentives embedded in the overall pension system 
comply with the objective of full employment. Incentives to early retirement and disincentives 
to prolonged employment and postponed retirement will for instance counteract the goal full 
employment. In general, work incentives within the pension system and in reforms may be 
considered as reflecting the full-employment guarantee.   
 
4.0 The Normative Foundation of the OECD Principles and the 
Scandinavian Model Compared 
In part, the object of my thesis is to analyse whether or not the normative foundation of the 
OECD principles and the Scandinavian welfare state concur. To the extent their normative 
values correspond, I expect the actual reforms in Norway and Denmark to reflect OECD 
recommendations and vice versa.      
 
Table 1 illustrates the normative principles I find reflected in the Scandinavian model and the 
OECD recommendations respectively. The former stresses the responsibility of the state for 
welfare provision and advocates universal public benefits, providing fundamental economic 
security through the basic pension. A reasonable level of compensation is maintained through 
public pension supplements and private pension schemes combined. The OECD principles, on 
the other hand, underscore the responsibility of the individual. Pension income should reflect 
individual choice, through private schemes and individual accounts, not public pensions 
alone. Increasing the role of private and individual pension schemes also implies transferring 
risk to individuals. OECD does not disregard public pension provision per se, fighting poverty 
is still regarded a public responsibility, but public pension provision is recommended reduced 
in order to make room for increased private provision. The state should primarily provide 
means-tested benefits, targeted to the needy rather than providing universal benefits.  
 
OECD advocates that public benefit levels should only aim at meeting poverty alleviation 
goals, and that unnecessarily high benefits should be reduced accordingly. The report does 
not, however, specify what it considers high benefit levels. The aspect of “minimal” public 
benefits contrasts with the notion of relatively generous benefit levels embedded in the 
Scandinavian model, which it to a certain extent also depends upon. With regard to 
employability, the normative principles of the Scandinavian welfare state and OECD more or 
less comply. Both favours high level of employment and active measures to attain this 
objective. By guaranteeing full employment, the Scandinavian welfare state may be regarded 
as more committed to this principle than the OECD approach.    
 
Table 1: An illustration of the normative principles reflected in the Scandinavian model and 
the OECD principles for reforms 
 Normative principles 
Welfare state dimensions The OECD principles for 
reform 
The Scandinavian welfare 
state 
Responsibility Primarily individual 
-private and individual 
schemes and accounts 
“Reduced” state 
    -means-tested provision 
Primarily state 
-public schemes 
Allows for private and 
occupational supplements, 
the stress on supplement  
Public benefits Targeted/ means-tested Universal 
Benefit level Only meet poverty alleviation 
goals 
    
Generous 
-basic pension 
-compensation level 
Employment Pro-active approach 
-e.g. high levels of 
employment and lifelong 
learning 
Full employment 
 
5.0 Summary 
So far I have addressed the welfare state per se and different types, with emphasis on the 
Scandinavian welfare state. I have chosen to apply ideal types in order to enhance 
comprehension of the welfare state in Norway and Denmark respectively. The use of ideal 
types is both disputed and contested, and I have accordingly discussed some of the pitfalls of 
applying typologies both in general and in this study in particular. 
 
My focus on the normative principles of the Scandinavian welfare state is based on the notion 
that these values are reflected in the pension systems in Norway and Denmark, an aspect that 
will be addressed in the subsequent chapter. In this chapter I have elaborated and 
operationalized four normative principles I find embedded in the Scandinavian model. In 
comparing the normative foundation of the OECD recommendations and the Scandinavian 
model respectively in light of public versus private pension provision, universality, generosity 
and employment, I find their intrinsic values mainly diverge. This does not necessary imply 
that implemented and/or proposed reforms in Norway and Denmark may not comply with 
OECD recommendations. Due to the estimated challenges of ageing, Norwegian and Danish 
politicians may be inclined to introduce measures that are not in accordance with the 
normative principles of the Scandinavian model.  
 
Before considering actual reforms and motions, I will in the following chapter attend to the 
pension systems in both countries inter alia in light of the normative principles of the 
Scandinavian welfare state. One important aspect will be the extent to which these normative 
principles are actually reflected in the pension systems in Norway and Denmark. Although 
Norway and Denmark generally are considered Scandinavian welfare states, no actual welfare 
state is a pure type. Besides, countries are usually classified according to a combination of 
aspects92, of which pension benefits only constitute one. Accordingly, a low score on one 
dimension may be counterweighted by a high score on another. With this in mind I direct my 
attention to the pension system.              
 
                                                 
92 Notably unemployment benefits, family allowances, sickness benefits, financing regulations and the quantity 
of welfare state expenditure etc. 
V The Pension System 
Before turning to pension reforms and recommendations for reform I would like to present the 
pension systems in Norway and Denmark. How can reform policies and their manifestations 
otherwise be fully appreciated and comprehended? The preceding chapter addressed the 
welfare state in general and the Scandinavian welfare state in particular. This chapter falls into 
line by directing attention to one aspect of the welfare state, namely the pension system. 
Social protection arrangements for the elderly can be divided into income protection and care 
related services, of which I will focus on the former. Income protection refers to cash transfers 
and includes public and private, collective and individual arrangements. Broadly defined, cash 
transfer could include housing allowance, personal allowance and assistance allowance as 
well as old-age pension. With regard to retirement income, all of the above transfers could be 
of importance at least for the individual recipient93. Whereas the old-age pension in Norway 
and Denmark is universal for all residents of a certain age, the allowances are unrelated to age 
but targeted to people with low income and/or high expenses. On account of their general 
nature, their modest benefit levels and the fact that there are relatively few recipients among 
the elderly94, I will disregard these allowances and henceforth focus on old-age pensions.  
 
Old-age pensions are often regarded the backbone of the Scandinavian welfare state as they 
were typically the first schemes implemented95. Old-age pensions usually constitute the loin’s 
share of public social expenditure and they generally affect the whole population (Kvist, 
1999:246). In Norway and Denmark old-age pension and some targeted arrangements are 
primarily the responsibility of the state, whereas private pension schemes, notably 
occupational (collective) pensions and individual insurance pensions, provide pension 
supplements. The pension systems in both countries are a mix of public and private 
arrangements, where the state-funded old-age pension constitutes the dominant pillar in 
coverage and as a source of income. In Norway the state provides a national basic pension, a 
special pension supplement and an earnings-related supplementary pension. In Denmark 
statutory pension schemes encompasses public old-age pension, including basic amount and a 
supplementary pension, ATP, SP and SAP. A more thorough elaboration of the respective 
                                                 
93 Elderly may also have capital income, income from work and benefit from lower taxes, cheap transportation 
and other subsidies. These arrangements will not be addressed in particular. 
94 In Norway, targeted arrangements only accounts for 3 per cent of the total public cash transfers whereas old-
age pension accounts for 97 per cent (Daatland, 1997:13). 
95 Although in Norway national insurances for industrial accidents and sickness, the latter means-tested on 
earnings, preceded old-age pensions (Hatland, 1992:40). 
pension systems is included in appendix B, which this chapter is mainly based on. For 
questions about the pension systems, whether arising from the following presentation or 
general curiosity, I refer to the appendix.  
 
The chapter consists of two sections commencing with a presentation of the overall pension 
systems in Norway and Denmark in light of the normative foundations of the Scandinavian 
model as previously defined. The question of interest is to what extent the normative 
principles are reflected in the actual pension system. As the preceding discussion of ideal 
types indicated, the fact that Norway and Denmark may be characterised as Scandinavian 
welfare states does not imply that they share all features, in this case normative principles. 
The respective normative values may be more or less emphasised and more or less reflected in 
actual implementations. In this respect the two countries may as well differ from each other as 
from the typology per se. To illustrate, Kvist reckons Norway has moved slightly closer to the 
Scandinavian model of welfare for the elderly, whereas Denmark has made a slight move in 
the opposite direction. At present he considers Norway to have the most “Scandinavian” 
welfare for the elderly as conceptualised and measured by universality, generosity and 
extent96 (1999:249). The second section gives an introduction of various paths to early 
retirement embedded in the pension systems in Norway and Denmark. The section addresses 
pre-retirement schemes and schemes entailing incentives to early retirement, which in practise 
(unintentionally) provide older workers the possibility of early labour market exit.    
 
1.0 The Pension System in light of the Scandinavian Model 
The preceding chapter defines the normative foundation of the Scandinavian welfare state 
according to the embedded principles of state/public responsibility, universality, generosity 
and the guarantee of full employment. In the following I will regard the overall pension 
system in Norway and Denmark in light of these normative principles.  
 
My intention is not to assess whether or not Norway and Denmark are Scandinavian welfare 
states. This I assume to be the case. I would, however, like to address how the aspects of the 
Scandinavian welfare state are reflected in the pension system. The object is not only to 
present but also to better comprehend the nature of the respective pension system, by 
                                                 
96 Kvist considers that the changes regarding the universality and generosity of pension systems during the 
1990s, amounts to differences in degree rather than in kind and none of the Nordic countries are excluded from 
belonging to the Scandinavian model of welfare for the elderly (ibid).  
regarding their normative foundation. This point of view may also provide an indication of 
whether or not reforms in Norway and Denmark are likely to converge with the OECD 
recommendations. In the preceding I have concluded that the normative foundation of the 
OECD principles and the Scandinavian model differ in certain aspects. I assume that if and 
where the pension systems diverge from the normative foundation of the Scandinavian model, 
Norway and Denmark may be more inclined to follow the OECD recommendations and vice 
versa 
 
1.1 Public Responsibility 
With regard to the pension system, the notion of state responsibility is reflected in public 
provision of old-age pension, in contrast to private pension provision. As previously 
mentioned, the pension systems in Norway and Denmark are a mix of public and private 
arrangements, where the former dominates, although private pensions are becoming more 
prevalent especially in Denmark. In Norway the state has incorporated the middle class within 
an advanced second-tier, earnings-related scheme on top of the flat-rate pension. According to 
Esping-Andersen (1990:26) this retains state universalism and blocks off the market. The fact 
that Denmark has no earnings-related superannuation pension, may explain why particularly 
occupational and to some extent individual pensions play a relatively large role as compared 
to Norway (Esping-Andersen & Korpi, 1987:52). Pedersen finds that throughout the period 
1970 to 199297 private pension expenditure, measured as percentage of GNP, is higher in 
Denmark than in Norway. Admittedly, both countries experience an increase in the share of 
private pensions, but the increase is stronger and more persistent in Denmark. By 1992 the 
share of private pensions has grown from 1.6 to 3.5 per cent in Denmark and from 1.1 to 2.0 
in Norway (1996:8). Private pension expenditure measured as percentage of total public and 
private expenditure indicate containment in Norway and growth in Denmark98. Private 
pension contributions are higher in Denmark throughout the period, even though occupational 
pensions are concentrated on a more narrow section of wage earners than in Norway, but from 
the mid-eighties private pensions in Norway have a marked increase (ibid:14)99.  
                                                 
97 With respect to occupational pension Pedersen (2002b:77) finds that more recent figures on coverage and 
growth in extent are scarce.   
98 In Norway private pensions amount to 17 per cent of total pension expenditure in 1970 and after decreasing to 
14 per cent in 1985 their share reaches 18.3, whereas Denmark experiences a steady increase from 20 to 30 per 
cent by 1992 (Pedersen, 1996:9). 
99 Regarding the size of accumulated pension funds as a percentage of GNP, the higher contribution rates after 
1970 puts Denmark in the lead and with total pension assets in the area of more than half of the annual gross-
national product Denmark ranks among the leading countries in the world (The Danish Ministry of Finance, 
 Table 1: The Norwegian and Danish pension systems as of 2002 with a multipillar approach 
Based on the multi-pillar approach as described in Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a,appendix 2 and 
information on the respective pension systems in appendix B. 
 Publicly administered 
mandatory schemes. 
First pillar 
Privately administered 
mandatory schemes. 
Second pillar 
Privately 
administered 
voluntary schemes.  
Third pillar 
Goal Redistribution 
Prevent poverty 
Savings and replacement 
rate 
Savings and 
flexibility 
Method Universal flat-rate 
benefit 
   or 
Income related benefit 
    or 
Guaranteed minimum 
pension  
Personal pension 
scheme 
    or 
Work-related pension 
scheme 
Personal pension 
scheme 
     or 
Work-related pension 
scheme 
The Norwegian 
pension system 
Public old-age pension 
 -basic pension 
 -special supplement 
 -earnings-related    
   supplementary  
   pension 
Occupational pensions 
in public and private 
sector100
Individual pension 
savings 
Public old-age pension 
 -basic pension 
-supplementary 
 income-dependent 
 pension  
Labour market pensions Individual pension 
savings 
The Danish 
pension system 
           ATP 
                           Civil service pension 
                                       SAP 
                                                      SP         
 
•The intention of Norwegian earnings-related supplementary pension is ensuring a more reasonable 
compensation level rather than preventing poverty per se. 
•Additional Labour Market Pension (ATP), labour-market like supplementary pension scheme (SAP) 
and Special Pension Scheme (SP), cf. appendix B, Denmark section 1.2. 
 
The pension systems in Norway and Denmark can be characterized as resting on three pillars, 
illustrated in table 1, although neither fits the multipillar approach perfectly. In Norway the 
backbone of the pension system, the National Insurance Scheme (Folketrygden), both 
provides a minimum of security for all citizens irrespective of income before retirement and 
ensures that the income of pensioners is proportional to their pre-retirement level (NOU 
                                                                                                                                                        
1993 in Pedersen, 1996:14). Norway experiences a steadily decline in total pension fund assets during the 1970s 
followed by a growth at a very high pace since the mid eighties. 
100 Participation is mandatory for employees of companies and institutions with pension funds and insurance-
based arrangements. Employers with private pension arrangements, whether in public or private sector, are 
obliged to cover all of their employees, cf. appendix B, Norway section 1.3. 
1998:19,p.17). Whereas the former is characteristic of first pillar, the latter objective is 
generally considered a second pillar feature in the multipillar approach. In Denmark the 
purpose of public old-age pension and the ATP is providing fundamental social security 
during retirement, whereas the compensation level is primarily ensured by private pension 
schemes, notably labour market and individual pensions (ATP, 1995:31). The statutory ATP, 
SP and SAP schemes provide funded pension supplements to ensure their members higher 
pensions. Although statutory, they entail features from both first and second pillar and are 
thus often considered to constitute a separate pillar, cf. appendix B. 
 
The relative importance of the respective schemes/pillars can be measures by weighing the 
individual schemes according to their role as a source of income and/or their coverage, cf. 
table 2. The relative weight of the various schemes with regard to income is not comparable 
across the two countries, as different measures are used101. The national old-age pension 
constitutes the dominant source of income for most Norwegian pensioners, comprising about 
2/3 of their average income (Daatland, 1997:13). However, the number of pensioners with 
additional income is increasing. In 1990 roughly 50 per cent of all pensioner households 
received occupational pension in addition to old-age pension. By 1999 the figures have risen 
to 70 per cent (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:28). Public and private occupational pensions are 
supplementing the statutory pension in Norway and account for 17 per cent of earned pension 
rights in 1992102 (Daatland, 1997:13). In Denmark public old-age pension constitutes 
approximately 50 per cent of a pensioner’s103 total income in 1998, ATP about 2.5 per cent, 
civil service pensions almost 9 per cent and labour market and individual pensions 12 per cent 
(Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a:6). With regard to coverage 60 per cent of all pensioners in 
Denmark in 1995 received ATP-benefits, 15-18 per cent were covered by labour market 
pension schemes, while 10-12 per cent acquired pensions from individual arrangements (ATP, 
1995:6).  
 
With regard to retirement income, OECD recognises that existing public pensions systems are 
likely to remain the major source of income for many retirees (OECD, 1998:13). 
Nevertheless, it indicates a necessity for reducing the dominance of the first pillar, both in 
                                                 
101 With regards to the relative weight of the schemes as a source of income it has proven difficult to obtain 
comparable data. Thus, the schemes in Norway and Denmark are measured by their percentage of earned 
pension rights and of total pension income respectively.    
102 Obtaining current figures has proven to be difficult.  
103 Over the age of 67. 
order to increase the role of the second and third pillars and to contain public spending in 
relation to population ageing. OECD advocates a multi-pillar pension system, rather than the 
dominant one-pillar system currently found in both Norway and Denmark. Whether reforms 
and motions for reforms in Norway and Denmark favour a more multi-pillar system, will be 
addressed in the subsequent chapter. 
 
Table 2: An illustration of the relative importance of the various pension schemes as 
measured by their extent, i.e. coverage and role as a source of pension income.  
  Coverage,  
percentage of all 
pensioners 
Pension income 
source •  
Public old-age 
pension 
100% 82% 
Occupational pension 70% in 1999 17% 
Norway 
Individual pensions  2% 
Public old-age 
pension 
100% 49.6%  
ATP 60% in 1995 2.4%  
Civil service  8.8%  
Labour market 
pensions 
15-18% in 1995 
Individual pensions 10-12% in 1995 
 
12.1% 
Denmark 
Other income104  27.1% 
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a:6, Daatland, 1997:13, Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:28 and 
ATP, 1995:6. 
• As measured by percentage of earned income in Norway at the 1992-level and percentage of total 
pension income in Denmark, the latter 1998-figures. 
 
1.2 Universality 
Due to the expected challenges of an ageing population, various reforms of the pension 
system have already been passed and implemented or are commencing. Nevertheless, 
universality has remained a central feature of the Nordic pension system and all citizens or 
residents are still guaranteed a minimum pension (Kvist, 1999:249). There has been 
development towards increased reliance on national supplementary pensions at the expense of 
basic pensions due to the introduction or expansion of income means-testing on basic amount 
and/or the increased relative weight of pension supplements. Whether these changes will 
actually undermine the aspect of universality per se in the longer term, remains to be seen.  
 
                                                 
104 E.g. earnings, capital income etc. 
Generally, old-age pensions consist of basic pension and pension supplements. Their purpose 
can respectively be regarded as providing fundamental economic security and maintaining a 
reasonable income level, or level of compensation. Both Norway and Denmark guarantee 
their older citizens a state-funded minimum pension, irrespective of previous income, 
contribution or employment. Entitlement is related to residency, with a minimum requirement 
of three years, whereas 40 years is required in order to obtain full basic pension. In this 
respect, the principle of universality is retained. Basic amount in Denmark is graduated for 
additional earned income above a certain limit, on the grounds that pensioners with relatively 
high income have not really retired and hence should not be entitled to full basic amount 
(Regeringen, 2000:28). In Norway a similar graduation only applies to recipients under 70, 
while basic amount in Denmark is graduated regardless of age105. In my opinion this 
graduation does not make the national basic pension in Denmark less universal than the 
Norwegian (cf. ch. IV section 3.3).  
 
The national pension supplements in both Norway and Denmark are conditional/selective of a 
residual or reciprocal kind. In Norway the supplementary pension is “insurance-based 
reciprocal” as it is premised on previous earnings and labour market affiliation. In addition 
Norway has introduced a flat “special supplement” of a residual means-testing kind, targeted 
at pensioners with no or low supplementary pensions. The Danish pension supplement is of a 
residual means-testing kind, and is reduced if additional earnings of the recipient and his or 
her spouse/cohabitant reach a certain amount, assets excluded (Ministry of Social Affairs, 
2002a, appendix 2). In other words both basic amount and the supplementary pension in 
Denmark are irrespective of previous labour market affiliation, though they to a certain extent 
depend on additional income. Kvist stresses that Denmark has increased the relative size of 
the national pension supplement subjected to means-testing against other pension income. 
Accordingly, pensioners with major income from occupational pensions will receive a 
reduced national pension (1999:246). Admittedly, the element of means-testing is more 
pronounced in the Danish pension system, but on the other hand the Norwegian pension 
system entails an aspect of reciprocity not found in Denmark. In this respect I do not consider 
one to be more “universal” than the other, as both pension systems include 
selective/conditional features. Kvist (ibid:249) concludes that despite means-tests and 
earnings-related national pensions, the principle of universality remains a distinctive feature 
                                                 
105 Until 1994 basic amount for all aged 70 or more were provided irrespective of additional earnings (Plovsing, 
1994:36). 
of the pension systems in Norway and Denmark.  The national pensions are described further 
in the appendix.  
 
It should briefly be noted that the aspect of universality in the pension system may in the 
longer term be affected by a shift towards more reliance on national pension supplements and 
less on basic pension. This shift primarily addresses people with considerable income from 
earnings, private pensions and/or other sources and is basically a result of means-tested basic 
pension and/or increased relative weight of pension supplements.  
 
Esping-Andersen recognises that almost all countries dominated by universal rights of 
citizenship regardless of need, contribution or labour market affiliation, have developed 
supplementary earnings- and work-related schemes106 to complement public flat-rate benefits 
(1990:49). In Norway the supplementary pension is related to previous income, counting the 
20 “best pension-earning years”, whereas the work-related element in the Danish public 
pension system is embedded in the ATP scheme. 
 
ATP is a statutory supplementary pension scheme in Denmark, which I classify as public. 
Although mandatory for all wage earners and certain groups of transfer recipients, its 
coverage is not yet universal. The scheme is, however, expected to attain almost universal 
coverage in the long run (ATP, 1995:9). ATP is contribution-defined, but depends on the 
scope of employment rather than earnings. In this respect dependency on previous income is 
less pronounced in Denmark as compared to Norway (Søndergaard, 1999:297). Originally, 
the work-element was prevalent in the ATP scheme, as coverage was based on labour market 
affiliation. Reforms incorporating certain groups of pension recipients and voluntary members 
have, however, weakened the work-element. Nevertheless, the relation to labour market 
affiliation still prevails. Hence, I regard the current ATP to be a selective scheme of a 
reciprocal kind. 
 
To sum up, basic pension in both Norway and Denmark currently retain the principle of 
universality with regard to coverage and allocation criteria. In my opinion this does not apply 
to the various pension supplements, where the aspect of selectivity appears to prevail.  
                                                 
106 Earnings- and work-related pensions are usually regarded aspects of the corporatist welfare regime. But then 
Esping-Andersen recognises that currently most countries presents a system mix, i.e. have incorporated elements 
from more than one welfare regime (1990:48).  
 1.3 Generosity 
Generous benefits are generally regarded essential features of the Scandinavian welfare state. 
The question currently at hand is how this supposition complies with the benefit levels of the 
national old-age pension. Kvist (1999:249) finds that as a consequence of the increasing 
reliance on supplementary pensions, the generosity of basic old-age pension in Denmark has 
to a certain degree decreased. His study indicates that Danish pensions went from being 
“fairly” generous in 1990 to “more or less” generous in 1997107. The main reason appears to 
be that increases in benefits did not fully correspond to increases in real wages, although 
current pensioners were compensated in a reform in 1994. Kvist measures the generosity of 
national old-age pensions by their average net replacement rate. It should in this respect be 
noted that Danish pensioners are taxed according to the same rules as those applying to other 
taxpayers, whereas tax rules in Norway especially favour pensioners.  
 
Eitrheim and Kuhnle concur that an overall tendency in the Nordic countries in the 1990s is 
decreased welfare generosity108, with the exception of Norway (2000:54). Admittedly, some 
schemes in Norway have been modified, while the generosity of others has actually increased. 
Albeit not necessarily valid for all countries and all schemes, benefit levels are generally 
reduced, benefit periods shortened while waiting periods are prolonged, eligibility is tightened 
and the “work line” (arbeidlinje) more pronounced109. To illustrate, the labour market reform 
in Denmark in 1994 both tightened eligibility and shortened benefit periods.  
 
                                                 
107 Kvist stresses that Norway may run counter to this trend, as his study has no available data for Norway.  
108 However, they address the welfare state in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland in general and not only 
pension systems. 
109 Reflected in increased emphasis on rehabilitation, activation, education and training. 
The level of national pensions in Denmark, i.e. basic pension and supplement, is more or less 
equivalent to the minimum pension in Norway. Nominally the rates are higher in Denmark, 
but as the special deduction for old-age pensioners was removed in the middle of the 1990s, 
current pensioners in Denmark pay higher taxes than pensioners in Norway (Pedersen, 
2002a:10).  
 
Table 3 illustrates national pension benefits in Denmark and Norway. Before taxation, single 
pensioners seem to receive more generous benefits in Denmark. However, Danes are taxed 
according to the same rules as general taxpayers, whereas tax rules in Norway especially 
favour pensioners. Comparing total monthly pension amount after taxation, both single and 
married pensioners in Norway enjoy more generous benefit levels. 
 
Table 3: Monthly minimum amount of pension, 2000 
  Denmark, DKK Norway, NOK 
Single people Basic amount  4 130 4 091 
 Supplement  4 095 3 245 
 Total before tax 8 225 7 366 
 Total after tax 6 097 7 336 
Married couples Basic amount  8 260 6 136 
 Supplement  3 756 6 491 
 Total before tax 12 016 12 672 
 Total after tax 9 494 12 672 
Source: NOSOSCO, 2002:126 
 
Whereas table 3 reflects the benefit levels of national old-age pensions, table 4 illuminates the 
compensation level of the national basic pension and national pension supplements combined. 
For a single pensioner with maximum insurance period, the net compensation level is almost 
identical in Denmark and Norway, amounting to well over 60 per cent of average industrial 
wages110 in 1998. Net monthly minimum pension in both countries are considered relatively 
high at the international level, even compared to Sweden and Finland, with respectively 427 
and 373 Euro. Monthly minimum pension is converted into purchasing power parity (PPP), 
which takes into account what recipients can actually purchase for the money they receive. 
Expressed in PPP the net minimum pension in Denmark appears to be higher than in Norway, 
whereas the figures in table 3 indicate the opposite. PPP may, however, be a more accurate 
measure for comparison as it reflects the actual purchasing power of pensions and not just 
their nominal value. Over time the generosity of national pension benefits in Norway and 
                                                 
110 Wage for the “average Production Worker” as defined by OECD. 
Denmark may have decreased, but at the international level, they are still regarded relatively 
generous, cf. the Long-term programme 2002-2005111.   
 
Table 4: Net levels of basic pension and national supplements for single pensioner with 
maximum insurance and average industrial wage, at the 1998-level.  
 Denmark Norway 
Net compensation level  63% 62% 
Net minimum pension in euro 
converted into PPP 
602 549 
Source: The Long-term programme 2002-2005 
 
1.4 Full Employment 
The introduction of labour market measures and reforms in Norway and Denmark has entailed 
a more active welfare state enhancing labour market re-entry for the unemployed through 
inter alia training and education (Eitrheim & Kuhnle, 2000:54). Active labour market schemes 
have especially been a success in Denmark in recent years, although the political concern for 
the “work line” is pronounced across the Nordic countries.  
 
Unemployment insurance benefit to people of working-age is related to earned income and is 
only allocated when earnings completely or partially fail. Employment is decisive for 
insurance demands and the Nordic countries have prioritised the goal of full employment for a 
long time. This policy may partially be due to a wish for keeping social expenditures down, 
but also a protestant belief that participation in the labour market is beneficial to the 
individual as well as society at large112 (Hatland, 2001:86). Insurance policies and 
arrangements primarily need to take two considerations into account, providing financial 
security when earned income fail, while advocating work to make sure that people choose 
employment over welfare benefits. In Norway the latter is particularly stressed in the 
Rehabilitation White Paper of 1992113. 
 
1.4.1 The “Activation” Strategy 
Jon Kvist (2001:5) distinguishes the activation policy in the Nordic countries from its 
European counterparts by the extensive and intensive intervening role of the state. The former 
                                                 
111 Langtidsprogrammet, Stortingsmelding no. 30 (2000-2001). 
112 This protestant work ethic may worsen the situation for the unemployed who may feel pushed out and 
rejected by society as well as the labour market in addition to experience financial difficulties. 
113Attføringsmeldinga, Stortingsmelding no. 39 (1991-1992) 
refers to getting the broadest section of the population into work or similar activities, whereas 
the latter implies that all of the state’s policies aspire this goal. The objective of participation 
in ordinary paid work may prove impossible to achieve for certain groups. Hence the term 
“activation” in the Scandinavian countries is more broadly understood as participation in 
some sort of activity, reflected in the provision of alternative activity for people who cannot 
undertake ordinary paid work. 
 
The “activation policy” in Denmark and Norway favours enforcing obligations to work and 
enhancing activation measures rather than lowering benefit rates and/or wages. There is also a 
political focus on strengthening the position of particularly vulnerable groups in the labour 
market by improving their qualifications (Kvist, 2001:5). Active labour market measures for 
adapting the labour force to structural changes include educational programmes, training and 
similar competence-building initiatives. Traditionally, participation has been based on rights 
and opportunities rather than duties and sanctions, although the obligation to actively seek 
work is central in Scandinavian welfare programmes. Kildal (2001:6) finds that new “work 
and activity approaches” emerge in the Scandinavian countries during the 1990s, where 
negative incentives, “sticks” take precedence over positive ones, “carrots”, characteristic of 
previous active labour market policies. The new approach entails a workfare114 element, i.e. a 
duty to work in return for benefits in the lowest tier of the income maintenance system, which 
especially distinguishes it from traditional work approaches. In Denmark the aspect of 
workfare was introduced in a labour market reform in 1993, obliging all social assistance 
recipients to participate in some sort of municipal activity. Refusal will impose a 20 per cent 
cut in benefits, cf. “sticks”, whereas compliance implies receiving a wage based on the 
collective labour market agreement (Abrahamson, 1999:412; Goul Andersen, 2002:81 in 
Kildal, 2001:9). With its strong emphasis on activation, duty and a trend towards workfare, 
Denmark is regarded a pioneer in Scandinavian compulsory activation. The Norwegian work 
approach also emphasises strengthening incentives to work by use of sticks with the aim of 
actively linking benefits to work requirements, and thereby abandoning passive income 
support policies, cf. the Rehabilitation White Paper of 1992 and the Welfare White Paper of 
1995115. This feature is reflected in the obligation for recipients of unemployment benefits to 
                                                 
114 “Workfare programmes oblige able-bodies recipients to work in return for their benefits on terms inferior to 
comparative work in the labour market and are essentially linked to the lowest tier of public income maintenance 
systems” (Kildal, 2001:3) 
115 Velferdsmeldingen, Stortingsmelding no. 35 (1994-1995). 
accept any work the employment office deems suitable anywhere in the country, reinforced in 
1998 (ibid). 
 
During the 1990s some Scandinavian welfare policies become stricter, others more generous 
(ibid:14). The former inter alia includes tightened eligibility criteria by increasing the focus 
on observable, medical diagnosis and reduced periods and levels of support. In Norway the 
possibility of granting disability pension due to “age weakening” was abolished in 1991 and 
recently a motion on reducing the period of disability support is submitted, cf. ch. VI. In 
Denmark the rules of eligibility to post employment wage, the dominant path to early labour 
force exit, have been tightened on several occasions and entrance to the transitional allowance 
scheme was terminated as of 1996. Both countries stress that disability/anticipatory pensions 
should only be awarded once rehabilitation and activation measures are exhausted, cf. section 
2.0. The work approach is reflected in the fact that retraining efforts also include older 
workers and incentives to re-entering the labour market for recipients are being created. So far 
the generous benefit levels typical of Scandinavia have not been attacked (Øverbye, 1997:14). 
 
Although Denmark and Norway are both moving towards workfare and a stronger emphasis 
on the aspect of “duty” by use of sticks, their official reasons differ. In Denmark high 
unemployment rates and increased public spending have given grounds for introducing 
workfare. Interestingly though, Danish researchers point out that elements of workfare were 
actually introduced after the recovery of Danish economy (Loftager, 1998; Goul Andersen, 
2002: in Kildal, 2001:9). Norway on the other hand, experiencing high economic growth and 
low unemployment rates from the beginning of the 1990s, states a financial concern for future 
generations, a concern for the work ethic and the dissolution of individual responsibility as 
reasons for justifying workfare (Kildal, 1998 in Kildal, 2001:14). Kildal concludes that 
although workfare is embedded in both parts of the two-tiered welfare system, as of yet it only 
constitutes a small portion of Scandinavian welfare reform. Rather than being replaced, the 
overall income-maintaining system is slightly scooped out and supplemented by workfare-
related schemes.   
 
1.5 Comparative Remarks 
Table 5 summarizes the above-presented aspects of the pension systems in Norway and 
Denmark in light of the OECD recommendations and the Scandinavian welfare state. The 
table is an extended version of Table 1 in chapter III and suggests that the pension systems in 
Norway and Denmark incorporate elements of both OECD and the Scandinavian welfare 
state, although the characteristics of the latter prevails. To the extent that the values embedded 
in the OECD recommendations are reflected in the pension system it is my opinion that both 
countries may be (more116) inclined to follow the OECD directions for reform. The fact that 
private pension schemes and accounts are more prevalent in Denmark could imply that 
Denmark is more inclined than Norway to follow the OECD multi-pillar pension provision 
approach, which entails downscaling public provision to facilitate private pension schemes. A 
multi-pillar approach implies increased individual responsibility for one’s retirement income. 
Although public pensions in both countries are primarily universal, certain benefits are 
means-tested. As means-tests are more pronounced in Denmark, this could indicate that 
Norway would be more reluctant to follow suit. On the other hand, Norway is not unfamiliar 
with selective pensions although the main principle is reciprocity rather than residualism. The 
principle of reciprocity is also reflected in the OECD recommendation of strengthening the 
relationship of earnings, contributions and benefits. In this respect Norway may be more 
inclined to follow OECD recommendations.  
 
With regard to benefit levels of public pensions, both Norway and Denmark reflect the aspect 
of generosity typical of the Scandinavian welfare state. I thus find it unlikely that either 
country would implement reforms reflecting the OECD view that public pension should only 
meet poverty alleviation goals. Whether or not my assumptions will prove likely, will be 
addressed in the following chapter. The aspect of employment embedded in the OECD 
principles and the Scandinavian model is generally similar, which also applies to the 
activation strategies in Norway and Denmark. In other words, general employment policies to 
boost employment rates and labour force participation, including workfare, would concur with 
normative values of both the Scandinavian model and OECD recommendations. 
 
 
 
                                                 
116 Compared to if the normative values embedded in OECD and the pension systems diverge.  
Table 5: An illustration of normative values embedded in the OECD principles and the 
Scandinavian model as reflected in the pension systems in Norway and Denmark as of 2002 
 Normative principles 
Welfare state 
dimensions 
OECD Scandinavian 
welfare state 
Norway Denmark 
Responsibility Primarily individual 
-private and 
individual                    
schemes and 
accounts 
“Reduced” state 
    -means-tested 
provision 
Primarily state 
-public 
schemes 
Allows for 
private and 
occupational 
supplements, 
stress on 
supplement 
Public pension 
provision 
dominates 
-not prevalent 
private 
provision 
Public provision 
dominates 
-more prevalent 
private provision 
than Norway 
Public 
benefits 
Means-
tested/targeted 
Universal -Universal 
minimum 
pension 
-reciprocal 
supplementary 
pension 
-residual 
means-tested 
special 
supplement 
-Universal 
minimum 
pension 
-residual means-
tested 
supplementary 
pension 
Benefit level Only meet poverty 
alleviation goals 
Generous 
-basic pension 
-compensation 
level 
-Generous basic 
pension 
-Generous 
compensation 
level 
-Not as generous 
basic pension as 
Norway 
-Equivalent the 
Norwegian 
compensation 
level 
Employment Pro-active approach 
-e.g. high levels of 
employment and 
lifelong learning 
Full 
employment 
Full 
employment 
-elements of 
workfare 
Full 
employment 
-elements of 
workfare 
  
2.0 Pre-Retirement Paths and Work Incentives/Disincentives 
In previous chapters I address the increasing trend of pre-retirement and its subsequent 
challenges with regard to pension system and ageing. Norway and Denmark have, together 
with Iceland, the highest retirement age in Europe (Hatland, 2001:109). Nevertheless, their 
actual retirement age are considerably lower than the standard age of retirement. This is 
primarily due to various paths to pre-retirement provided by the pension system in general 
and pre-retirement schemes in particular, notably the AFP in Norway and the post 
employment wage and the transitional allowance schemes in Denmark.  Although not 
“voluntary” pre-retirement schemes, disability/anticipatory pensions have in practice provided 
a path to early exit. In Norway this is reflected in the fact that the disability pension remains 
the most important path to pre-retirement. I refer to the disability pension in Norway and the 
anticipatory pension in Denmark, although their objectives are more or less the same. In fact, 
the latter was originally labelled disability pension. However, the term anticipatory pension 
better complies with the current Danish term førtidspension, whereas Norway still apply the 
term disability, uførhet117. They are equivalent in the sense that they are public early 
retirement schemes, though not voluntary, and condition eligibility on health criteria, although 
Denmark also includes social criteria.    
 
The following section focuses on various paths to early retirement embedded in the overall 
pension systems in Norway and Denmark. Schemes entailing early retirement have been 
introduced as means to redistribute employment from older workers to the young unemployed 
at times of increasing unemployment and are sometimes “exploited” by companies at times of 
labour redundancy and cutbacks. On one hand, their implementation may reflect current 
sentiments in the population for lowering the retirement age (ibid:109). On the other, their 
existence and embedded incentives may actually contribute to increased sentiments for early 
retirement. A survey conducted by MMI118 in 2002 indicates that on average Norwegians 
wish to retire at the age of 59 (Aftenposten, 2002). In this context schemes providing early 
retirement may constitute pull factors for early labour force exit and in practise undermine the 
actual standard age of retirement. Faced with an ageing population and a decreasing labour 
force, the embedded work incentives and disincentives of early retirement schemes should be 
reassessed. In the following I direct attention to schemes I consider to constitute important 
paths to early labour force exit in my two countries. This is not to say that the presentation is 
complete. Denmark has various public pre-retirement schemes, where the objective in both 
theory and practise is to provide the opportunity of early retirement, whereas in Norway such 
schemes are non-existing. With regard to Norway I thus present schemes that to a certain 
extent provide the possibility of early labour force exit for older workers.  
 
The strength of pre-retirement paths as pull factors will partly depend on whether or not they 
constitute a viable option to continued employment. The transition from work to retirement 
implies replacing earned income with pension income, their interrelation being referred to as 
                                                 
117 The anticipatory pension in Denmark have various levels consisting of distinctive allowances, inter alia a 
disability allowance which is included in two of the levels, cf. Denmark section 2.1.  
118 The survey was performed on behalf of Storebrand and included 3500 Norwegians. 
the level of compensation. The higher the compensation level, the stronger the incentives to 
retirement may be perceived. To the extent costs associated with early labour force exit do not 
outdo its gains, early retirement may in fact be regarded as a rational choice. This is not to say 
that the decision of pre-retirement is necessarily rational. Besides, arguments can be made for 
considering either work or retirement a good per se. Several aspects may influence the 
retirement decision, of which only some are a direct result of public pension policies. I do not 
intend to explain why an increasingly share of older workers opt for early retirement. I do, 
however, consider that pre-retirement schemes may provide strong and rational incentives to 
early labour force exit, which may be influenced through reform policies.       
 
Norway 
Pre-retirement arrangements are decreasing the actual retirement age, though the standard age 
of retirement has reminded unaltered at 67. In 2000 the average age of labour force exit is 
62.8 years in Norway, only counting pensioners over 50 years. If young receivers of disability 
pension are included, the average exit age is only 59.6 years119 (Hatland, 2001:110). Of the 
630 000 people who received old-age pension in 2000, 610 000 were 67 years or older 
(ibid:214), leaving a considerable number of pensioners below the age of 67. Due to the 
projected reduction of the future labour force, the various pre-retirement paths need to be 
addressed. Restricting one path will hardly counteract the tendency of early retirement if other 
schemes still favour or render pre-retirement possible. Likewise, schemes providing a bonus 
to those who defer retirement are not likely to be successful if other retirement options are 
more attractive. Despite the tendency of early retirement, the labour force participation rate of 
older workers in Norway is among the highest in the world. On the other hand, participation 
of elderly has decreased, the average working hours per person has dropped considerably, 
whereas the extent of part-time employment has increased significantly since 1970. From 
1980 to 2000 the labour force affiliation of men aged 60-64 dropped from 75 to 61 per cent 
and from 35 to 14 per cent for men over 65. Meanwhile the labour force participation of 
women aged 60-64 increased from 41 to 48 per cent  (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:21).       
 
A distinction may be drawn between permanent and in principal temporary pre-retirement 
arrangements. The distinction is of particular importance to social security and pension 
policies. AFP is considered a permanent arrangement because it neither assumes nor implies a 
re-entry to previous or other employment, though AFP-pensioners are generally allowed 
                                                 
119 The figures include retirement through the AFP and the National Insurance Scheme. 
additional income without reducing their pension payments. Disability pension holds an 
intermediate position. It is in principal a temporary arrangement, unless the claimant is at least 
50 per cent disabled until the age of 67. Otherwise it is considered possible and generally 
desirable that the disabled may re-enter the labour force. In reality fully disabled often 
consider themselves permanently “retired” and disregard re-entrance altogether regardless of 
any improvement in their ability to work (NOU 1994:2,p.93). Although sickness benefit and 
daily allowance may compensate temporary droppings of income, they are not pension 
arrangements as such. They may, however, directly precede pension payments in accordance 
with their intent in cases of actual sickness and/or unemployment or due to deliberate 
(mis)use as means of pre-retirement. Either way they may in practise constitute temporary 
pre-retirement arrangements.      
 
2.1 The Disability Pension 
Despite the introduction of the AFP, the disability pension scheme constitutes the most 
widespread pre-retirement path in Norway120, in part because eligibility criteria traditionally 
have been laxer for older workers (Øverbye, 1997:12). It was for instance possible for 
employees above 63 to be granted a disability pension in Norway under the diagnosis “age 
weakening”, a policy abandoned in 1991121. The only entrance criterion for a flat-rate 
disability pension is residency, whereas an earnings-related disability pension normally 
requires work experience. Regulation further stipulates treatment and rehabilitation to precede 
the assignment of disability pension.  
 
The disability pension scheme is based on the line of thought that one should not be punished 
for leaving the labour force due to disability. Full disability pension is measured out like pre-
retirement pensions and the disabled is credited pension credits (or pension points) until the 
age of retirement. In other words, the claimant is entitled to the same old-age pension as were 
he or she employed until the age of 67 (Hatland, 2001:98).  
 
To a certain extent regulation permits people on disability pension to undertake employment. 
Partially disabled claimants, less than 100 per cent but more than 50 per cent disabled, may 
receive rated disability pension amounting to 50, 60, 70, 80 or 90 per cent of full disability 
                                                 
120The number of recipients and new entrants is relatively high, although restricted to disabled.    
121 Although the practise is maintained in public occupational pension funds cf. appendix B. 
pension. Thus, claimants may have additional income, provided it is in accordance with their 
rated disability pension. In the second year the ceiling on additional income is raised without 
the rate of disability being re-evaluated, allowing the recipient an annual income equivalent to 
basic amount in addition to the amount already granted on the basis of the remaining ability of 
earning an income122 (Kjønstad, 1998:458). Claimants of full disability pension may only earn 
a totalling 10 per cent of previous income. Recipients of disability pension are given trial-
periods in the labour market where they may try their ability in the labour market with the 
security that if unsuccessful, they will not have to re-apply from scratch (Øverbye, 1997:14). 
Free amounts and trial-periods limit the risks of trying to (re)enter the labour market123. In 
practice, however, there are primarily two ways of exiting disability pension, death or transfer 
to old-age pension (Hatland, 2001,p.99). 
 
The number of recipients of disability pension has increased more or less continuously since 
its implementation in 1961. In the peaking years of 1987 and 1999 roughly 33 600 people 
entered the scheme and at the turn of the century almost 280 000 claimants received disability 
pension (Hatland, 2001:99). In addition 70 000 below the age of 67 received rehabilitation 
benefits (ibid:214). This development led to governmental intervention and parliamentary 
initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s. Is should be noted that the contemporaneous restrictions of 
the old-age pension, notably the lowering of the income ceiling (cf. appendix B section 1.2), 
also effected the disability pension scheme. Measures aimed at limiting entrance to disability 
pension have been implemented, like the tightening of the geographical and occupational 
mobility requirements in 1990. In 1991 Parliament tightens the medical conditions by 
emphasising diagnoses, which permanently reduce functional ability. Henceforth regulation 
requires that the medical diagnosis should be the “primary cause” of reduced income 
(ibid:117). The Rehabilitation White Paper of 1992 stipulates that the insurance arrangements 
should incorporate a “work line”, stipulating that people generally should earn their own 
income through work rather than be supported by benefits. This strategy, which has been the 
most important approach to reduce the growth of public welfare spending in the 1990s, has 
included improving medical and occupational rehabilitation as well as requiring claimants to 
“earn” their received benefits.                       
 
                                                 
122 Upon which the rate of disability was based in the first place. 
123 This does not necessarily imply that the incentives to enter work are more pronounced than the disincentives. 
In general rehabilitation precedes an application for disability pension. This is usually not 
required of people between the ages of 55 and 60 whose return to their original or equivalent 
employment are considered unlikely, who may apply for disability pension directly. As 
rehabilitation benefits are not credited pension point unless being directly succeeded by 
disability pension without work intermission, claimants in this age group are often 
recommended to circumvent rehabilitation altogether. In addition applicants over 60 years are 
not subjected to the same mobility requirements in order to obtain employment (Engelstad, 
1992:23).  
                                                                                                                                                                               
In the long-term the above restrictions have proven rather ineffective in reducing the number 
of recipients of disability pension. Hence the so-called Sandman-committee was established. 
In its report of 2000 it proposes to reduce the level of sick leave. Sick leave is identified as the 
first step towards disability and disability pension and reducing the level of sick leave is 
expected to decrease the number of disability claimants. The committee does not propose 
restricting the entitlement to disability pension, but recommends increasing rehabilitation 
measures and extend their financial support as long as there is hope of improving the ability 
of work. The report advocates a temporary disability pension124 as well as enhancing the 
combination of work and pension (Hatland, 2001:105). Which of the above suggestion will be 
adopted and implemented, if any, still remains to be seen. 
                                             
2.2 Schemes Favouring Early Exit 
In 1973 Norway granted an allowance for pensioners to choose a mix of pensions and 
earnings, provided they retired between the ages of 67 and 70. Hence Norway became the first 
OECD member to introduce part-time pension (Øverbye, 1997:15). Apart from the disability 
pension, no public pre-retirement path exists in Norway. However, a collectively bargained 
early retirement scheme set up by the social partners, the AFP, is providing voluntary early 
retirement.  
 
2.2.1 AFP 
The National Insurance Scheme does not include a pre-retirement arrangement, but in practise 
disability pension and local programs have constituted a path to early retirement for older 
                                                 
124 Not generally, but in cases where recipient maintain some ability of earning an income in the future (Hatland, 
2001:105). 
workers (Daatland, 1997:19). Increased unemployment during the 1980s prompted trade 
unions to demand a provision for a “worthy” exit for elderly members, a demand the 
Government was reluctant to comply. The confederation of trade unions (LO) gave pre-
retirement schemes top priority in wage negotiations, which resulted in an agreement between 
the unions and the employer organisations in 1988. The special pre-retirement scheme, the 
AFP, was introduced (Øverbye, 1997:19). Its objective is to offer workers the possibility to 
completely or partially retire from the labour force before the age of 67.   
 
Though formally a private arrangement, the AFP is financed by employer contributions and a 
40 per cent basic state funding. It covers 2/3 of the work force, and by 2000 about 32 000 
receive AFP-pension (Hatland, 2001:214). Initially the AFP scheme only addressed the 65 
and 66 years old, but the age of eligibility is lowered to 64 in 1990 and further to 62 in 1998. 
According to eligibility criteria, applicants are required to having been employed for at least 
10 years after the age of 50 with an income above basic amount. Annual income in the year of 
application must exceed basic amount, which is the principal rule for earning pension credits. 
An AFP-retirement will not affect the public superannuation from the age of 67 (Øverbye, 
1997:16).  
 
In general the AFP portion is equivalent to the old-age pension the recipient would receive at 
the age of 67. The rate of compensation is more favourable for people with low income and 
less generous for people with higher income (NOU 1994:2,p.129). As opposed to old-age 
pension, AFP is not tax deductible and net income of AFP will usually be considerably lower 
than the equivalent of disability and old-age pensions. However, AFP-pensioners on a 
minimum pension level are exempted taxation, cf. minimum pensioners, and to a greater 
extent additional earnings is rendered possible as compared to disability pension regulation 
(Sirnes, 1990:178).  
 
The framing of the AFP provides strong incentives towards early labour force exit. According 
to AFP-regulations annual pension will in general be irrespective of whether the recipient 
retire at 62 or 67. This is a result of the fact that the annual pension is not correlated to age 
upon retirement. The national old-age will be estimated as were the pensioner in employment 
until reaching the age of 67 and taxes on pension income is lower then on earned income 
(NOU 1998:19,p.30).   
 
The AFP-pension is coordinated with public occupational pensions. Private occupational 
pension earning will not continue once the AFP-pension is withdrawn. Private employees 
withdrawing AFP-pension may loose substantial occupational pension payments after the age 
of 67 due to the fact that the private occupational insurances are based on progressive 
pension-earnings, as opposed to the linear pension-earnings in the public occupational 
pensions. In private occupational pension arrangements half the premium is often paid after 
the employee has reached 60 years. An employee retiring at the age of 64 may thus annually 
loose 15-20 per cent of the occupational pension as compared to if he or she had continued in 
their employment until the standard age of retirement (NOU 1994:2,p.129).  
 
In combining AFP and work, the AFP-portion will be reduced according to the total income 
of pension and earnings. Employment in the private sector, provided income do not exceed 
basic amount, and public employment without public pension funds will not affect pension 
payments. The rules of reduction are identical to the ones applying to old-age pensioners 
between the ages of 67 and 70. The employer is not obligated to offer shorter hours and 
besides, the AFP scheme presupposes the employee to resign current employment, regardless 
of whether the employee wants full, ¾, ½ or ¼ AFP (Sirnes, 1990:177).  The entitlement to 
AFP does not apply above the age of 67 or on receipt of disability pension, rehabilitation 
benefit or survivor’s pension.  
 
Evidence125 suggests that AFP and endowment benefits combined are often applied upon 
retrenchment and as means to reorganise (NOU 1998:19,p.57,237). In this respect the 
withdrawal of AFP-pension is not necessarily the wish of the employee, it may as well reflect 
the employer’s need to reduce the number of hands. The endowment pension is meant to 
increase total pension income and encourage employees to opt for early retirement. On the 
other hand, using pre-retirement as a means for retrenchment entails that dismissal is not 
required to be founded on facts, which may increase the applied pressure on older workers. 
   
2.2.2 Unemployment Benefits 
For unemployed over the age of 60.5, the National Insurance Scheme may in practise provide 
daily allowance until the standard age for retirement, from the age of 64 without 
                                                 
125 Inter alia a survey conducted by Opinionen AS on behalf of the committee “On Flexible Retirement” (NOU 
1998:19,p.237). 
intermittence. Thus, for older recipients daily allowance may approximate pre-retirement 
pension (NOU 1994:2,p.99). The level of compensation is relatively generous. Recipients 
over the age of 64 are emitted a minimum daily allowance amounting to 3G, and payments 
are, in contrast to other groups of transfer income, regulated according to changes in basic 
amount (Kjønstad, 1998:218). 
 
2.2.3 Endowment Pension 
Daily allowance has to some extent been employed in informal pre-retirement of older 
employees, particularly at times of labour redundancy and cutbacks. The former employer 
will in this case usually provide an additional endowment pension, a so-called gavepensjon, to 
supplement daily allowance. Older workers are offered retirement with a certain amount of 
previous wages guaranteed, provided they register as unemployed in order to receive daily 
allowance. If the offer is accepted, their former employer will supplement their income with 
an endowment pension. In April 1993 it was estimated that the number combining 
endowment pension and daily allowance constituted somewhere between 2 500 and 3 000 
people, whereas 9 277 people over the age of 60 were registered as unemployed (NOU 
1994:2,p.112). On account of stipulation changes in December 1994, daily allowance and 
endowment pension are henceforth coordinated (NOU 1998:19,p.237). Daily allowance is 
reduced with the equivalent of the endowment pension upon dismissal or resignation. At a 
minimum, the combined benefits should at least amount to 3 per cent of basic amount a week. 
A similar coordination regulation was adopted in 1997 with regard to the disability pension.     
 
Norway has avoided so-called employer-sponsored occupational schemes encouraging exit 
between the ages of 55 and 60126 due to government regulations. In order to receive 
favourable tax treatment, Norwegian occupational pensions cannot provide benefits, with the 
exception of disability and survivor’s pensions, before their employees reach the retirement 
age. In addition benefits have to be in the form of annuities and not lump-sums (Øverbye, 
1997:20). The fact that white-collars are over-represented among the holders of occupational 
pension implies that regulatory policies may limit the pre-retirement path of salaried staff 
especially. In other words, governments can influence the designs of private and negotiated 
retirement schemes through regulation and tax incentives. Hence, governmental (pre-) 
retirement policy need not only address the design of public or mandatory pension schemes.  
                                                 
126 In US and Australia firms apply such schemes to encourage early exit (Øverbye, 1997:20). 
 
Denmark  
Although the standard age of retirement in Denmark is 67, 65 from 2004, the average actual 
retirement age is lower, currently about 61 years. The major decline in labour market 
participation occurs from the age of 60 when many become eligible to the post employment 
wage. From the age group 55-59 to 60-62 the participation rate in 1998 dropped from 72 to 39 
per cent (Bingley et al, 2001:7). This may partly be a result of the generous provision of 
voluntary retirement, i.e. broad and relaxed conditions, from the age of 60, whereas retirement 
at younger ages primarily is a question of health conditions and eligibility for anticipatory 
pension. A study from 1997 of the correlation between health problems/disability and 
anticipatory pension also indicates occurrence of either moral hazard or imperfect targeting. 
On the other hand, eligibility to post employment wage is conditioned on previous labour 
force participation and may thereby discourage temporary leave. This also applies sick pay 
and unemployment insurance benefits, also premised on previous labour participation  
(Søndergaard, 1999:310).  
 
The participation rate, especially for the age group 60 to 67 which in 1998 constituted 59 per 
cent, is still high in international comparison despite the availability of various paths of labour 
force exit. Financial incentives may strongly favour early retirement particular for low-
income groups, for whom the net replacement rates sometimes exceed 100 per cent, implying 
that some may actually suffer a net income loss on working (ibid:316). On the other hand, 
people with higher income will generally receive a relatively low level of compensation from 
pre-retirement schemes as compared to earnings, which may constitute a disincentive for early 
exit for this group127 (Bingley et al., 2001:7).    
 
The negotiated pension schemes in Denmark are less centralized than the AFP-scheme in 
Norway and may vary across the various branches of the economy. The schemes are, 
however, anticipated to be more important as regards regular retirement, including disability, 
than early retirement (Øverbye, 1997:20). 
 
Generally, Denmark offers the most extensive pre-retirement schemes in Scandinavia 
(ibid:15). In contrast to Norway, Danish part-time pensions combining work and retirement 
                                                 
127 Net compensation for low-income groups is approximately 70 per cent as compared to “only” 40 per cent for 
the high-income groups (Bingley et al., 2001:8). 
also include those who retire before the formal retirement age. A partly pension allows 
claimants to receive pension while working reduced hours. The scheme includes the self-
employed, although stricter eligibility criteria apply as compared to employees. The post 
employment wage scheme provides the opportunity of complete withdrawal from the labour 
market. Both schemes apply from the age of 60, but eligibility is more restricted in the latter 
as applicants are required to have been a member of an unemployment insurance fund for at 
least 20 out of the last 25 years128. It is possible to receive permanent daily allowance (or 
unemployment benefit) from the age of 50, provided the recipient is eligible for early 
retirement benefits upon turning 60. Øverbye (ibid:16) concludes that Norway and Denmark 
represent opposites in their approach to pre-retirement. 
 
2.1 The Anticipatory Pension129
Although not a “voluntary” early retirement scheme, the anticipatory pension (førtidspension) 
provides a path to early retirement. Next to the old-age pension, it is the main social security 
benefit in Denmark and available to citizens aged 18 to 65130 whose capacity for work is 
significantly reduced. Eligibility was initially conditioned on health criteria alone, but is 
gradually extended to also include social criteria. Anticipatory pension is only awarded once 
rehabilitation and activation measures and other relevant possibilities for using or enhancing 
remaining working capacities are exhausted. At the age of 65/67 recipients enter the old-age 
pension scheme (Jørgensen, 2002c:36). The anticipatory pension is a defined benefit scheme 
fully financed from general tax revenues. 
 
On average 8 per cent of the population in Denmark receives anticipatory pension. Not 
surprisingly, elderly are generally more likely to be awarded anticipatory pension than the 
young, in part because of gradual wear and tear. It is primarily people aged 50 to 66 who 
receive anticipatory pension and in 1990 their share amounted to 63 per cent. The 
corresponding annual figures in the period 1990 to 1997 range from 50 to 70 per cent 
(Weatherall, 2002:7). 
  
                                                 
128 Though membership is voluntary, unemployment insurance funds cover about ¾ of the labour force (ibid:15). 
129 Under the pension reform of 1984 the term disability pension was abolished and replaced with anticipatory 
pension (Simonsen & Damsø, 1998:13). I refer to the latter, but there is in principle no distinction between the 
two as they refer to the same social benefit, and both are still employed. 
130 People who turned 60 prior to July 1999 may under certain conditions receive anticipatory pension until the 
age of 67.  
The Danish anticipatory pension is graduated according to the loss of capacity for work, and 
there are four types of pension levels (table 6). The highest anticipatory pension addresses 
citizens between 18 and 60 whose working capacity is negligible. Claimants between the ages 
60 to 66 are in other words excluded. The intermediate level refers to people aged 18 to 60 
whose earnings capacity are reduced by approximately 2/3 and people at the age of 60 to 
65/67 with no earnings capacity. The ordinary anticipatory pension covers the age category 18 
to 66 whose capacity for work has been reduced by at least 50 per cent as a result of health 
and/or social reasons, although persons above 50 years may receive on social grounds alone 
(Jørgensen 2002c:36). Recipients of ordinary anticipatory pension less than 60 years may be 
awarded an additional anticipatory amount, førtidsbeløp, resulting in an increased ordinary 
anticipatory pension level.   
 
Table 6: The distinct levels of the anticipatory pension in Denmark. 
Ordinary level Increased 
ordinary level 
Intermediate 
level 
Highest level 
   Unemployability 
allowance 
 Anticipatory 
amount 
Disability 
allowance 
Disability 
allowance 
Pension 
supplement 
Pension 
supplement 
Pension 
supplement 
Pension 
supplement 
Basic amount Basic amount Basic amount Basic amount 
 Source: Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002b:23 
 
The anticipatory pension is gradually reduced if the recipient has supplementary income. 
More precisely, basic amount and the pension supplement are graduated according to the 
recipient’s income, whereas the anticipatory amount, the disability amount and the 
unemployability allowance are not be affected (Jørgensen, 2002c:36). 
 
Pensioners over 60 receiving pension at the highest or intermediate level, may opt to make 
their pension temporarily suspended, a so-called dormant pension131. The intention is to 
enhance and encourage attempts to resume employment by providing a guarantee of re-claim 
without re-application. This means is usually applied when prospects indicate that earned 
income will exceed the earned amount allowed while receiving pension and it remains 
uncertain whether the recipient can fully maintain employment. Pensioners accepting a “flex 
                                                 
131 Hvilende pension. 
job”132 may also have their anticipatory pension made dormant (Simonsen & Damsø, 
1998:147). If the pensioner does not reclaim his or her pension within a given time frame, the 
pension will be deprived.     
 
In contrast to the Norwegian disability pension, participation has been relatively stable partly 
due to the opening up of other non-health related pre-retirement paths (Bingley et al., 2001:4). 
Nevertheless, the anticipatory pension remains the dominant source of income for the non-
working segments of the population aged 50 to 60, 60 being the eligibility age for receiving 
post employment wage. 
 
According to change in legislation in 2001, the anticipatory pension will be reformed with 
effect from 2003. Succeeding implementation, pensions are only awarded at one level and the 
focus is on the resources and potentials of recipients rather than their limitations (Ministry of 
Social Affairs, 2002b:23). The reform is elaborated in the following chapter. 
 
2.2 Post Employment Wage, PEW  
The dominant path to early labour force exit is through the post employment wage scheme, 
the so-called efterløn, from 1978. The scheme was adopted at a time when unemployment 
was high and rising, and the main idea was to have elderly workers retire early in order to 
make room for the young. In theory the scheme only intended to redistribute a restricted 
number of physically demanding jobs from older workers to young unemployed. In practise, 
the scheme became a means to reduce the pension age for broad groups in the labour market 
(Binley et al., 2001:6). The scheme becomes increasingly popular and by 1999 the number of 
participants is close to 150.000 (Hansen, 2001:4).  
 
The rules of eligibility to post employment wage have been tightened on several occasions 
and a reform to be phased out in the coming years was enacted in 1998/99. Accordingly, two 
PEW schemes are currently running in Denmark. The old PEW-scheme addresses members133 
who turned 60 prior to July 1999, whereas a new and more flexible scheme includes members 
turning 60 after this date. This section addresses the old PEW-scheme, whereas the new post 
employment wage is outlined in chapter VI. I should note that the new scheme is given 
                                                 
132 Denmark uses so-called “flex jobs”, governmental programmes creating jobs on special terms, as means of 
integrating weak groups. 
133 I.e. members of an unemployment insurance fund 
precedence, both because it has been running for a couple years already and because it 
eventually will replace the old scheme completely.  
 
At the age of 60 to 66 it is possible to enter the scheme from both employment and 
unemployment depending on long-term labour market attachment as documented by 
membership of an unemployment insurance fund. The old PEW-scheme requires membership 
for 20 of the past 25 years and upon entrance members must either be eligible for daily 
allowance or receive transitional benefit (Jørgensen, 2002c:59). 
  
The old scheme allows claimants to work 200 hours annually without reducing their post 
employment wage. Once this limit is exceeded, entitlements are lost completely and 
permanently (Binley et al., 2001:6) Workers offered early retirement by occupational pension 
schemes and eligible for post employment wage, will generally postpone the former and enter 
the latter due to the means-testing rules inherent in the PEW-scheme.   
 
The post employment wage is primarily financed from general tax revenues and benefits 
correspond to daily allowance for the first 2.5 years, after which it is reduced to 82 per cent of 
this rate (table 7). When the recipient turns 67(65134) the post employment wage is replaced 
by the national pension (Jørgensen, 2002b:72). The net replacement rate for low-income 
groups is relatively high, especially at the step 1-level. For this group it may not pay to 
continue to work, or the economical difference between working and receiving post 
employment wage is small (Hansen, 2001:4). Not surprisingly this pre-retirement scheme has 
proven to be a popular exit path.  
 
Applying members satisfying all of the above requirements are generally issued a post 
employment wage certificate, efterlønsbevis. Entrance is not conditioned on holding a PEW-
certificate, but the certificate provides certain guarantees and possibilities. The certificate 
ensures that holders remain eligible to post employment wage even if they upon entry are no 
longer at the disposal of the labour market135. The PEW-certificate makes provision for the 
post employment wage to at least correspond to the PEW-amount at the time of issue. If entry 
is postponed, the post employment wage is not affected by any wage reductions (Jørgensen, 
                                                 
134 Cf. the lowering of the standard age of retirement from 2004. 
135 Due to sickness, inability to undertake ordinary employment, imprisonment etc. Applicants must still meet the 
remaining stipulations for entry.  
2003:48). This stipulation allows certificate holders to reduce their working hours, provided 
he or she does not exit the labour force all together, while retaining their already earned rate 
of PEW-payments. In this respect the scheme may entail a more flexible transition from full 
time employment to retirement.  
 
2.2.1 Semi-Post Employment Wage       
The semi-post employment wage of 1995 is a variety of the PEW-scheme. It addresses 
workers eligible for post employment wage who wishes to work part-time or retire gradually. 
The semi-post employment wage provides partial compensation for the loss of earnings as a 
result of reduced working hours. Claimants are required to reduce their hours by at least ¼, 
whereas the average number of hours worked weekly should at a minimum amount to 12. 
Regulations allow transfer to the post employment scheme and vice versa (NOU 
1998:19,p.181). The scheme has not proved particularly popular, only covering about 1500 
people per June 1998, partly due to its relative low benefits and the fact that part-time 
employment in Denmark is scarce136.     
       
2.3 “Partial Pension” 
The intention of the partial pension (delpension) is to facilitate the transition from work to 
retirement. The Act of partial pension stipulates that loss of income due to reduced hours 
should be compensated economically.  The scheme includes wage earners aged 60-66, 
provided they turned 60 prior to July 1999, and otherwise wage earners between the age of 60 
and 65, who reduce work by at least 7 hours or 25 per cent. Continued employment should at 
least amount to 12 hours, 30 at the most. The partial pension presupposes that labour market 
affiliation constitutes 10 years full time employment within the last 20 years. The partial 
pension is estimated according to hours reduced and per January 2002 the estimation is based 
on a basis sum of DKK 128.602, of which the annual partial pension constitutes 1/37 for 
every weekly hour reduced (Jørgensen, 2002c:35). 
  
                                                 
136 Cf. note 24. 
2.4 The Transitional Allowance Scheme 
In 1992 a new early retirement scheme, the transitional allowance137, is introduced. Eligibility 
was initially the age group 55-59, but in 1994 the eligibility age was lowered to 50. Eligibility 
was also conditioned on being a member of an unemployment insurance fund and having 
been unemployed for at least 12 out of the last 15 months (Bingley et al., 2001:6). Due to its 
unexpected high participation rate exceeding preconceived government assumptions, entry 
was terminated at the end of 1995. This decision may reflect a change in attitude towards 
seniors as it increasingly becomes clear that future policy “need to” encourage seniors to stay 
longer in the labour market rather than opting out. At the age of 60 current recipients are 
automatically transferred to the post employment wage scheme. From having about 46.000 
participants in 1996, the number is reduced to approximately 30.500 members in 1999 
(Hansen, 2001:5). 
 
Similar to the benefits of post employment wage, the transitional allowance is related to daily 
allowance, constituting 82 per cent of its maximum rate. Claimants receiving social pension 
benefits138 cannot simultaneously enter the transitional benefit scheme. Participants may 
undertake employment, but not without affecting the transitional allowance. A deduction will 
in this case be estimated according to the deduction regulations for daily allowance 
(Jørgensen, 2002b:74).   
 
Table 7: Maximum benefit levels (DKK) in various Danish schemes per week, 2003 
 Full time insured Part-time insured 
Transitional Allowance 2.555   1.700   
Post employment wage,  
new scheme at a 91% rate 
2.835  1.890  
Post employment wage, 
new scheme at a 100% rate 
3.115  2.075  
Post employment wage, 
old scheme Step 1 
3.115  2.075  
Post employment wage, 
old scheme Step 2 
2.555  1.700  
Source: Jørgensen, 2003:85. 
3.0 Summary 
This chapter presents, together with appendix B, an introduction to the pension systems in 
Norway and Denmark. By presenting the pension system in light of the Scandinavian model, I 
                                                 
137 Overgangsydelse. 
138 Benefits assigned in accordance with the Social Pension Act, Lov om social pension. 
aim to hypothesize the probable inclination of Norway and Denmark to comply with OECD 
recommendations. The characteristics and the normative values of the Scandinavian welfare 
state are reflected in the actual pension systems, although I also find features in accordance 
with the OECD view. The fact that the pensions system in Norway and Denmark also include 
features that diverge from the Scandinavian welfare state should not come as a surprise. After 
all, the Scandinavian welfare state is an ideal type and does not exist empirically in its 
entirety. Actual welfare states are not pure types but generally hybrid cases with features from 
more than one welfare regime. I assume that to the extent the pension systems diverge from 
the Scandinavian welfare state, Norway and Denmark would be more inclined to move in the 
direction recommended by OECD. To the extent that their pension systems differ and 
Denmark is considered the lesser “Scandinavian” of the two, I suspect that Denmark may be 
leaning more in the OECD direction than Norway.    
 
The pension system is an essential aspect of the welfare state in particular sensitive to the 
combined effects of ageing and changing life-course patterns. On the other hand, pension 
schemes may influence labour force participation and retirement patterns through embedded 
incentives and disincentives to work.  
 
Paths to early labour force exit, whether intended as pre-retirement schemes or not, constitute 
pull factors for older workers. Their strength and popularity partly depend on their ability to 
provide viable options for continued employment. It is my opinion that the more generous 
benefits and the laxer criteria for entry, the stronger their embedded incentives towards early 
retirement will be. Pre-retirement schemes may be beneficial at times of depression when 
unemployment levels are high or rising, at which some were also implemented. The fact that 
schemes were adopted as measures to combat unemployment may explain their incentives to 
early retirement. However, faced with a declining labour force and an increasing share of 
pensioners, they may actually be disadvantageous. This is not to say that pre-retirement 
schemes should be abandoned all together. It is, however, my opinion that their embedded 
incentives/disincentives and their future role be reassessed. Pension policies can influence the 
retirement decision of the individual worker to a certain extent by making prolonged 
employment more attractive and/or early retirement less. Pension policies, reforms and 
recommendations for reform in Norway and Denmark are the focus of attention in the 
succeeding chapter. 
 
VI Policy Reform and (beginning) Action 
Population ageing, increased public spending, decreased labour force and a trend of early 
retirement. Against this background pension systems are being assessed, scrutinised and 
reformed. The Norwegian Government has (rather late) appointed a committee to review and 
elucidate reform of the Norwegian pension system. Its final report will be presented in the 
autumn of 2003, but a temporary report is already published. Denmark has outlined a general 
strategy addressing future demographic challenges, focusing on attaining a sustainable 
pension system responsive to demographic changes. The pension system is considered 
sustainable once the provision of a reasonable139 pension income is consistent with a sound 
national economy.   
 
In the following I outline what I consider some of the most significant pension and pension-
related140 reforms and motions in Norway and Denmark. I want to address two questions in 
particular: To what extent do reforms reflect OECD recommendations? Are Norway and 
Denmark converging and/or moving away from the Scandinavian welfare state with respect to 
pension arrangements and employment policies? 
 
To a certain extent my focus on Norway and Denmark differs, as the two countries apparently 
are on various stages of responding to the challenges of ageing populations. With numerous 
reforms already adopted and/or implemented, Denmark appears to be ahead of Norway. This 
notion is partly substantiated by the Danish national strategy report’s141 conclusion that the 
pension system is well-balanced and sustainable, and the fact that no further major system 
adjustments are planned. In Norway the question of how to attain a sustainable pension 
system remains under deliberation and so far few pension reforms have been introduced. This 
is not to say that Norway has not initiated measures altogether. Nevertheless, in addressing 
reform policies in Norway and Denmark, my focus will primarily be on reports and motions 
for reform in the former, and already adopted and/or implemented reforms in the latter.   
 
 
 
    
                                                 
139 Pension income is considered reasonable if recipients do not experience a drastic fall in income after 
retirement.  
140 Notably regarding employability and the transition from work to retirement. 
141 cf. Denmark section 1.0. 
Norway 
Norway experiences a record high employment rate in 2000, continuing in 2001, and appears 
to have little work capacity available, although unemployment is rising in 2003. Expenditures 
on illness and disability pensions have increase partly due to demographic changes. The 
government aims to increase labour force affiliation in order to meet the challenges of an 
ageing population, reflected in recent changes of the disability pension and an intention 
agreement with the labour market parties to enhance a more “including” working life.  
 
1.0 The Disability Pension 
In 2001 the Government implements a five-year experiment addressing the reactivation of 
recipients of disability pension. Re-entry to the labour force is to be enhanced through the 
means of wage subsidies and temporary employment. The experiment allows people to work 
on a temporary basis for one year only, after which they must attain permanent employment. 
Employers receive a wage subsidy for a maximum of tree years amounting on average to 50 
per cent of pay and social charges (ibid:19). New stipulations of 2002 reduce labour market 
measures addressing both ordinary and disabled jobseekers, while directing certain measures 
at the disabled exclusively and more room is given for local assessment and individual 
adaptation.    
 
The Government has put forward a motion (Ot.prp. 102, 2001-2002) on a temporary disability 
pension, reducing the period for reception and generally improving efforts of rehabilitation. 
To indicate that the new pension is not a permanent benefit, the motion proposes it be 
estimated according to the rules of rehabilitation payments rather than the old-age pension 
(Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:81).  
 
1.1 A more Including Labour Market 
On account of the increasing rate of sick leave and disability pension and decreasing labour 
force participation among elderly over 60, the Intention Agreement on a more Including 
Working Life (IA) was introduced in October 2001 for an experimental period of four years. 
The purpose of the agreement is to reduce absence due to illness by improving the 
employment conditions and options for elderly employees and people suffering from reduced 
working capacity. The agreement went into force in January 2002 (NOSOSCO, 2002:17). 
 
The IA intends to increase the employability and labour force demand for older workers, 
notably by lowering the tax for employers, which actually discriminates older employees142 
(Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002,p.53). A national all-out effort for senior policy in the labour 
market is initiated with to prolong employment. These measures comply with OECD 
recommendations (cf. ch. III).   
 
In accordance with the IA aim of taking care of the resources and labour of older workers to 
counter early exit, the government finances an action program for senior policies from 2001 to 
2005 prepared by the labour force parties. The objective is to enhance incentives to remain in 
employment rather than opt for early retirement by furthering a good working environment 
and personnel policy (NOSOSCO, 2002:20). By improving incentives towards prolonged 
working career and working conditions, the program generally complies with OECD 
recommendations.   
 
2.0 Committee Recommendations 
2.1 The Committee “On Work and Retirement”, NOU 1994:2 
An awareness of the necessity of maintaining a high labour force participation rate combined 
with a wish for providing older employees the possibility of early retirement, resulted in a 
governmental appointed committee in 1993. The committee was requested to address the 
transition from work to retirement and recommend measures for reform (NOU 1999:2,p.14).     
 
The committee recommends coordinating endowment pensions and daily allowance to 
prevent them from being (mis)used as “push out-measures” (cf. ch V section 3.2.3). To 
enhance work incentives for the elderly, it suggests reimposing a waiting reward (ventetillegg) 
for postponing the national old-age pension. The objective is to increase the average 
retirement age with three years by 2015 through implementing measures stimulating 
continued employment and preventing older workers from being pushed out of the labour 
market. If this objective is not met, the committee suggest employing stronger and more direct 
measures. It suggests restricting paths to early exit, notably the AFP, and raising the standard 
                                                 
142 The tax, arbeidsgiveravgiften, presents disincentives for employers to recruit or retain older workers as this 
generally implies higher taxes. 
age of retirement beyond 67143 (ibid:33). The objective of increasing the average retirement 
age complies with the OECD view. 
 
2.2 The Committee “On Flexible Retirement”, NOU 1998:19 
In 1997 the Government appoints a committee to assess the issue of pre-retirement with the 
object of increasing the average age of retirement. The committee was inquired to recommend 
measures for strengthening incentives to prolonged labour market affiliation without 
disregarding or compromising the aspect of flexible retirement. Its evaluations and 
recommendations is presented in the report “ On Flexible Retirement”144 (NOU 1998:19,p.9).  
 
The committee recognises the challenge of introducing flexible retirement while stimulating 
older workers to remain in the labour force145  (ibid:32). Of particular interest to my study, I 
may add that the report inter alia addresses the OECD principles for reform. This does not 
necessarily indicate that its conclusions are especially influenced by OECD recommendations, 
although the question presents itself.     
 
The report recommends graduating pension benefits according to age upon retirement. This 
implies permanently curtailed pension for those who choose to retire prior to the standard 
retirement age and increased pension when retirement is postponed (ibid:41). Compared to 
current regulation this would increase the economic benefits of prolonged employment and 
complies with the OECD recommendation that benefits at a minimum accrue with every year 
in gainful employment. 
   
Regarding the framing of a pre-retirement scheme, the committee favours a universal146 and 
flexible programme within the National Insurance Scheme. The committee holds that a 
publicly administered pre-retirement scheme would better stimulate older and healthy workers 
to continue in employment than agreement-based arrangements (ibid:44). AFP is 
recommended replaced with public early retirement schemes with actuarial early pensions and 
                                                 
143 It should be noted that committee members representing employers and employees respectively opposed these 
proposals (Solem & Øverbye, 2002:14). 
144Labour union members withdrew from the committee prior to its final presentation due to disagreements 
concerning certain amendments to the pension system, including the AFP (Solem & Øverbye, 2002:14). 
145 Generally, the committee presupposes that the National Insurance Scheme remains the main pillar in the 
pension system and that a balance between redistribution and the insurance aspect is attained.  
146 The committee rejects selective pre-retirement schemes in principle and on administrative grounds. 
Establishing publicly accepted criteria for eligibility would prove difficult, as experienced with the AFP, and a 
selective programme would not be compatible with the aspect of increased flexibility (NOU 1998:19,p.44).   
actuarial increased postponed pensions (Solem & Øverbye, 2002:14). From this I gather that 
the committee finds pre-retirement to be a matter of public, as opposed to private, 
responsibility. OECD does not directly advocate or disregard pre-retirement schemes per 
se147. Introducing the actuarial principle would be in accordance with OECD 
recommendation.  
 
The committee expresses concern over the fact that employee quarters on principle aim to 
lower the eligibility age for AFP-pension to 60 years. Besides, curtailing benefits according to 
age upon withdrawal, the committee recommends increasing the required number of years of 
employment upon entry. The current criteria of 10 years of pension-earnings after reaching 50 
is proposed extended to 20 years beyond the age of 40 (NOU 1998:19,p.53). The practise of 
crediting pension-earnings embedded in the AFP is criticized because it entails that old-age 
pension payments are not affected by age upon retirement. The committee rejects the notion 
that AFP-pensioners be treated on a par with disability pensioners on the grounds that AFP is 
a voluntary pre-retirement scheme and suggests that this practise is abolished altogether from 
2007. In my opinion the crediting of AFP-pensioners strengthens incentives towards early 
retirement, which OECD generally recommends be diminished. It would be difficult to 
determine how this aspect influence the decision of early retirement, but in theory incentives 
to early retirement counteract the objective of increasing labour force affiliation among the 
elderly, which the committee advocates be the superior aim of future pension policy (ibid:33). 
The committee recommends enhancing the opportunity and flexibility of combining pension 
and work, which would ease the transition from work to retirement and suggests that the AFP 
offer other options of semi-retirement besides a 20 or 40 per cent retirement.    
    
On the grounds that the majority of pensioners today has had opportunity to earn a 
supplementary pension and as the minimum pension level has increased, the committee 
considers that the distributional political basis of current tax regulation has diminished. It 
suggests that tax rules for pensioners over time approximate tax regulations for wage earners 
(ibid:42), which is the case in Denmark. A move in this direction would be in accordance with 
the OECD suggestion of subjecting pensions to income tax where this is not already the case.      
 
                                                 
147 Cf. Denmark section 4.0 for a further discussion on the OECD view on pre-retirement schemes. 
2.3 The Pension Commission 
In 2001 the Norwegian Government appoints a parliamentary Pension Commission, 
Pensjonskommisjonen, to address the main principles and objectives of a future sustainable 
pension system148. The Commission will submit its final report in the autumn 2003, but 
presented upon request a preliminary report on objectives, principles and alternative pension 
models in September 2002.  The Commission emphasizes that its evaluations and 
recommendations are preliminary and not founded on consequence analyses149. Its 
recommendations are based on two models it considers the most likely alternatives for a 
future pension system; a modernized national insurance pension or a national flat-rate basic 
pension respectively. 
 
The preliminary report gives a brief account of the pension system in a few selected countries, 
Denmark included, and refers to analyses, reports and recommendations of international 
organisations like the World Bank, the European Union and the OECD150. It is, in other 
words, possible that international experience and recommendations may influence the final 
evaluations and recommendations of the Commission. For instance, the Commission stresses 
the importance of funded systems as a means to maintain a balanced burden-sharing in the 
population. It recommends funding parts of the pension obligations of the National Insurance 
Scheme, the State’s Pension Scheme and/or attaching greater importance to premium-based 
labour market pension schemes and individual pension arrangements (Pensjonskommisjonen, 
2002:68). This emphasis of funding is consistent with OECD recommendations and the 
Danish pension system, where the element of funding is extensive, at least compared to 
Norway. Whether or not the preliminary report generally complies with the OECD view will 
be addressed subsequently. 
 
2.3.1 A Sustainable Pension System 
The report states that a future pension system should distribute income, benefits and burdens 
equally between generations. The public pension scheme should maintain its aim of income 
redistribution, for instance through taxation. Pension obligations and promises must be met in 
                                                 
148 The pension system should respond to demographic changes, provide flexible retirement and ensure 
redistribution and equality of status (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:7)  
149 Konsekvensutredninger. 
150 Including the OECD principles for reform addressed in ch. III. 
a way that provides residents economic security and maintains general financial sustainability 
both in the shorter and longer term (ibid:70). 
 
According to the Commission a sustainable pension system depends on a large labour force, a 
low unemployment rate and an inclusive labour market, inter alia attained by restrincting the 
increase of early retirement and encouraging prolonged employment. By relating pension 
benefits more closely to earnings and contributions, the incentives to labour market exit may 
decrease and continued employment favoured (ibid:16).   
 
The report acknowledges the importance of pull and push factors respectively with regard to 
the trend of early retirement. It stresses improving the labour market footing of older 
employees and diminishing current push factors in employment policy and the employer tax 
(ibid:54). The impact of pull factors are to be reduced by ensuring that early retirement is not 
supported economically, which to a certain extent is the case today. Current AFP-benefits are 
not affected by the retirement age of the recipient nor is the national old-age pension affected 
by AFP-retirement. Whereas full national pension is attained after 40 years, full AFP-pension 
requires in practice only 35. Hence, if a person declines an entitled AFP-retirement and –
pension, his or her “pension wealth”151 will be reduced.  As retirement between the ages of 67 
and 70 is optional, postponing retirement implies reducing one’s pension wealth, particularly 
if full national pension is already attained (ibid:54). The Commission recommends measuring 
annual pension according to age upon retirement, the total pension earning period and 
expected duration of retirement. Accordingly, a low retirement age would entail reduced 
annual benefit, whereas prolonged employment would increase pension earnings and total 
pension payments. In this respect the report concurs with OECD recommendations, which 
stipulate that benefits at least should accrue with every year in gainful employment 
irrespective of the standard age of retirement. Workers, who nevertheless choose early 
retirement, should not receive any gain in output or material living standards, as the case may 
be with AFP.      
 
The present tax structure generally favours pensioners as compared to wage earners with 
equivalent income as the former pays less tax. Originally the easy tax terms were introduced 
because pensioners generally constituted a low-income group. The report questions whether 
                                                 
151 Refers to the value of the expected total pension payment at the time of retirement (ibid:54). 
tax regulation should continue to favour pensioners in the future, but only concludes that any 
tax change should consider the minimum pension level (ibid:57). OECD recommends 
abolishing arrangements that are obsolete or inconsistent with stated pension policy 
objectives. In my opinion current taxes are incompatible with the aim of a better balance of 
burden-sharing between generations. Especially as the Commission acknowledges that even if 
a more balanced burden-sharing is attained within the pension system, the overall burden152 
will nevertheless fall on the employees. In my opinion the original grounds for taxes 
favouring pensioners per se are not valid anymore as many pensioners today are relatively 
comfortably off. Nevertheless, I concur with the Commission that any changes in tax 
regulations should be based on the level of minimum pensions, which would only partially 
comply with the OECD suggestion of subjecting pensions to income tax. 
 
There are conflicting interests between the principle of redistribution and measures 
encouraging elderly to remain in employment. Economic incentives of the latter imply 
improving the correlation between contributions paid and benefits received, which counter the 
principle of redistribution. It may also prove difficult to attain a sustainable pension system 
without increasing the importance and the responsibility of labour market and individual 
pension schemes. If pension benefits are not to be reduced and the general tax level not 
increased, pension contributions may have to be increased by enhancing the connection 
between the individual premiums and benefits. In principle this is also attainable in public 
pensions, but it implies reducing the element of redistribution. The Commission concludes 
that a high employment rate, which would increase private pension provision, and a 
sustainable pension system may conflict with the principle of redistribution (ibid:26). 
 
2.3.2 Funded Schemes 
OECD generally recommends that the overall pension system should include a mix of tax- 
and transfer schemes, funded schemes and private earnings and savings. The Commission 
concurs that funding public pension obligations could ensure a balanced burden-sharing 
between generations and a sustainable pension system. In addition it considers funded 
schemes to be more stable to demographic changes.  
 
                                                 
152 With regard to health and long-term care expenses and reduced tax revenues. 
In the long run funded pension schemes strengthen the relation between contributions and 
pensions respectively. Pension arrangements in the private sector are ordinarily funded, 
whereas individual pension schemes always are. The potential risk of funded schemes is 
related to the pension funds returns. However, as the profits of the pension fund increase,  
funded pension schemes will entail lower expenses than pay-as-you-go schemes. The two 
proposed models, the flat-rate basic pension and the modernized national insurance pension, 
both entail funded schemes. The former may primarily increase the element of funding 
through the second and third pillar, i.e. labour market and individual pension schemes, 
whereas the latter may introduce funded schemes within the public system (ibid:58). 
 
Replacing a dominant pay-as-you-go system with a more funded system will entail some 
undesired consequences. The transfer will generally imply that wage earners for a period will 
have to finance both currently running pensions and their own future pensions. In this respect 
Norway enjoys a fortunate position due to the Petroleum Fund. The Commission suggests 
basing national pension funds partly on the Petroleum Fund to cover already established 
pension obligations. The Commission further proposes funding the State’s Pension Scheme to 
increase the awareness of pension expenses and generally further saving (ibid:67). 
 
2.3.3 Basic Security 
The preliminary report stresses that the National Insurance Scheme should maintain its 
provision of basic security by guaranteeing a minimum pension based on residency 
irrespective of previous income or contribution. The purpose is to ensure all pensioners a 
means of subsistence and entails economic and social redistribution (ibid:70). Basic security 
can be attained either through a “guarantee pension”, garantipensjon, complementing the lack 
of or low income-related pensions or through a universal flat-rate basic pension based on 
residency. In either case the Commission finds that basic security should be financed by the 
state through general taxation and its level correspond the current minimum pension.     
 
A flat-rate basic pension would imply considerable gross savings with regards to long-term 
national pension expenses153. Basic security would not be targeted as the same amount is 
provided for all pensioners irrespective of income (ibid:74). The universal aspect embedded in 
                                                 
153 It may reduce the expenses of the National Insurance Scheme by 40 per cent compared to maintaining the 
current pension system, whereas a guarantee pension with a pension percentage of 50 probably would maintain 
the current level of national pension expenses (ibid:56).     
a basic pension is in conformity with the Scandinavian welfare state but may conflict with the 
OECD view that public pensions should only aim at meeting poverty alleviation goals. A 
universal basic pension further entails relatively high pension expenses to be financed through 
taxation. On the other hand, low-income groups with various pension supplements may attain 
a relatively high level of compensation. 
 
In comparison the guarantee pension is targeted and effective because it is only provided if 
earned pension is below a certain minimum level (ibid). Hence, it may comply with the 
OECD objective of only meeting poverty alleviation goals, depending on its stipulated level 
of generosity. The pension entails low expenses on basic security, but the means-testing 
complicates the pension system. The guarantee pension entails expanding means-testing 
compared to current regulation which diverges from the universal aspects of the Scandinavian 
welfare state. It may also be seen as an indication of reduced pension generosity, provided 
generosity is not strictly measured by economic criteria, cf. ch. IV section 3.4. 
 
2.3.4 Proportional Level of Compensation 
According to the Commission future pension benefits should ensure a compensation level in 
proportion to previously earned income, contribution and pension earnings. The level of 
compensation could either be guaranteed by a mandatory, public income-related pension 
supplemented by occupational and/or individual pensions or completely entrusted to 
occupational pensions supplied by individual pensions (ibid:17). In my opinion the generosity 
of pension benefits is not as likely to be reduced if income-related pensions are made 
mandatory, compared to if they are voluntary.  
 
The Commission advocates mandatory income-related pensions, whether public or private, on 
accounts of distribution, gender neutrality, risk diversification, expenses etc. (ibid:76). If the 
compensation level primarily is provided by the state, there is a risk that the aspect of 
redistribution could take precedence over the aspects of earnings and savings. The risk of 
private pension schemes, both individual and occupational, is rather related to the proceeds of 
the capital invested. This also applies to public schemes financed through funds rather than 
according to the pay-as-you-go principle. Other than recommending that an income-related 
pension be mandatory, the Commission has of yet not taken a definite stand on whether the 
compensation level should be the responsibility of public and/or private schemes respectively. 
 OECD generally recommends increasing the size of advanced-funded elements in countries 
where pay-as-you-go systems now dominate and suggests increasing advance-funded 
elements within public plans and introducing mandatory individual accounts. The two 
alternatives presented for ensuring the compensation level in a future Norwegian pension 
system both comply with the above recommendations, provided that a public scheme is 
funded or that private schemes, occupational and/or individual, are mandatory.    
 
2.3.5 Life-Earnings and Life-Savings       
The Commission generally recommends that a future pension system encourages dispersing 
income and consumption over the course of life by emphasizing life-savings and life-
insurance. The former implies that each saves up for old age, whereas the latter involves 
diversifying risks related to old age, disability and loss of breadwinner between the 
participants of the pension arrangement (ibid:70). The issue of implementing features of life-
earnings has, however, been raised before. In the NOU report 1994:2 the majority of 
committee members suggests introducing life-earnings to strengthen incentives to prolonged 
employment (p.247). The majority of the committee members of the NOU report 1998:19 
(p.49) does not recommend a pension system based on life-earnings154.  
 
Both pension models presented in the report entail strengthening the correlation between 
previous income, contributions and pension benefits compared to current pension regulations. 
Income-related pensions can be based on salary upon retirement, total life-earnings or average 
income for a certain number of years, of which the current pension system is based on the 
latter155. The Commission is of the opinion that the relation between earned income and 
pensions is best ensured through pensions based on life-earnings and advocates that this 
aspect is included in a pension reform (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:77).   
 
The overall emphasis on life-earnings and –savings of the preliminary report is in conformity 
with the OECD recommendation of “generally linking life-time benefits and contributions”. 
By introducing life-earnings and –savings, it will pension-wise always pay to work. This is 
                                                 
154 The majority acknowledges that life-earnings reward long careers to a greater extent than current pension 
regulation, but considers pensions without curtailment according to age of retirement insufficient for increasing 
the average retirement age. Besides, it may undermine general support for the standard age of retirement.  
155 The “best pension-earning years”-rule, cf. appendix B 
also in accordance with the OECD recommendations, which stipulate that benefits at a 
minimum should accrue with every year in gainful employment. 
 
An introduction of life-earnings will generally benefit people with long careers and steady 
income whereas people with varied and increasing income and/or who alternates between 
full-time and part-time employment will receive lower pension compared to current pension 
regulation (ibid). Today people with similar life-income may receive different pensions, and 
some receive almost equal pension amounts despite different life-incomes. The Commission 
finds this unreasonable and claims that the income-related pension to a greater extent should 
reflect total income over the career course (ibid:33). The Commission recognises that this 
may particularly affect women as more women than men are employed part-time. It does, 
however, not propose remedial measures.  
 
A pension system based on life-earnings may also disadvantage groups with late labour 
market entry like students undertaking higher education and groups with early exit, notably 
the pre-retired. Whereas a pension reform may discourage early retirement, it should in my 
opinion not produce disincentives, whether intended or not, towards higher education. I 
acknowledge that with regard to population ageing it is important to maintain an extensive 
labour force, but not at the expense of the rate of people with higher education. In this day and 
age high skilled knowledge is an asset, which in the longer term may per se benefit our 
society and economy.  
 
Pensions related to life-income will also affect groups with long and/or several periods of 
absence from the labour market, notably women on maternity leave, unemployed and people 
on sick leave or in rehabilitation. It should also be stressed that some may experience several 
of these situations at various stages, and certain groups may be more exposed than others. The 
director of equality of gender (likestillingsdirektør) Mona Lisa Asp criticizes pensions based 
on life-earnings for discriminating women. She claims that 90 per cent of all women will 
receive lower pensions and that if implemented the pension system would imply a large 
setback as regards equality of status (VG, 13.01.2003). She receives support from LO, The 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, which considers women with higher education 
and extended156 maternity leave to have the most to loose if the “best pension-earning years”-
                                                 
156 That is time spent in informal care of children beyond the stipulated period of maternity leave. 
rule is removed. Of the total number of minimum-pensioners in 1999, the rate of female 
recipients constituted 87 per cent (LOnytt, 15.01.2003). It is not unlikely that this rate may 
increase if the “best pension-earning year”-rule is removed without adequate compensation 
for particularly disadvantaged groups. The students’ national organisation, Studentenes 
Landsforbund, concurs that the proposal of the Pension Commission discredits long 
education, as (long) periods of study in essence will imply pension-earning time lost. To 
compensate, the students’ national organisation suggests crediting students pension credits157 
(Universitas, 22.01.2003). Whether or not the directed criticism will be taken into 
consideration in the final report and/or future reforms remain to be seen. 
 
2.3.6 Alternative Pension Systems 
The report outlines two alternative models for a future pension system, a modernized national 
insurance scheme or a flat-rate basic pension scheme. Both entail financing basic security 
through general taxation at the level of today’s minimum pension. Both models intends to 
increase the connection between contributions and payments and stress the importance of life-
earnings and –savings in meeting the challenges of the aging population, although in different 
ways. The former model entails relating life-income and benefits in national pensions, 
whereas the latter strengthens the correlation between life-savings and pensions through the 
private pension schemes. Either way the Commission recognises that a reform requires 
transfer arrangements and adaptive measures in order to ensure the predictability of pensions 
and individual pensions rights (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:14).  
 
Model I 
A modernized national insurance scheme should, according to the Commission, enhance the 
correlation between pensions, contributions and income. The proportional income-related 
pension would be a national premium-funded pension, providing old-age pension for all 
citizens in proportion to total income. Pension earnings should be life-earnings with every 
year of income and contribution counting equally. A guarantee supplement graduated against 
the income-related pension could also be graduated against mandatory supplementary 
pensions. A guarantee supplement is considered a targeted, inexpensive and effective means 
for ensuring basic security (ibid:44). Redistribution is notably ensured through basic security 
and pension credits for unpaid care of own children and relatives in need of nursing.  
                                                 
157 With regard to old-age pension, Germany credits certain non-contributory periods including studies beyond 
the age of 16, notably completed technical training or higher education (EU, 2003). 
 Public occupational pensions would become purely supplementary to a modernized national 
insurance pension. The Commission recommends that the total level of benefits from 
occupational pension and national insurance pension correspond current pension levels and 
that regulation of public and private occupational pension schemes is coordinated and 
simplified (ibid:18). 
 
Estimations suggest that this model could increase the pension percentage158 from 42 to 50 on 
account of the savings made in abolishing the basic pension and the “best pension-earning 
years”-rule.  If the current minimum pension level is maintained, the pension level for the 
lowest income group will not be affected. The future payment level of other groups will 
depend on the pension percentage chosen and the redestributive aspect. The latter would, 
however, violate the principle of a proportional pension159. Income groups above the lowest 
income level and groups with middle incomes are expected to receive reduced pension 
benefits compared to current pension stipulations, whereas the high-income group will 
experience increased pensions. A somewhat higher income will be required in order to receive 
more than the minimum pension amount due to the dropping of the basic pension. In other 
words, if this alternative is chosen the number of minimum pensioners is likely to increase. 
Nevertheless, the Commission recommends that the model is evaluated further (ibid:14).  
 
The proportional rate between income and pension will depend on the pension percentage 
chosen. According to the Commission, the pension percentage should ensure a fair 
compensation level for pensioners not receiving the guarantee supplement without requiring a 
too high premium. In order to restrict the responsibility of the state, a ceiling on pension 
earnings is proposed with an equivalent ceiling on premium payments (ibid:46). The higher 
the pension percentage, the lesser need for supplementary pension schemes, and vice versa. 
On the other hand, the lower the ceiling on pension earnings, the increasing need for such 
pension supplements.   
 
An income-related pension proportional to previously earned income is expected to provide 
stronger work incentives than a flat-rate basic pension for all by generally stimulating 
employees to remain in the labour force and to postpone retirement. For pensioners entitled to 
                                                 
158 The relation between income and pension. 
159 However, any undesired distributional effects could be compensated by changing the tax structure. 
the current supplementary pension, who become minimum pensioners in a modernized 
system, work incentives will decrease. In other words, the means-testing of the guarantee 
supplement provides disincentives to work. The model also entails a somewhat more uneven 
pension distribution as compared to the current pension system. The Commission assures that 
the aspects of (re)distribution and work incentives will be addressed further in its final report 
(ibid:47). 
  
Model II 
The presented alternative is a system based on a national flat-rate basic pension irrespective of 
previous income. Income- and earnings-related pensions ensuring the level of compensation 
are entrusted to funded occupational and individual pension arrangements. The Commission 
has not yet reached a decision as to whether such schemes should be voluntary or mandatory. 
Any changes should only apply future earnings and not affect pension earnings already 
attained. According to the Commission this alternative should imply a future reduction of 
taxes to the National Insurance Scheme, notably the employer- or national insurance tax 
(ibid:17).     
 
This model will mainly continue recent pension developments and any changes will probably 
not be revolting. The national pension has for example gradually been “flattened” as the 
minimum pension has increased and the pension supplement decreased. In addition, 
supplementary pensions like occupational and individual arrangements have become more 
common and conditions for occupational pensions in the private sector are improved. As the 
model implies that the compensation level is ensured by occupational and individual pension 
arrangements, their extent and coverage would have to increase. An advantage with entrusting 
income-related pension to labour market and individual pension arrangements is more flexible 
schemes emphasizing freedom of choice (ibid:42). 
 
By removing the pension supplement, national insurance taxes can be reduced accordingly. 
This would benefit minimum pensioners, who would receive the same amount in benefits but 
pay reduced tax, and people with high income who currently pay high taxes without receiving 
equivalent high pensions. Recipients of supplementary pension and people with middle 
income would, however, end up with lower pensions compared current pension regulation. 
This also applies those who currently benefit the most of the “best pension-earning years”-
rule. On average people would neither benefit nor lose from working (ibid).  
 Whereas it today is possible to attain full occupational pension after a minimum of 30 years, 
the Commission reckons that contribution-defined arrangements would strengthen incentives 
to prolonged employment. The report recommends maintaining the “proportional principle”, 
i.e. that the total benefits of basic pension and other pension schemes should not constitute a 
higher percentage of income for members with high income than members with lower income 
(ibid:43).  
 
The model clearly defines the responsibility of national old-age pension and supplementary 
pension schemes respectively, provided the latter are not guaranteed by the state. Basic 
security will hardly be targeted as it is provided to all citizens, which means that the taxation 
level will be relative high. In addition, there will rarely be a correlation between contributions 
to and benefits from the national pensions compared to the former model (ibid:14). 
 
Transition 
The Commission acknowledges that reforming the pension system necessitates transition 
rules ensuring predictability and adaptability respectively. One possibility is distinguishing 
between previous and future pension rights and earnings. In this case pension rights already 
attained would not be affected. Reforms and new regulations would only affect future pension 
earnings and rights. This requires handling two different systems simultaneously for a number 
of years and it would accordingly take a long time for the new system to take full effect. The 
alternative is relating regulation to age cohorts for whom the respective old and new 
stipulations fully apply. In other words, new regulation addresses people under a certain age, 
whereas the old regulation applies for people above a certain age. For the intermediate stages 
pensions are proportionally estimated according to both old and new regulations. This 
alternative would limit the period of transition by accelerating the introduction of the new 
system to a certain extent (ibid:49). The preliminary report does not recommend one 
transitional method in particular but relates the choice of transition rules to the respective 
pension models.  
 
2.3.7 Pre-Retirement and Flexible Retirement 
The report stresses that a pension reform should provide a possibility of withdrawing old-age 
pension from the age of 62 if certain requirements on previous labour force attachment and 
pension earnings are satisfied. A future pension system should ensure flexibility on the extent 
of retirement while ensuring that it will always be worthwhile economically to work. Thus, a 
long career and postponed retirement should result in a higher annual pension. The 
Commission also recommends that the specific age limits for certain groups be revised and 
modernized (ibid:17). A modernization could entail that upon reaching a certain age 
employees are offered adjusted tasks and responsibilities instead of retirement. Such measures 
would comply with OECD’s emphasis on attaining employability for longer working lives. 
    
The Commission stresses the need for pension arrangements to increase allowance for 
earnings while withdrawing pension to improve flexibility, increase labour force participation 
and ease the transition from work to retirement. Such measures should be elaborated in 
collaboration with the labour market parties (ibid:82)    
 
The Commission and OECD respectively concur that it should always pay to work pension-
wise and both stress the notion of flexibility which would give the individual more of a say in 
his or her retirement decision. The preliminary report does not comply with the OECD 
recommendation that the lower age limit for early retirement should be increased, which may 
be due to the fact that Norway currently has no public pre-retirement scheme, the AFP being a 
private arrangement only covering two-thirds of the labour force. In fact, the Commission 
recommends extending the provision of pre-retirement to include every older employees. To 
the extent this may decrease the average age of retirement160, it diverges from the explicit aim 
of OECD as well as the Commission. The universal aspect of the recommendation is, on the 
other hand, in accordance with the normative foundation of the Scandinavian welfare state. To 
a certain extent it also complies with the OECD notion that regulations of private schemes 
prevent non-discriminatory access to pension schemes. The Commission proposes that the 
lower age limit for entry should correspond to the current limit for AFP-entry, i.e. 62 years, 
whereas OECD recommends increasing the lower age limit for early entitlement. 
      
 
There are conflicting interests. On one hand, the Commission holds that the pension system 
should provide the opportunity of pre-retirement with a reasonable level of compensation in 
proportion to previously earned income. On the other, generous early retirement benefits in 
mandatory arrangements will provide incentives to early exit and may decrease the labour 
                                                 
160 Or at least maintain the current rate of pre-retirement. 
force participation rate of elderly further. The Commission thus emphasizes that in outlining a 
more flexible pension system, the objective should be encouraging employment of the elderly 
(ibid:39).    
 
2.3.8 Pension Supplements 
In 2001 a pension reform introducing favourable taxes on contribution-defined pension 
schemes is implemented, with the objective of increasing the extent of labour market pensions 
in the private sector. It is yet too soon to draw any conclusions on whether or not the reform 
has produced the desired effect (ibid:37). The reform is in accordance with the OECD 
suggestions of generally stimulating occupational pension schemes. 
 
The Commission recognises that the regulations of occupational pension schemes in the 
public and private sector discourage, maybe even prevent, labour force mobility from one 
sector to another. Although stipulations ensures full mobility within the respective sectors, it 
is almost impossible for a private employee to enter the public sector and a public employee 
to enter the private sector without affecting his or her pension earnings. This is primarily due 
to the fact that private occupational pensions are net arrangements, whereas public 
occupational pension are gross arrangements. The Commission recommends harmonizing the 
arrangements in order to enhance mobility and ensure previously earned pension rights by 
making public occupational pensions net arrangements (ibid:38).   
 
The OECD principles for reform stress the importance of labour market pension schemes but 
do not express a preference for neither net nor gross pension arrangements. The objectives of 
the Commission of ensuring mobility and pension rights, reflect the OECD view that 
regulations should protect vested rights and ensure the transferability of pension rights in 
order to maintain confidence in private pension schemes. 
      
Denmark 
In Denmark discussions on reform and initiatives have already been on the agenda for some 
time, and a general strategy consisting of three main areas is adopted. The strategy implies a 
gradual ongoing shift of emphasis from pay-as-you-go to funded schemes, reverse the 
declining average retirement age and increasing the labour force participation of claimants of 
various public income transfers. The latter may reduce public expenditure and simultaneously 
expand the tax base (Bingley et al., 2001:16). In other words, the Norwegian and Danish 
response to ageing generally complies. 
 
Specifically, the government intends to increase the employment rate of approximately 87 000 
people from 2000 to 2010, during which the labour force is expected to decrease by 66 000 
people due to the demographic development. Accordingly, the employment rate must increase 
by 153 000 in order to meet the stipulated objective. Already adopted reforms are expected to 
increase the participation rate by 80 000 people until 2010. Implemented reforms include the 
stop of new entrants to the transition allowance scheme in 1996, the reform of the voluntary 
early retirement scheme in 1999 and the anticipatory pension reform as from 2003 and 
measures to increase the employment of people suffering from reduced working capacities 
(NOSOSCO, 2002:8). 
 
The action plan “More People in Work” was presented by the Government in 2002. In 
addition to enhancing job provision for unemployed in general, it stresses a need for 
increasing the focus on work for the elderly unemployed in particular. The action plan aims at 
enhancing the incentives to work by ensuring that it is worthwhile for everyone to undertake 
employment compared to receiving benefits (ibid:9). 
 
1.0 The National Strategy Report on the Danish Pension System 
The Laeken European Council in December 2001 adopted eleven objectives for securing 
sustainability of pension systems. It would be interesting to compare these objectives with the 
OECD principles for reform, but that is beyond my scope. During the summit the member 
states were requested to present a national strategy report on pensions before September 2002. 
The Danish contribution is addressed subsequently. 
 
The Danish report holds that the overall pension system is “well-balanced and able to secure 
present and future pensioners adequate coverage” particularly once the aim of reducing 
government debt is attained (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a:1). This view of contentedness 
is further reflected in the fact that no major system adjustments are currently planned. But 
then again the Danish pension system has undergone a number of changes in recent years161, 
                                                 
161 The report emphasises the increased prevalence of labour market pensions and supplementary pensions 
administered by the ATP, the anticipatory pension reform and enhanced incentives for older workers to remain 
in employment. 
of which some will be presented in the following, which have made the system more robust 
towards demographic changes.     
 
The aim of increasing activity is related to the recent reforms of the transitional allowance, the 
post employment wage and the anticipatory pension schemes. Although the influx to these 
schemes has fallen significantly since 1996, the effects of the reforms will primarily occur 
once they are fully phased in (ibid:21). Nevertheless, the report advocates structural labour 
market improvements in order to increase the employment rate. This view is reflected in the 
action plan “More people in Work” presented by the Government in the autumn 2002, which 
focuses on improving financial incentives to work, enhancing the efficiency of finding people 
jobs and more flexible measures for finding the fastest way to employment. Measures address 
the population in general, but may be of particular importance to elderly who increasingly opt 
for early exit and often find it hard to re-enter the labour market after a period of absence.162. 
This complies with the OECD recommendation of developing effective active labour market 
programmes to help older workers find new jobs. OECD also stresses the need for employing 
reforms that generally can attain high levels of employment. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
The national strategy report complies with the OECD view that the pension system should 
avoid obstructing labour market flexibility with regard to access to pension schemes in 
general and changes in employment especially (ibid:25). Access to second pillar pensions is 
considered relatively flexible, mainly requiring a minimum age of 20 and 9 months of service 
in the line of business163. The fact that Danish labour market pensions are funded implies that 
pension benefits depend on contributions paid and returns obtained. Accordingly, employees 
will not lose their pension rights on changing jobs164. It is a statutory requirement of life 
insurance companies and pension funds that members in mandatory pension schemes may 
transfer their pension, free of charge and without losing pension rights, in connection with 
changing employment. This job-change agreement ensures that employees may transfer their 
earned pension rights and gather their pension savings in the institute, which the contributions 
from the new job are paid. 
 
                                                 
162 Due to for instance sickness, unemployment etc. 
163 Groups with non-standard employment are not so dependant on coverage from labour market pensions 
because they can choose to enter individual pension schemes instead. 
164 In contrast to Norway where employees may suffer a loss in pension especially when moving between the 
public and private sector cf. Norway section 2.3.8 and appendix B, Norway section 1.3.2.  
2.0 The National Pension 
The relative weight of the pension pillars is expected to change in the near future, in particular 
due to the ongoing expansion of labour market pension schemes. As labour market pension 
schemes mature, the number of people with pension supplements will increase, while the 
share of pensioners with national old-age pension only will decrease (Regeringen, 2002:73). 
Seeing that the national supplementary pension is partially means-tested against other pension 
income165 exceeding a certain amount, the relative importance of the national old-age pension 
will decrease whereas the role of labour market pensions, ATP and SP as pension providers 
increase. As part of the post employment wage reform, the means-testing of public old-age 
pension is eased as regards income from work (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a:6). 
 
In 1999 a change in legislation, taking effect from July 2004, reduces the public old-age 
pension age from 67 to 65 (ibid:6). Indirectly the reform appears to diverge from the OECD 
direction of increasing the average age of retirement166. At first glance, the decision of 
reducing the standard age of retirement, and thus the age of eligibility, does not seem to be in 
accordance with the aim of increasing the average retirement age. On the other hand it reflects 
the widening gap between a relatively high standard retirement age and a decline in the actual 
average age of retirement. Per se, the initiative would seem to discourage rather than promote 
prolonged employment and increase rather than reduce public pension expenses. This is, 
however, not necessarily the case. 
 
 
As a matter of fact, a significant share of people aged 65 and 66 receives a post employment 
wage, which is actually higher than the old age pension level. Reducing the age of eligibility 
to old-age pension may in other words actually decrease public expenditures, provided people 
who originally did not receive any income transfers do not enter at the age of 65 (Bingely et 
al., 2001:17). I question whether this assumption will prove valid. Due to changes in the 
means testing of basic amount, gradual retirement is made more attractive to improve the 
transition from work to retirement. The reduction of basic amount begins at a higher level of 
income and the rate of reduction is reduced from 60 to 30 per cent. Basic amount will not be 
fully phased out until the level of income significantly exceeds the average income of skilled 
                                                 
165 Including labour market and individual pensions. 
166 On the other hand, OECD assesses the standard age of eligibility to only modestly effect the actual retirement 
age (cf. ch. III). 
workers, raising the question of whether the reform will actually reduce total public pension 
expenditures as predicted.      
 
In my opinion the lowering of the standard age of retirement may indicate an enhancement of 
the generosity aspect. As mentioned previously (cf. ch. IV section 3.4), the generosity of 
benefits may not be reflected and measured in economic terms only. The lowering of the 
retirement age generally increases the benefit period, which I find reflects an aspect of 
generosity particularly considering the outlook of increased public pension expenses and the 
increasing share of pensioners.    
 
2.1 ATP 
In 1997/98 an ATP-reform is implemented with the intention of ensuring better pension 
coverage for people with no or limited affiliation with the labour market, long or many 
periods with no employment or who exit before the standard age of retirement. The ATP- 
scheme is extended to include several groups who temporarily receive social benefits, to 
provide them the opportunity of attaining a higher pension (ATP, 1996:5). The reform renders 
it possible for recipients of lasting transfer benefits167 to pay voluntary contributions and 
enhances the possibilities for people with early retirement to improve their pension coverage. 
 
The intention of improving the pension level for certain exposed groups, although targeted, 
may appear to run counter the OECD view that public pensions should only aim at meeting 
poverty alleviation goals. ATP is a pension supplementary scheme, aimed at ensuring the 
replacement rate rather than prevent poverty. Admittedly, I have classified ATP as a public 
scheme, together with SP and SAP, on the grounds that they are statutory. ATP is, 
nevertheless, a fully funded scheme and entails no public expenses. Thus, I do not consider 
the OECD recommendation that public pensions only meet poverty alleviation goals 
necessarily includes the ATP scheme. 
     
As from 1997/98 double ATP-contributions are payable in connection with unemployment, 
sickness, childbirth and participation in training programmes. As a result, people with periods 
of absence will receive a higher ATP-pension than ordinary contributors. This aspect will to 
                                                 
167 Notably anticipatory pension, partial pension, transitional allowance, post employment wage and semi-post 
employment wage (ATP, 1996:6). 
some extent counter the effects of the labour market pension schemes, where the size of 
pension benefits is determined by labour market affiliation and are affected by periods of 
unemployment and sickness without pay etc. where no contribution is made. The purpose of 
the double ATP-contribution is to provide some compensation for the groups in question, for 
whom contributions are financed by members of unemployment insurance funds collectively 
contributing one third, private employers collectively contributing one third and the member 
paying the remaining third (ibid:8). 
 
According to recent changes taking effect from January 2001, future ATP-pension rights will 
be estimated on an age-dependent basis168. As the reform matures individual benefits are 
assumed to better reflect the value of the contributions made by the individual and the scheme 
will be more robust to demographic changes (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a, appendix 2). 
As part of the anticipatory pension reform, ATP is made mandatory for new anticipatory and 
their contributing share will be reduced to one third of full contribution from January 2003. 
Simultaneously, the share of the contribution paid by voluntary members is reduced. 
  
Overall, I find the ATP scheme to be in accordance with the OECD recommendation of 
increasing advance-funded elements within public plans. As a contribution-defined scheme, 
ATP enhances the direct link between contributions paid and benefits received, which is 
recommended by OECD. This is, however, only partly true for the groups of transfer payment 
recipients included in the scheme. OECD advocates providing significant voluntary and 
mandatory elements in earnings-related pensions. Admittedly, ATP is related to the scope of 
employment rather than earnings, but it constitutes a supplementary pension scheme 
mandatory for all wage earners, and certain recipients of transfer payments, while admitting 
voluntary members. I do not think the reform necessarily counters the OECD principles for 
reform, although it does diminish the relation between individual contributions and benefits, 
but not only at the state’s expense. 
 
2.2 SP 
According to a change in the SP scheme in 2002, a person’s future contributions will be added 
to his or her savings and the aspect of redistribution will cease making the new SP-scheme a 
                                                 
168 Previously, the ATP-pension was age neutral in the sense that payments did not depend on when 
contributions were made, cf. appendix B, Denmark section 1.2.2. 
purely funded non-redistributive scheme like its predecessor DMP169 (Ministry of Social 
Affairs, 2002a:7). Henceforth, future SP-payments depend on individual earnings during 
one’s working years, which is in accordance to the OECD view of establishing a direct link 
between life-time benefits and contributions.  
 
3.0 The Anticipatory Pension Reform 
Since 1988 the influx to the anticipatory pension scheme has decreased170, but the number of 
entrants has been particularly low in recent years, amounting to 21.286 in 1997171. This may 
in part be due to more resources being spent on rehabilitation and the increased provision of 
“flex-jobs” on special conditions in the period 1989-1999, providing an alternative to 
anticipatory pension. On the other hand critics claim that the decline of new entrants is rather 
a result of tightened eligibility requirements. Bingley et al. (2001:17) emphasise that it is still 
too early to reach any conclusion of the effects of these policy changes as they have only been 
in effect for a short period of time. The anticipatory pension reform is expected to reduce the 
influx of new entrants, compared to if no initiatives were implemented (Ministry of Social 
Affairs, 2002a,appendix 2). 
  
In 2001 a reform of the anticipatory pension scheme, coming into force in January 2003, is 
adopted. The reform entails an enhancement of the connection between labour force 
activation measures and the anticipatory pension. Preventive steps are emphasised and the 
responsibility, influence and opportunities of the individual is strengthened by including 
claimants in the process (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002c:10). The objective is to improve 
the possibilities of persons with reduced capacity for work to enter or continue in 
employment. The focus of attention is the actual resources of recipients, their potential rather 
than their limitations. Activation measures are preferred to passive provision. This complies 
with the conclusion of a recent study (Weatherall, 2002:11) that protracted income-replacing 
provision, notably cash benefits (kontanthjælp) and sickness benefits, increases the 
probability of receiving anticipatory pension. From 1990 to 1997 roughly 70 per cent of the 
anticipatory pensioners received some kind of social benefits the year preceding entrance. 
This is hardly surprising as recipients of social benefits generally have more social and health 
                                                 
169 DMP was introduced in 1998 but already replaced by the former SP scheme in 1999 (Socialministerier, 
2002a:15). 
170 During the 1990s the number of recipients awarded anticipatory pension has dropped by roughly 20 per cent 
(Weatherall, 2002:7).  
171 Between 1990 and 1997 the highest number of awards constituted 28.625 in 1991 (Weatherall, 2002:15). 
related problems than the general population. On the other hand, evidence indicates that 
prolonged rehabilitation172, which is not merely a passive benefit provision, reduces the risk 
of becoming anticipatory pensioner the following year. This suggests that rehabilitation serves 
it purpose of improving individuals’ attachment to the labour market and decreasing their 
likelihood of becoming anticipatory pensioners (ibid), (cf. Filges et al., 2002).         
 
According to the new stipulations anticipatory pension is awarded on a capacity to work-
criterion, arbejdsevnekritertiet. The criterion refers to the capacity to meet labour market 
requirements, including specific work tasks, to attain an income of full or partial self-support 
(the capacity for work-notice173 § 4). Anticipatory pension is only awarded once the working 
capacity of the applicant is permanently reduced to the extent that he or she can no longer 
support themselves and rehabilitation and activation measures are exhausted (Ministry of 
Social Affairs, 2002c:12). Individuals’ capacity for work is assessed regardless of any 
structural problems in the labour market, like high or rising unemployment, or geographical 
limitations. In other words, whether employment is available or not is of no relevance. The 
reform stresses the actual capacity for work, whereas the original anticipatory pension 
emphasised the opposite, i.e. loss of capacity for work. The former is considered to better 
enhance comprehension of eligibility decisions, ensuring that recipients with actual work 
capacity are provided the possibility of remaining attached to the labour market 
(Jurainformation, 2001:30). The anticipatory pension reform reflects the current activation 
strategy in Denmark. The activation line aims to provide citizens the opportunity of remaining 
or becoming self-supporting, whether by ordinary employment or through flex job (Ministry 
of Social Affairs, 2002c:12). 
 
The reform generally simplifies the anticipatory pension scheme by replacing the original four 
pension levels with one rate only, corresponding the level of daily allowance for single 
pensioners and 85 per cent thereof for married/cohabitant couples. Special benefits for 
anticipatory pensioners, like health allowance, heating benefits and personal allowance, are 
abolished. The anticipatory pension is independent of previous income or employment, but is 
graduated according to any additional income of the recipient and his or her spouse/ 
                                                 
172 I.e. revalideringydlesen. 
173 Arbejdsevne-bekendgørelsen. 
cohabitant. According to the reform benefits are subjected to taxation174 (ibid:10). The 
taxation and the abolition of special benefits generally comply with the proposals made by 
OECD of subjecting pensions to income tax and phasing out or targeting subsidised privileges 
for seniors. 
 
Stipulations embedded in the reform improve pension savings for anticipatory pensioners, 
notable by introducing a supplementary labour market pension scheme, SAP, and making 
ATP-contributions mandatory. In this respect the reform complies with the OECD 
recommendation of introducing mandatory individual accounts. For recipients awarded 
anticipatory pension prior to January 2003 ATP-contribution is voluntary. The government 
provides 2/3 of the contributions to ATP and SAP and the recipient the remaining 1/3 (ibid). 
Rendering participation in the ATP scheme mandatory ensures anticipatory pensioners a 
higher income upon transfer to the national old-age pension. On the other hand, the old-age 
pension is partly means-tested against income as the supplementary pension is graduated once 
additional income exceeds a certain amount. To the extent the number of pensioners with 
graduated national pension increases, the expenses of the national old-age pension may be 
expected to decrease. In Denmark only the national old-age pension is a publicly financed 
pay-as-you-go scheme. By increasing the role of supplementary pension schemes, which in 
Denmark primarily are funded and contribution-defined, public pension expenses may be 
reduced or at least contained and make the overall pension system more robust towards 
demographic changes175. This would comply with the OECD recommendation of a more 
multi-pillar pension system.     
 
3.1 SAP   
The public labour market-like supplementary pension scheme for anticipatory pensioners is a 
part of the anticipatory pension reform. Its objective is to provide anticipatory pensioners the 
opportunity of supplementary pension savings in order to be on a more equal footing with 
members of labour market pension schemes. Contributions amount to 2.8 per cent of the 
anticipatory pension for a single person, of which the recipient pays one third and the state the 
remaining two thirds (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a, appendix 2). 
 
                                                 
174 The anticipatory pension amount and the disability allowance in the original scheme were not taxable 
(Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002b:23) 
175 Funded schemes are generally considered more robust to demographic changes cf. ch. III, section 2.4.  
Participation in the scheme is voluntary, compared to the mandatory ATP, and addresses 
recipients awarded anticipatory pension both prior and after January 2003. Pension rights are 
gender neutral, i.e. the fact that life expectancy for men and women differ does not give 
grounds for distinctive pension rights. SAP-contributors are given individual accounts 
administered by ATP, a life insurance company or pension funds as chosen by the contributor 
(Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002c:43). 
 
The introduction of SAP is in accordance with OECD recommendations of improving the 
importance of funded elements in the overall pension system, whether within public or private 
plans. Contributions to SAP are voluntary, but as the state provides for 2/3 of the annual 
payments, the incentive for participation is in my opinion strong. The intention of the SAP of 
increasing the compensation level may conflict with the OECD view that public schemes 
primarily should aim at meeting poverty alleviation goals. On the other hand, it reflects the 
values of state responsibility and generosity of the Scandinavian welfare state. At the outset 
the implementation of SAP entails increased public pension expenses due to the fact that the 
state is obligated to pay 2/3 of individual contributions. However, as the scheme mature the 
number of recipients receiving a relatively decent SAP-pension may increase. To the extent 
the combined payments of ATP and SAP increase the number of pensioners with additional 
income above the level set for graduating the national supplementary pension, total public 
pensions expenses may in the longer term decrease. 
      
4.0 The Post Employment Wage Reform 
Since its implementation in 1979 the post employment wage scheme has become the most 
dominant path to early retirement from the age of 60. Initially the only financial incentive for 
postponing entry was eligibility to maximum unemployment insurance benefits until the age 
of 67, provided entry was delayed until the age of 63. However, a recent reform176 aims to 
enhance incentives for postponement further. In the long run it is estimated that this reform 
and the reduction of the retirement age combined, will significantly decrease the number of 
participants in the PEW scheme (Bingely et al., 2001:17).      
 
Originally, the PEW-scheme was introduced as a means to redistribute employment from 
older workers to young unemployed. Its intention was to encourage early retirement for 
labour market reasons, hence it should, according to the OECD view, be phased out. The 
scheme may have outplayed its original role, but rather than closing the scheme altogether, cf. 
the transitional allowance scheme177, the Danish government has chosen to reform it.  
 
The view of the OECD on the subject of pre-retirement schemes is in my opinion ambiguous. 
On one hand, financial incentives to early retirement are recommended removed and 
programmes encouraging early exit for labour market reasons phased out, which could be 
comprehended as a general disregard for pre-retirement schemes. On the other hand, OECD 
seems to acknowledge early retirement schemes by suggesting that the lower age limit for 
early retirement is increased and the early retirement ages in occupational and public old-age 
pensions respectively be more closely aligned. In my opinion pre-retirement schemes will by 
definition entail some financial incentives to early labour force exit, otherwise they would not 
provide a viable option to continued employment. I hold that the financial incentives cannot 
be removed altogether without undermining the purpose and function of the schemes, whereas 
their strength as pull factors is another matter. I also fail to see the distinction between general 
pre-retirement schemes and programmes encouraging early exit for labour market reasons, 
which OECD seems to make.  In practise their result will be the same. All in all I find the 
OECD view on pre-retirement to a certain extent self-contradictory. In consequence, I only 
assess whether the reform of the PEW-scheme complies with OECD recommendations and 
not its existence as such.   
                                                 
176 Gradually taking effect from July 1999. 
177 The termination of the transitional allowance scheme is in accordance with OECD recommendations, only the 
scheme was closed prior to their publishing. 
The primary purpose of the post employment wage reform is to provide financial incentives 
for older workers to remain in the labour market and to facilitate gradual retirement. This is in 
accordance with the general OECD view on work and retirement. The reform includes 
elements making the scheme less attractive when joined early and elements encouraging 
postponed entry. The former implies means-testing against other pension arrangements, 
whether actual or future payments, primarily from private and occupational schemes. The 
latter is reflected in the introduction of a special tax-exempt premium178 for people who 
postpone entrance beyond the age of 62. If entry is postponed 2 years, the means-testing 
against other pension arrangement will only be on actual payments (Hansen, 2001:8). As the 
reform has only been in effect for a relatively short time, its impact on labour force 
participation and exit is difficult to ascertain. On the assumption that the reform will reduce 
the implicit tax on continued work, especially for the age groups 61 and 63-64, a recent 
study179 predicts that the reform will increase the average age of retirement with 1-1.5 years 
for eligible180 men and 1-2 years for women.        
 
The reform tightens the required years of membership of an unemployment insurance fund 
and changes the estimation of allocated benefits. Whereas benefits previously were reduced 
according to the period of receiving PEW, current benefits depend on age upon entry being 
60-61 or 62 or older. In the former benefits constitute 91 per cent of maximum unemployment 
insurance benefits and benefits are means tested against income from all other pension 
schemes. In the latter case benefits are equivalent to the maximum of unemployment 
insurance benefits and only means-tested against income from pension schemes with 
payments originating from previous employment. Prior to the reform, no age-distinction was 
made (Bingley et al., 2002:18). The lower age of entry is not increased, as recommended by 
OECD, but the fact that incentives to enter at the age of 60 or 61 are weakened, and incentives 
to postponed entry are enhanced, indicates a move in the direction advocated by OECD.  
 
Besides having turned 60 and being a member of an approved unemployment insurance fund, 
eligibility to the new post employment wage is conditioned on a membership period of at least 
25 out of the last 30 years. Members are also required to have paid a PEW-contribution for at 
least 25 out of the last 30 years and have to be eligible for daily allowance upon 
                                                 
178 This would constitute 50 per cent of the annual income of an unskilled worker provided work is continued 
until the new age of retirement of 65 (Bingley et al., 2001:18).  
179 Danø et al. 2000 in Bingley et al. 2002:18. 
180 Meeting the criteria of the post employment wage scheme. 
unemployment or receive transitional benefit. Eligibility ceases at the age of 65 whereupon 
the post employment wage is replaced by the national pension (Jørgensen, 2002a:4).    
 
The reform replaces the previous allowed work limit of 200 hours annually, with a more 
flexible regulation enhancing the financial incentives for remaining in work. The new PEW-
scheme does not restrict the amount a claimant may work while receiving post employment 
wage, but the post employment wage will be reduced by each working hour. One post 
employment wage hour at the highest rate of daily allowance equals approximately DKK 84, 
and the post employment wage is accordingly reduced with DKK 84181 for each working 
hour, irrespective of the hourly pay. This aspect facilitates gradual retirement, although in 
proportion to the level of income182, and may ease the transfer from work to retirement. 
Eligibility is terminated if the claimant works 30 hours or more a week (Bingley et al., 
2001:18). Members of the old scheme may choose whether to work within the 200 hours limit 
without reducing their post employment wage or according to the new regulations (Jørgensen, 
2003:53).  
 
The new PEW-scheme presents incentives for postponing entrance. Holders of a PEW-
certificate postponing entry for two years are granted certain privileges, notably a post 
employment wage equivalent to the individually estimated daily allowance rate, favourable 
pension deduction and the opportunity to earn a tax-free premium. The latter implies that once 
the “two years rule” is met, a member can earn a tax-free premium for every 481 working 
hours, which correspond to a quarter of full-time employment, i.e.13 weeks a 37 hours. This 
privilege applies to both fully and partly insured members. Employment within the two-year 
period is not taken into account (ibid:39). The premium for every 481 hours worked amounts 
to 6 per cent of the maximum daily allowance rate, i.e. roughly DKK 9.719 for member with 
full-time insurance and DKK 6.474 for the part-time insured in 2003. The premium is paid 
once the member turn 65 and hence the maximum possible premium183 to be attained is 
approximately DKK 116.628 for fully insured members and about DKK 77.688 for those 
partly insured. Basically the premium is rendered for not withdrawing the post employment 
wage. The rules for earning a premium will also apply members of the old PEW-scheme.  
                                                 
181 At the 2003-level (Jørgensen, 2003:20). 
182 The fact that the post employment wage is reduced by a fixed amount regardless of the hourly pay benefits in 
particular higher income earners compared to lower income groups. 
183 On account that the PEW-certificate is issued at 60 and the holder does not withdraw post employment wage 
but remain in employment. 
 The PEW-amount received varies according to whether a member has a full-time or part-time 
insurance. The post employment wage is equivalent to the daily allowance rate members 
would be entitled upon unemployment at either time of entry or the issuing of the PEW-
certificate. The amount can at the most constitute 91 per cent of the highest daily allowance 
rate. Per January 2003 the maximum post employment wage amounted to DKK 2.835 a week 
for fully insured members amounted and DKK 1.890 for the partly insured.  If entry is 
postponed for two years after the issue of the PEW-certificate, members may at the most 
receive a post employment wage of DKK 3.115 a week (ibid:36).  
       
Maximum yearly post employment wage (DKK) in 2003 
 Full time insured Part-time insured 
New scheme 147.935  98.625  
Old scheme, step 1 162.546  108.279  
Old scheme, step 2 133.323  88.710  
Source: Jørgensen, 2003:86. 
 
Originally, the post employment wage scheme is a nonce offer. However, new stipulations 
allow members one re-entry, provided they withdraw to re-affiliate with the labour market 
and are entitled to daily allowance upon re-entrance (ibid:76). The possibility of re-entrance 
may encourage recipients to return to the labour market full-time by providing a guarantee 
that withdrawal from the scheme not necessarily has to be final. I think that a fear that the 
costs of leaving the scheme may exceed the gains may constitute a greater disincentive for re-
entering the labour market than were re-entrance to the PEW-scheme not an option. If the 
opportunity of employment presents itself, I suspect that recipients would be more inclined to 
accept knowing that if it does not work out they may still be eligible to post employment 
wage. 
        
To the extent the post employment wage reform changes the original intent of the scheme, i.e. 
as a labour market means, its existence may not necessarily be inconsistent with OECD 
recommendations. However, some still regards the post employment scheme as a labour 
market means (cf. Jørgensen, 2003:3). Generally, the reform reduces the strength of 
incentives for early labour force exit and encourages employment by rewarding postponed 
entry. In this respect the reform complies with the OECD principles for reform. 
     
5.0 Summary 
Overall, Norway and Denmark seem to share certain views on the challenges posed by ageing 
and the response needed. Common aims include ensuring a sustainable pension system184, 
reversing the declining age of average retirement and increasing labour force participation by 
strengthening work incentives generally and among transfer recipients in particular, e.g. 
through workfare and reactivation.   
 
Few of the reforms and motions for reform included in this study diverge directly, i.e. entail a 
move in the opposite direction, from OECD recommendations, although the extent of actual 
compliance may vary. Particularly with regard to employment policies and measures for 
improving employability among older workers, Norway and Denmark comply with each other 
as well as OECD recommendations, which I assumed to be the case185. The fact that few 
reform/motions conflict directly with OECD recommendations does not necessarily imply 
Norwegian and Danish endorsement of the OECD direction for reform. Indirectly reforms 
may diverge from the OECD view by ignoring and/or neglecting to adopt or act on 
recommendations given. Some of the OECD recommendations are disregarded altogether in 
Norwegian and Danish pension reforms and proposals, implying that pension arrangements 
OECD recommends changed remain unaltered, which may be indications of diverging 
opinions. Norway and Denmark both express intentions of maintaining minimum pensions, 
which conflict with the OECD view that public pension should only meet poverty alleviation 
goals. To the extent their explicit aim of sustaining current compensation levels entail state 
guarantees and state provision, both countries diverge form the OECD notion that total 
                                                 
184 Primarily entailing a sound economy to meet current and future pension obligations and a pension system 
responsive to demographic changes. The latter is assumed to be attained by strengthening the elements of 
funding. 
185 Cf. ch. V section 1.5. 
pension income should reflect individual choices186. This said, it is my opinion that OECD 
never intended for countries to comply with all of its recommendations in the first place187. I 
generally regard the seven main principles as guidelines for reform directions, whereas the 
more specific recommendations188 primarily are suggestions for illustrative purposes. All in 
all, the recommendations may or may not suit distinctive countries depending inter alia on 
their welfare regime, which I assume to affect their respective directions for reform. 
 
The drawing of any conclusion about direction for reform in Norway is complicated by the 
fact that reform proposals rather then actual implementations seem to dominate and I cannot 
foresee which ones will be enacted or whether they will be implemented according to their 
original proposed wording. At this stage I would like to note that from my point of view 
reform motions primarily indicate the views of the proposer and segments of (public) 
authorities189, which not necessarily comply with general public policy. With regard to the 
two alternative pension models proposed by the Pension Commission, I could not say that one 
is better than the other in light of OECD recommendations. Both may reflect the OECD view, 
although perhaps to various degrees and on different aspects. I would like to point out that the 
model based on a national flat-rate basic pension, would entail a pension system à la the 
current pension system in Denmark, whereas the proposed alternative would distinguish the 
pension systems in Norway and Denmark even further. 
 
With its elements of funding190, individual accounts and partly income means-tested national 
pension, Denmark may appear to have a pension system which comply more with OECD 
recommendations than Norway, at least for the time being. Reforms in Denmark generally 
aim to strengthen funding and private pension provision and extend their coverage by 
including particularly vulnerable groups191. As reforms and (new) schemes mature, the share 
and coverage of private pension provision are expected to increase, which may ease the 
demographic pressure on public spending. In my opinion the Danish pension reforms entail a 
move in the direction recommended by OECD, although the reforms also include elements 
typical of the Scandinavian welfare state, which may diverge from the OECD view. I consider 
                                                 
186 For instance with regard to years in gainful employment, age of retirement, individual pension contributions 
and savings. 
187 And if this were the case, it would appear to me not a very realistic point of view. 
188 Concrete reform proposals of each principle, cf. ch. III sections 2.1.1, 2.2.1 and 2.3.1.  
189 Which may or may not reflect the views (of segments) of the general population. 
190 Which may be considered extensive compared to Norway. 
191 I refer to groups that would otherwise receive lower pensions due to limited or reduced labour market 
affiliation.  
the most significant discrepancy between Denmark and OECD to be the lowering of the 
standard age of retirement of the former. True, the intention of thereby reduceing public 
spending192 would be in accordance with OECD recommendation.  On the other hand, I fear it 
may generate sentiments193 that could strengthen the current trends of early retirement, despite 
the fact that Denmark has a pronounced aim of the opposite  
 
That Denmark generally appears to comply more with the OECD view than Norway, may 
support my assumption that Denmark already from the outset was somewhat closer to the 
OECD view on pension policies. On the other hand, it may result from the fact that Denmark 
is a forerunner in implementing reform, at least compared to Norway. It will be difficult to 
draw further conclusions until the nature of actual reforms in Norway is known. 
  
                                                 
192 The post employment wage scheme apparently being considered more expensive than the national old-age 
pension.  
193 Of public endorsement of early retirement. 
VII Concluding Remarks 
I have addressed various aspects of the ongoing demographic trend of ageing, notably 
population, individual and active ageing. Combined and separately these interrelated trends 
entail challenges that will affect most aspects of society politically, socially, fiscally and 
maybe even normatively. At first glance individual and active ageing may appear to primarily 
be of individual matter, addressing the individual per se as it were. But aggregately, the fact 
that individuals are living longer and are spending a decreasing amount of their lifespan in 
actual employment due to later labour force entry and/or exit, is affecting the collective 
society. I have to admit that it is not without personal interest that I have regarded potential 
and probable consequences of ageing, in particular as it inter alia is my generation that 
presumably will shoulder the lion’s share of the burden. The burden of ageing populations 
will inter alia reflect itself in health and long-term care, general labour market and 
productivity demands and increased pension costs. I have primarily focused on the latter, 
notably addressing pension and pension-related194 arrangements and policies.       
 
1.0 Problematic Encounters 
My study was complicated by the fact that direction for reform in Norway is primarily still 
being deliberated and of pension policies needing to be clarified, whereas Denmark has 
implemented several reforms to increase pension system robustness towards demographic 
challenges. Denmark is currently not considering further system adjustments, which may 
indicate a perception that all required measures are initiated. The fact that Denmark is ahead 
of Norway in introducing pension reform may be an indication of a greater willingness for 
reform195. But it may also be the result of a more pronounced need for reform. After all, 
Norway holds a distinctly favourable position regarding the increasing pension costs due to its 
oil revenues and the Petroleum Fund. However, oil revenues depend on oil prices, which tend 
to fluctuate according to international affairs. 
 
                                                 
194 I.e. employability of older workers and the transition from work to retirement.  I consider the former 
important as labour force participation rates among older workers are generally significantly lower than the 
remaining population of working-age. Despite a willingness to work, many older workers experience a reluctant 
and discriminating labour market.   
 
195 Whether this may also be an indication of a stronger leaning towards OECD views in general, is another 
matter for discussion. I do, however, not disregard that to the extent the Danish pension system reflects view and 
values of OECD, theses values may also be reflected in the general public and political opinion.     
During this process I have discovered that some figures and data of documentation regarding 
pensions in Norway have proven especially difficult to obtain, notably on private pensions. 
Recent figures on the scope of private pensions, pension earnings and their share of total 
pension income for the average pensioner have proven unavailable196. Pension reforms and 
policies are being deliberated, it may seem, without regarding the actual extent of current 
private pension provision. I do not imply that these figures would significantly alter the 
decisions finally taken, but I consider them important aspects that ought to be included in the 
overall equation. In comparison, corresponding data in Denmark are plentiful. 
 
2.0 Restating the Questions 
Are Norway and Denmark complying with the OECD recommended direction for reform in 
responding to the challenges posed by ageing? In answering this question I have chosen to 
address the pension system and related reforms in light of the normative foundation of  the 
Scandinavian welfare state in an attempt to hypothesize the direction for reform. My tentative 
assumption is that a comparison of the normative values (I found) embedded in the OECD 
principles for reform and the Scandinavian welfare state, could indicate whether or not their 
respective reform policies would be likely to comply with OECD recommendations.  
 
To what extent do the normative features of the OECD principles and the Scandinavian model 
correspond/differ? I find the normative foundation of the OECD principles and the 
Scandinavian welfare state to primarily differ on public responsibility, universality and 
generosity, and more or less comply regarding the aspect of full employment. Per se this could 
suggest that Norway and Denmark would be reluctant to comply with OECD 
recommendations, perhaps because it may be perceived197 as a too radical move away from 
the Scandinavian welfare state model. By considering the pension system in light of the 
Scandinavian model and including my findings in the equation, my initial assumption is 
modified. The current pension systems in Norway and Denmark reflect characteristics and 
normative values associated with the Scandinavian welfare state, but I also find features 
complying with the OECD view, which may indicate a lesser reluctance to follow the OECD 
direction for reform. To the extent that the pension systems in Norway and Denmark differ, I 
assume that Denmark might be somewhat more inclined to follow the OECD view.  
 
                                                 
196 Cf. note 97. 
197 Both by politicians and the general public. 
2.1 An OECD Direction for Reform 
Are Norway and Denmark moving in the direction recommended by OECD? I would like to 
note that although reform measures are found to be in accordance with the OECD view, this 
does not necessarily imply that they are proposed/implemented on OECD advice. Any 
concurrence may be coincidental and unintended. It is also a question of the order of 
succession198, as certain reforms in Denmark were motioned and adopted prior to the 
publishing of the OECD recommendations.  
 
I am admittedly somewhat surprised at the extent to which reforms and motions for reform 
appear to be in accordance with OECD recommendations, particularly as OECD generally 
stresses diminishing the role of public pensions and public responsibility, enhancing private 
pension provision, and thereby transferring responsibility and risks to individuals. Both 
Norway and Denmark intend to strengthen the role of private pension provision, although not 
primarily by downscaling public provision. Funding and individual accounts have nearly been 
non-existing in Norway, whereas they are more common and widespread in Denmark. 
Nevertheless, sentiments for complying with OECD recommendations, entailing pension 
arrangements more in line with the ones found in Denmark, may currently be observed in 
Norway. In a new pension arrangement coming into force January 2004, the Norwegian 
Employers’ Association (NHO) is replacing defined-contributions with contribution-defined 
pensions. In consequence new NHO-employees199 will no longer be guaranteed a pension of a 
specific amount200. LO criticizes this arrangement for transferring risks from companies to 
individuals, whereas NHO encourages others to follow suit by advocating that contribution-
defined schemes are less expensive for companies to run, and are more “company-friendly”201 
(Nettavisen, 2003).  
 
2.2 The End of the Scandinavian Model as Reflected in the Pension System? 
If Norway and Denmark to a certain extent are moving in the direction recommended by 
OECD, does this entail a move away from the Scandinavian welfare state as reflected in the 
                                                 
198 Whether reforms precede or succeed OECD recommendations. 
199 Employees of NHO, not employees of firms that are members of NHO, although NHO encourages its 
members to introduce similar arrangements. 
200 Whereas today’s defined-benefit generally guarantees NHO-employees a pension of 66 per cent of wage upon 
retirement. 
201 Cf. According to Myles (1996 in Esping-Andersen, 1999:177) that a shift from defined-benefits to defined-
contribution plans is a case of shifting costs from employers to workers. 
pension system and related policies? In my opinion the answer is both yes and no. It is more a 
question of degrees rather than either-or. As the normative foundation of OECD and the 
Scandinavian welfare state primarily diverge, the enhancement of one may to a certain extent 
necessarily imply a curtailment of the other.  
 
It appears to me that both countries attempt to attain “the best of two worlds”, by combining 
conflicting elements of the Scandinavian welfare state and the OECD recommendations. In 
my opinion Denmark has followed the OECD direction without compromising its 
Scandinavian welfare state. The national pension, which reflects public responsibility, still is 
and will most likely remain the most important pension pillar. Recent reforms imply increased 
state provision of pension supplements for particularly vulnerable groups where private 
pension provision fails and the aspects of universality and generosity appear to remain at their 
current levels. Norway and Denmark concur that the future public pensions, cf. first pillar, 
should maintain their guarantee of minimum economic security in old age with relatively 
generous benefits.  
 
As private pension schemes mature, and to the extent participation is encouraged202, their 
share of total pension income and coverage will increase. Despite these projections neither 
Norway nor Denmark suggests reducing general public pension levels accordingly. In fact, 
the lowering of the retirement age in Denmark may enhance the generosity aspect of the 
pension system, provided generosity is not measured on economic terms only203. On the other 
hand, the general strengthening of workfare may indicate an inclination of reducing the 
overall aspect of generosity, at least as reflected in eligibility criteria. Workfare elements are 
in accordance with the aim of full employment. This implies that an extensive definition of 
the generosity aspect may conflict with the aim of full employment, although both are 
embedded in the Scandinavian welfare state. 
 
The lesson for Norway to learn would be that it is possible to follow OECD recommendations 
within a Scandinavian welfare state. Whether complying with OECD recommendations in the 
longer term may weaken the normative values of the Scandinavian welfare state as reflected 
in the pension system, remains to be seen. So far, I may only conclude that following the 
                                                 
202 For instance by initiating incentives or making participation mandatory. 
203 That is an extensive definition of generosity, including benefit periods, waiting periods, eligibility and the 
principle of universality.  
OECD direction for reform not necessarily implies a change of welfare regime type, i.e. to a 
liberal or a conservative welfare regime. In re-classifying welfare regimes the issue is the 
over-dominating character of the entire welfare package, not whether or not one programme 
deviates from the typology (Esping-Andersen, 1999:88). Besides, in the words of Esping-
Andersen: “It is one thing to redesign of reform the ways in which the state delivers welfare, 
another to recast the entire welfare regime” (1999:173). 
 
2.2.1 The Final Report of The Pension Commission: What to Expect? 
Whether or not Norway will maintain the principle of universality and the aspect of 
generosity embedded in its future pension system remains to be seen, but the final report of 
the Pension Commission may give an indication. A modernized national insurance scheme, as 
outlined in the preliminary report, would if adopted curtail the universality principle as it 
entails increased means-testing compared to the alternative flat-rate basic pension model and 
current regulation.  
 
Admittedly, I am anxiously awaiting the final report of the Norwegian Pension Commission 
in part because its recommendations are likely to hit my and following generations the 
hardest. Is it plausible to assume that a commission, with an average age above 50, will tend 
to the interest of future generations if it entails greater costs on their own behalf? The 
Commission emphasises the necessity of diversifying risks and sharing the burden related to 
demographic and economic changes204, which is not only a question of sharing the burden 
within generations but also between generations. In my opinion this aspect is only partly 
reflected in the preliminary report.  
 
Has the criticism aroused by the preliminary report affected the Commission and its final 
recommendations? May we expect that the Commission recommends granting students 
pension points for each year in higher education and/or that remedial measures are taken to 
ensure that women are not (again) the main pension losers? Is it pessimistic or realistic not to 
expect the Commission to suggest introducing a special pension tax/contribution on the 
                                                 
204 (Pensionskommisjonen, 2002:16). 
wealthy “dessert generation”205, i.e. the Norwegian baby boomers, who appears to be the 
pension winner in the preliminary report?  
 
I fear that the interests of the current 40-60 age cohort will be given precedence, both in the 
final report and in future pension reform.  In part because young people apparently are less 
inclined to use their electoral vote than older people. Young people hardly worry about their 
old-age pensions, although they probably should especially as reforms may strengthen the 
relation between life-earnings and -savings and benefits. Young people may feel estranged 
from the on-going pension debate, the subject is probably not decisive for their vote, which 
may diminish political inclination of protecting their interest compared to the interest of older 
people. Older people, on the other hand, are generally more aware of and interest in their 
pension rights and benefits and what they stand to lose on reform. Thus, I assume that they 
would be more likely to protest reforms compared to younger generations. 
 
3.0 Current Events and (future) Challenges 
The sentiment for increased spending of oil revenues and the Petroleum Fund appears 
currently to be widespread both among segments of politicians206 and the general population. 
The Pension Commission recognises that the size of the Petroleum Fund currently 
corresponds to the obligations of the supplementary pension. Earmarking the Petroleum Fund 
for future pensions will not meet the total future pension costs, additional reforms will be 
required as well207. Even if expenses on pensions were cut back by 2-3 per cent of BNP, 
which would reduce the level of pension expenses by 10 to 20 per cent, their increase would 
nevertheless be higher than in most countries (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:25).  
 
While pension reforms are being elaborated, politicians advocate increasing the spending of 
oil revenues on the grounds that it will not have a negative influence on the national economy. 
Perhaps not, but a decreased Petroleum Fond may increase the need for more severe pension 
reform in order to the meet future pension costs. In the summer of 2003 the opposition parties 
                                                 
205 Desertgenerasjonen. Generally the term denotes a generation benefiting from the labour and hardship of 
previous generations. The term is culturally conditioned, perhaps only valid for Norway. I employ the term to 
refer to the post-war baby-boomers in Norway in particular. The term was originally used in reference to 
Norwegian labour youth of the 1960s (Store Norske Leksikon, 2003).  
206 In the 2003 revised national budget the government suggests increasing the spending of oil revenues by NOK 
6.9 billions compared to balanced budget (St.meld. nr.2, 2002-2003:7). 
207 The Pension Commission acknowledges that increased future spending of oil revenues would require 
extending the provision of occupational and individual pension arrangements.  
force the Norwegian Government to increase pension expenses by half a billion. Will this be 
the beginning of a spending stream, political parties overbidding each other on pension rights 
and promises in order to increase their electoral support? After all, the median voter is getting 
older.    
 
I find it disturbing that Norway as of yet has not introduced any major reforms. Reforms need 
time to mature, as does the consolidation of public support. To illustrate, during the summer 
of 2003 France experiences several massive national strikes as public sector workers 
demonstrate against a governmental planned pension reform208. The strikes coincide with a 
series of major protests against pension reforms in Austria (BBC News, 2003) and some 
predict that the summer of 2003 will be “the summer of discontent”209 partly due to initiated 
pension reforms. Are we witnessing a growing intergenerational tension, which current 
demonstrations and protests are indications of? Will Norway experience similar reactions 
once a pension reform is finally presented?  
 
I assume that Norway may encounter greater difficulties in introducing pension reforms, 
particular in terms of gaining public support, than Denmark has experienced. To my 
knowledge the process of pension reform in Denmark has run relatively smoothly. But then 
again, applying the term reform on the recent changes in the Danish pension system may be 
called into question, at least when referring to reforms that reduce already established pension 
rights. Rather than reducing benefits and rights, pension reforms in Denmark entail a more 
extensive system of tariff negotiated pension arrangements, probably due to the fact that 
Denmark never introduced a second-tier of income-related public pensions. As private 
pension provision generally has been more extensive and common in Denmark, I expect that 
reforms enhancing private pension may be more contested and disputed in Norway. To the 
extent pension reforms in Norway reduce existing public pension rights and promises, I 
assume that reform implementation may prove more difficult and protested than in Denmark.   
 
                                                 
208 The reform, intended to shore up a growing deficit, entails increased payment period for receiving full 
pension and higher contributions of employees to reduce public pension deficit. Two opinion polls indicate that a 
majority of the population in France is sympathetic to the cause of protest. The unions acknowledge that 
measures need to be taken provided, I might add, that it is not at their expense. The problem is that someone has 
to pay, whether they agree to or not. Improving public awareness of the situation and ensuring public support 
may be essential, particularly if intergenerational conflicts are to be prevented.    
209 Italy and Germany are reducing social benefits due to strains of population ageing and high unemployment. 
3.1 Future Studies 
With respect to subsequent studies of pension systems and pension reform, it would be 
interesting to address implemented reforms in Norway, as they cannot be avoided or 
continuously postponed. Will Norway follow Denmark in the direction for reform or will their 
respective pension systems diverge further? I suspect that Norway may be more reluctant to 
implement OECD recommended reforms than Denmark, which I consider to be somewhat 
closer to the OECD view on pension from the outset. In Denmark, the object of further 
attention should be on the actual effects of the reforms as they mature. Do they comply with 
their intended and estimated effects? Are the initiated measures sufficient with regard to the 
challenges posed by ageing? Future studies may provide more information on whether or not 
the Norwegian and Danish response to ageing imply a divergence from the Scandinavian 
welfare state as reflected in their pension systems. It may not be the original intention of 
reforms to move away from the normative principles of the Scandinavian model, but as 
reforms develop and mature they may come to have this effect in practice.  
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Appendix A: Welfare State Regimes 
Esping-Andersen stresses that the term welfare regimes “refers to the ways in which welfare 
production is allocated between state, market, and households” (1999:73). In other words, 
there are three sources of managing social risk and how risks are pool will in effect define a 
welfare regime (ibid:33). Esping-Andersen originally (1990:47-78) defined welfare regimes 
in terms of the mix of public and market provision as measured by their modes of 
stratification/solidarity and degree of “de-commodification”. De-commodification refers to 
the extent a service is rendered as a matter of right and enables a person to maintain a 
livelihood without reliance on the market, whereas politics of stratification/solidarity denotes 
the way welfare states manage risk inequalities. In the revision 1999 Esping-Andsersen 
includes the aspect of  “de-familialization”, which refers to politics that lessen individuals’ 
reliance on the family by maximising their economic resources independently of familial or 
conjugal reciprocities (:45). He maintains the “three worlds” typology, and their original 
labelling210, of “liberal”, “conservative” and “social democratic” welfare regimes. 
 
 With regard to welfare state solidarity Esping-Andsersen distinguishes three models. The 
residual approach of the liberal welfare regime generally targets risk strata and divides society 
into a self-reliant majority that obtain adequate private insurance and a minority of dependent 
welfare state clients. Residual benefits are typically needs-tested and ungenerous since the 
support of the median voter is unlikely to be high due to scare personal relevance. The 
corporativist approach of the conservative welfare regime pools risk by status membership 
(usually compulsory) and is most typical expressed by occupational differentiation. The 
universalist approach typical of the social democratic regime implies a notion of solidarity as 
it pools all individual risks under one umbrella, on the grounds that the risk is universal or the 
idea that the risk should be shared universally.    
 
According to Esping-Andersen social risks are the building blocks of welfare regimes and 
where the state absorbs risks, the satisfaction of need is both de-commodified, i.e. taken out of 
the market, and de-familialized, i.e. taken out of the family (1999:40). Esping-Andersen 
stresses that the mere presence of social assistance/insurance does not per se necessarily bring 
about de-commodification or, I might add, de-familialization. For instance, needs-tests and 
meagre benefits curtail the de-commodifying effect, whereas benefits based on citizenship, 
                                                 
210 Cf. discussion on contested headings ch. IV section 2.2.3. 
offering a basic equal benefit to all, are not truly de-commodifying if they do not provide 
recipients with a genuine option to work. In other words, for welfare states to be de-
commodifying they have to emancipate individuals from market dependence (1990:22). The 
concept of de-commodification parallels the concept of de-familialization, only where the 
former related to the market the later relates to the family (1999:51). De-familializiation refers 
to the degree to which households’ welfare and care responsibilities are relaxed via state or 
market provision. Examining familialization through welfare state provision, Esping-
Andersen presents a bimodal picture with the social democratic regimes as distinctly de-
familialized (ibid:62). With regards to de-familialization through the welfare state, within 
households and to a certain extent through markets the social democratic regimes remain the 
only truly distinct cluster. “Basically, via the de-familialization of welfare responsibilities, the 
social democratic welfare state helps commodify women (and so lessens the dependence on 
males) so that it can then de-commodify them” (ibid:46). 
 
Esping-Andersen characterises the liberal welfare regime inter alia by a political commitment 
to minimize the state, to individualize risks and to promote market solutions, thereby 
disfavouring citizens’ entitlements. It has a narrow definition of eligibility and employ means 
or income tests to ascertain desert and need (1999:47). The conservative welfare regime is 
described as a blend of status segmentation with corporatist status divisions permeating social 
security systems, and familialism, in terms of a male-bread winner bias of social protection 
and a centrality of the family as care-giver and ultimate responsible for its members’ welfare. 
Compulsory social insurance is complemented with residual schemes for strata without 
“normal” employment patterns. Whereas liberal residualism is related to market failure, 
conservative residualism responds primarily to family failure. Both regimes favour a passive 
approach to employment management, but on different grounds. Where the liberal regime 
prioritises unregulated labour markets, the conservative regime emphasises strong job 
protection for already employed adult, male households (ibid:83). Esping-Andersen 
distinguishes the social democratic welfare regime by its commitment to universalism, 
comprehensive risk coverage, generous benefit levels and egalitarianism211. It is active in its 
effort to de-commodify welfare by minimizing market dependency and to attain its explicit 
goal of full employment, as reflected in active labour market policies. The social democratic 
                                                 
211 In terms of the practise of universalism, the active promotion of well-being and life chances perhaps 
particularly for women and redistribution and the elimination of poverty (Esping-Andersen, 1999:80). 
regime is a state-dominated welfare nexus with an emphasis on de-familialiazation, inter alia 
because rights are attached to individuals (ibid:80).       
 
Table 1: An illustration of welfare state regimes characteristics 
 “Liberal” “Corporatist” “Social democratic” 
Role of: 
-Family 
-Market 
-State 
 
Marginal 
Central 
Marginal 
 
Central 
Marginal 
Subsidiary 
 
Marginal 
Marginal 
Central 
Welfare state: 
Dominant mode of 
solidatity 
 
Individual 
Kinship 
Corporatism 
Etatism 
 
Universal 
Dominant locus of 
solidarity 
Market Family State 
Degree of 
decommodification 
Minimal High (for 
breadwiner) 
Maximum 
Conditions for 
entitlement 
Need, in response to 
market failure 
 -restrictive income 
and/or means-test 
Residualism 
Work performance 
and contributions 
-Need, in response to 
family failure 
Reciprocity 
Citizenship 
 
 
 
Universalism 
Benefits Modest  
-associated with 
stigma 
-Contribution-
defined212
    
Generous 
   -graduated 
according to earnings 
Examples213  The United States, 
Canada and Australia 
Austria, France, Italy 
and Germany 
The Scandinavian 
countries 
Source: Esping-Andersen, 1999:74-86, Esping-Andersen, 1990:26 and Kildal & Kuhnle, 
2002:3. 
 
 
The nation classification in Table 1 is based on the distinctions made in Esping-Andersen’s 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), where nations cluster according to modes of 
stratification/solidarity and degree of de-commodification. The “conservative” principle of 
solidarity is identified according to the degree of status segregation, measured as number of 
occupational pension schemes and the degree of “etatism” as measured by the expenditure on 
government-employee pensions. The “liberal” principle of solidarity is represented by the 
relative weight of means-tested welfare benefits measured as a percentage of total public 
social expenses, the importance of the private sector in pensions and health care as measured 
by its share of total pension spending and total health spending respectively. Finally, the 
                                                 
212 Cf. actuarial benefits with a contractual relationship between prior work and contributions and benefits, eg. 
how much a person has to work or contribute to qualify. 
213 Esping-Andersen finds that welfare states cluster, but stresses that there are no pure cases. Although the 
Scandinavian countries may be predominantly social democratic, they entail liberal elements, notably earnings- 
and work-related schemes complementing the flat-rate universal benefits. 
“socialist” principle of solidarity is associated with the degree of program universalism, 
measured as average percentage of population aged 16-64 eligible for sickness, 
unemployment and pension benefits and the degree of equality in the benefit structure 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990:73). 
 
Esping-Andersen identifies the de-commodifying potential of actual welfare programmes 
according to eligibility rules and restrictions on entitlements, income replacement and the 
range of entitlements provided. In the former, schemes are considered de-commodifying if 
access is easy and adequate standard of living is provided irrespective of previous labour 
force attachment, needs-test and contributions. Further, schemes have to ensure a certain level 
of income replacement level in order not to drive the recipient back to work as soon as 
possible (ibid:46). 
 
The “social-democratic” welfare states, the Scandinavian countries included, appear to have 
high de-commodification and strong universalism, whereas the “liberal” Anglo-Saxon welfare 
states have low de-commodification and strong individualistic self-reliance. The “corporatist” 
Continental European countries are etatist and modestly de-commodifying (ibid:50). Esping-
Andersen attempts to measure the de-commodifying potential of old-age pension by capturing 
their degree of market-independence for the average worker. According to his analysis, the 
pension schemes in the Nordic countries have a particular high degree of de-commodification. 
 
Appendix B: The Pension Systems in Norway and Denmark 
Elaborated  
Norway 
1.0 An Introduction to the Norwegian Pension System 
The Norwegian pension system rests on three pillars respectively; the national old-age 
pensions, labour market pension and individual pensions. The National Insurance Scheme 
(folketrygden) is the backbone of the Norwegian pension system and has primarily two main 
objectives. It provides a minimum of security for all citizens irrespective of income before 
retirement through the basic pension. Secondly, it intends to ensure that pension income is 
proportional to pre-retirement level, reflected in the supplementary pension complementing 
the basic pension (NOU 1998:19,p.17). Labour market pension schemes include both public 
and private occupational pension arrangements as well as pre-retirement pension agreements, 
notably AFP. Individual pension schemes are agreements between the individual and a 
financial institution on the initiative of the former. 
 
The correlation between labour market affiliation, i.e. pension earnings, and the level of 
national pension has over time decreased. This is mainly due to a curtailment of the special 
supplement against the supplementary pension, a reduction of the supplementary pension and 
a ceiling on pension earnings (cf. subsequent section 1.1). Accordingly, incentives to labour 
market participation in order to secure income after retirement are weakened. The national 
minimum pension has gradually been increased, providing incentives to exit the labour market 
at the first favourable opportunity (NOU 1998:19, p.30).  
 
The national old-age pension constitutes the dominant source of income for most pensioners, 
comprising about 2/3 of their average income (Daatland, 1997:13). However, the number of 
pensioners with additional income is increasing. In 1990 roughly 50 per cent of all pensioner 
households received labour market pensions in addition to the old-age pension. By 1999 the 
figures had risen to 70 per cent (Pensjonskommisjonen, 2002:28). The old-age pension will be 
more thoroughly elaborated in the following, with additional emphasis on labour market 
pension schemes and individual pension arrangements. 
 
1.1 Historical Background 
Traditionally, income protection in old age was considered a personal and/or family 
responsibility. Local government provided protection through the poor laws and/or through 
charity. From the turn of last century certain pension arrangements were gradually developed, 
like the Norwegian Public Service Pension Fund for state employees in 1917 and occupational 
pension schemes for local government employees but also in private industry. These 
arrangements were directed at certain groups in private industry covering selected groups in 
management mainly (Daatland, 1997:14).  
 
The development and implementation of a national pension scheme turned out a long and 
slow process. The Norwegian Parliament, Stortinget, approved an introductory plan in the 
1920s, but a national old-age pension scheme did not come into effect until 1937. While 
Parliament disagreed on whether insurance benefits should be proportional to contributions 
made throughout working-life or means-tested with a basic pension securing a minimum 
economic standard to all elderly, local government maintained the responsibility for 
subsistence through social security under the poor laws. Many municipalities established old-
age pension schemes and by 1922 means-tested basic pension was implemented in 105 
municipalities, covering 40 per cent of the Norwegian population (Hatland, 2001:84). 
Although the national old pension scheme was approved in 1936, many local arrangements 
continued as supplements until the national pension reached a reasonable level.  
 
The national old-age pension was originally a modest and means-tested pension of the social 
security type, payable from the age of 70 (Daatland, 1997:14). Means-testing was gradually 
curtailed until its final abolishment in 1957 (Hatland, 2001:84) Henceforth the old-age 
pension is universal and flat-rate. Other national benefits, like the disability pension and 
survivor’s pension, were later modelled on the old-age pension scheme. The next major 
reform was the National Insurance Act of 1966, integrating various insurance and pension 
schemes in the National Insurance Scheme. It also introduced new principles, including a 
modified insurance principle reflected in a supplementary pension based on previous earnings 
to top of the basic pension. (Daatland, 1997:15). The basic pension provides economic 
security for all, whereas the supplementary pension rewards previous contributions. The latter 
allows the well-off to earn substantial supplementary pension benefits, making it possible to 
maintain an accustomed standards of living as pensioners, while the former benefit the less 
well-off because of its redistributional profile214. Basically, the national old-age pension 
includes all residents, all profit and accordingly all should be motivated to support the scheme 
and contribute. 
 
In addition to the basic pension and the supplement pension, a flat “special supplement”, 
særtillegg, was introduced in 1969, granting a minimum supplement to “basic amount” (G). 
The special supplement benefits pensioners with no or low supplement pension, and with the 
basic pension215 it constitute the minimum pension. Initially the special supplement only 
constituted 7.5 per cent of basic amount, but it has gradually been raised and constituted 80 
per cent for singles and 55 per cent for couples in 2000 (Hatland, 2001:208). As a result the 
minimum pension is increased, amounting to NOK 92.104216 in May 2001 (ibid:106). In order 
to adjust the minimum pension benefits, the government can either change basic amount or 
the rate of the special supplement. If the growth of the minimum pension exceeds the growth 
of basic amount, which was the case fin the period 1980-1995, the difference between the 
average supplementary pension and the minimum pension will over time diminish. This may 
at the outmost result in a system where everybody receives equal pensions. Thus, the political 
practice of pension regulation between 1980 and 1995 actually undermined the relation 
between occupational income and future pension contributions. This policy has lately been 
changed, and pension adjustments are again primarily addressing basic amount (ibid:210).  
 
In 1973 the standard age of retirement was lowered to 67. In addition some flexibility was 
introduced, making it possible to defer the pension totally or partially until the age of 70 and 
for employees in the public sector to continue working until this age. At the same time 67 
became the mandatory age of retirement in many private industries (Daatland, 1997:15).  
 
1.2 The National Pension 
The national pension scheme is based on a mix of social security and insurance principles. In 
practice a tax-based system, financed by contributions from employers, employees and the 
state on a pay-as-you-go basis (ibid:16). The fact that pensions primarily are financed by 
                                                 
214 With an income ceiling on pension credits for higher income groups and higher replacement rates for lower 
income groups, the supplementary pension also holds a redistributional profile (Daatland, 1997:16).  
215 The Basic pension covers income equivalent to G by 100 per cent, income between G and 6G by 42 per cent, 
with income between 6 and 12G counting a third. Income above 12 G is not reflected. 
216 The amount addresses single pensioners. Couples may receive a somewhat smaller pension as the basic 
pension for each is reduced to 75 per cent of G. 
current income would imply increased taxes in meeting the increased pension costs of an 
ageing population (Hatland, 2001:214).  
 
All residents in Norway, with a minimum of three years residence, are entitled to minimum 
pension, but an insurance period of 40 years is required in order to obtain full basic pension. 
Accordingly, many first generation immigrants will not acquire full pension217 (Daatland, 
1997:54). The supplementary pension is related to previous income, counting the 20 “best 
pension-earning years”. For full value, 40 years in employment is required and the first cohort 
with the possibility of obtaining full supplementary pension reaches the retirement age in 
2007.  
 
According to pension regulation pensioners are allowed a certain additional income while 
receiving old-age pension, without affecting the latter although special restrictions apply. At 
the age of 70 pension payments will not be affected by additional income regardless of its 
amount. This rule applies national as well as labour market pensions (Engelstad, 1992:85). 
The rules restricting income only refer to earned income, whereas income from interests, 
property return, stocks, occupational pensions and individual pension insurance are 
disregarded. 
 
Between the ages of 67 and 70, the old-age pension will be graduated according to pension-
earning income unless the annual amount constitute less than basic amount. Since 1997, 
pension payments are reduced by 40 per cent, as compared to the previous per cent, of the 
amount exceeding basic amount. For AFP-pensioners pensions still decrease with the 
equivalent of 50 per cent of the amount above basic amount. In addition, the total of pension 
and pension-earning income for this group cannot constitute more than 100 per cent of 
previous pension-earning income, a restriction which was otherwise removed in 1997. 
Regulations imply that most income groups may receive a small old-age pension while 
continue in full employment (Kjønstad, 1998:688). 
   
In general recipients of disability pension may have an income equivalent to the half of basic 
amount. If this amount is exceeded considerably, the claimant may risk losing their pension 
altogether. At the age of 67 the disability pension is replaced by the old-age pension and the 
                                                 
217 On the other hand some may have portable pension rights from their home country. They can also apply for 
cash support through various programmes (Daatland, 1997:54).  
allowed annual income is doubled. Recipients granted 50 per cent disability pension and 
working part-time 50 per cent are allowed an income of half their previous income218 
(Engelstad, 1992:88).     
 
Old-age pension is taxable but also deductible, making the actual tax rate lower then on 
earned income. Recipients of minimum pensions only, with no additional income, is 
exempted income tax altogether (Sirnes, 1990:168). 
 
Recent changes to the national pension scheme include cuts in earnings to the supplementary 
pension, intended to limit future pension expenditure. Introduced in 1992, it will affect future, 
and not present pension levels, and then only the higher income groups. By lowering both the 
income ceiling for supplementary pension credits and the factor in the supplementary pension 
formula, the future ratio of the maximum to the minimum pension will be reduced from 3 to 
2.5 (Daatland, 1997:17). Simultaneously, pension rights are expanded by granting 
supplementary pension credits for informal care work219. As the majority of informal 
caretakers are women, this expansion will primarily benefit women, who in general receive 
far lower pensions than men. 
 
1.2.1 Coordination Regulations 
In 1959 an act coordinating pensions and benefits became effective. The purpose of the act is 
to regulate interacting benefits to prevent claimants receiving double benefits (Kjønstad, 
1998:676). For claimants entitled to national pensions and public occupational pension 
scheme benefits are coordinated, otherwise it would actually be possible to attain a higher 
income as a retiree than as an employee (Engelstad, 1992:56). 
  
Coordinated benefits are estimated on the basis of national pensions. Pensions from public 
occupational schemes, or public pension funds, are “put in” and counted until the total sum of 
the two pensions combined constitute the amount guaranteed. With full pension-earning years 
the total sum will always amount to at least 66 per cent of previous income (for further details 
                                                 
218Additional income may only amount to half of basic amount if the part-time worker/pensioner does not hold 
permanent employment.  
219 Caretakers of children under the age of 7, elderly,  sick or disabled are granted pension benefits equivalent to 
an income of 4G.  Though below the average earnings for men, it is well above the average credits of working 
women (Hatland, 2001:109).   
see section 1.3.1). The actual coordination is undertaken by the pension funds after national 
pension payments are made.     
 
1.3 Labour Market Pensions 
Public and private occupational pensions are supplementing the statutory pensions. They are 
regulated by law or agreements respectively, and subsidised by the state through tax 
deduction (Daatland, 1997:19). Labour market pensions cover 60 per cent of the labour force 
in 1990, the majority from public sector (Hatland, 2001:111). The fact that regulation and 
stipulations of public and private occupational schemes are not identical complicates the 
overall pension system and may affect labour force mobility between the public and the 
private sector. In the following I address general labour market pension schemes, covering the 
main occupational groups. Special schemes providing full old-age pension from earlier ages 
than 67 for special occupational groups220 will not be addressed.   
 
1.3.1 The Public Sector 
In public sector all employees are in principal members of an occupational pension scheme 
with separate arrangements for state and local government employees. “Public” occupational 
pensions refer to the statutory commitments of the State’s Pension Fund, Statens 
pensjonskasse, and corresponding municipal occupational pension agreements (NOU 
1994:2,p.15).  
 
The State’s Pension Fund constitutes the main arrangement. Henceforth 1980 state pensions 
are regulated according to changes in basic amount in order to secure accordance with wage 
increases (Hatland, 2001:112). The Municipal National Pension Fund, Kommunal 
Landspensjonskasse, includes the majority of employees in local councils and counties, 
whereas a minority is member of “The Independent Municipal Pension Fund”, “De 
selvstendige kommunale pensjonskasser”. They are all integral parts of a common pension 
scheme and pensions are calculated according to common regulations (Engelstad, 1992:38). 
Whereas local government schemes are organised in funds, this is not the case for state 
occupational pension scheme (Daatland, 1997:19). In principal the same rules and regulations 
apply the different “public” occupational pension arrangements, hence they are in the 
following addressed as a whole rather than treated separately. 
                                                 
220Like military personnel, policemen, pilots etc. (Daatland, 1997:19). 
 “Public” occupational pensions are defined-benefit arrangements with a commitment for 
future pension benefits to cover a fixed portion of previous income earnings. They guarantee a 
66 per cents replacement rate of gross income for medium income groups with 40 pension-
earning years. Due to an income ceiling, the replacement rate is somewhat lower for higher 
income groups (ibid). Pension-earning in public pension funds is linear, that is the number of 
pension-earning years will secure a corresponding percentage portion of full pension and 
public employees may change employment within public sector without reducing their 
pension entitlements or pension-earnings. The premium for members of public pension funds 
is 2 per cent of earned income. The age of retirement in public pension funds is 70 years, 
although members may withdraw occupational old-age pension from the age of 67 (NOU 
1994:2,p.117). However, it is currently possible to retire at the age of 62 through the AFP. 
 
The fact that public occupational pensions are gross arrangements, implies that pensions are 
coordinated with national insurance benefits by reducing the supplementary occupational 
pension. Thus, the arrangement represents a gross guarantee for a certain pension benefit, as 
opposed to net arrangements which constitute a subsidiary net benefit in addition to an 
expected, not actual, national insurance benefit (ibid). 
  
Once occupational pension is withdrawn, the public employee cannot continue in his or her 
employment or accept other employment covered by public pension funds, i.e. employment in 
public sector, without reducing his or her pension payments. Pension-earning income from 
private sector will on the other hand not affect public occupational pension payments. If the 
employee continues working part-time after the age of retirement, the pension will be 
estimated according to the portion of the wage that is no longer received (ibid:118). In public 
sector various stipulations refer to additional income while receiving pensions, and 
regulations distinguish between income from private and public sector respectively and 
whether the recipient is under or over the stipulated occupational age limit (Engelstad, 
1992:88). 
 
For former public employees receiving gross old-age pension and/or AFP from public 
occupational pension funds, there is no ceiling on earned income, provided they originate 
from employment in private sector. If the claimant, while receiving pension, continues 
working in the public sector, different rules will apply. In principal the pension will be 
adjusted to prevent the total amount of both pension and earned income exceeding full wages. 
The pension is not affected if the claimant accepts pension wage, constituting NOK 63 in 
1992. If this pay is accepted, the old-age pension or AFP is not affected regardless of the 
amount earned. Further, pension payments are not affected if the claimant work less than 15 
hours/half-time post and is under the age limit. Receiving a fee as a consultant or special 
advisor at a department for a task completed, will not affect the pension either (ibid:88).  
 
Pension funds also provides occupational disability pension to public employees, 
guaranteeing in principal 66 per cent of final wages after being coordinated with the national 
disability pension, which claimants are required to apply for as well. Though the disability 
rate awarded by the occupational pension schemes and the National Insurance Scheme usually 
corresponds, the former have less strict terms of entry. Whereas the National Insurance 
Scheme requires a disability of at least 50 per cent, pension funds have no such limit. As 
opposed to the national disability pension, pension funds have retained the provision of 
disability pension for claimants over the age of 64 under the diagnosis “age weakening” 
(NOU 1994:2,p.119).                                            
 
1.3.2 The Private Sector 
Occupational pensions in private sector include pension funds and insurance-based 
arrangements covering all of the employees of the respective companies. Benefits are 
restricted to a certain level of total pension, the expected national insurance benefit included 
(ibid:115). In general “private” occupational pensions can only be withdrawn after the 
claimant has reached the age of 67. Accordingly, private occupational pension cannot be 
given as an additional benefit to ordinary AFP-pensions provided from the age of 62.  
 
Within the private sector various collective occupational pension arrangements exist, of which 
none guarantee a specific replacement rate, cf. pensions in the public sector. In this respect 
public employees have in general a higher pension level than private employees. Public 
employees may change place of work, provided they remain in the public sector, without 
suffer a drop in pensions, whereas private employees usually have to “start afresh” because 
previous pension earnings will not be taken into account in further pension estimations. The 
Public sector also provides greater opportunities for employees to vary their working hours 
without affecting their pension and part-time employment is credited higher pensions than 
part-time work in the private sector (Engelstad, 1992:39).   
 
In “private” occupational pension schemes the employer generally pays the premium for his 
or her employees, although in some cases employees pay a premium of 2 per cent of their 
wages. The annual premium increases as the employee reaches the age of retirement and may 
for employees close to the retirement age almost be equivalent to their salary. Companies pay 
a relatively low premium for young employees and a considerable higher premium for older 
employees. This age-discriminating feature may result in employment policies favouring 
younger employees (ibid:71). 
 
With the introduction of the national supplementary pension, it was assumed that occupational 
schemes would be crowded out. By currently covering about 40 per cent of the employees in 
the private sector, this assumption is proven wrong (Daatland, 1997:19). Due to the fact that 
the national pensions provide more favourable coverage for the low-income groups, the 
supplementing occupational pensions will be of greater importance to the higher-income 
groups (NOU 1994:2,p.123).  
 
Occupational pensions in private sector are net pension schemes supplementing and not 
coordinated with national insurance benefits, like “public” occupational pensions. A certain 
level of national pension payment or disability pension is taken into account, whereupon the 
occupational pension is estimated as an additional net benefit. In consequence all employees 
will have equal occupational pensions, expressed in percentage. The arrangements do not 
provide complete pension coverage by themselves, but depend and are based on national 
pensions. Net arrangements do not make provision for any changes in the national pension 
system, like the gross guarantee in public occupational arrangements does. Hence, a net 
benefit is basically less favourable than gross pension, but as the former supplements national 
pensions without coordination, the total pension result of the respective arrangements will 
roughly be the same  (ibid:122).  
 
Like “public” occupational arrangements, “private” occupational pensions are primarily 
defined-benefit and rising pension costs are succeeded by higher member premiums. In 2000 
Parliament passed a resolution introducing defined-contribution pensions in private sector, in 
which contributions are fixed and pensions adjusted according to individual contributions. 
The purpose is enabling more private corporations to provide supplementary pension 
arrangements for their employees as the pension costs of defined-contribution arrangements 
are more predictable for both the employer and the employee than defined-benefits 
arrangements (Hatland, 2001:112). 
 
There is in principal no limitation on additional income inherent in occupational pension 
arrangements in the private sector. It is, nevertheless, unlikely that claimants will only receive 
“private” occupational pension without also receiving national pension. Thus, in practice the 
regulation of the national pensions will apply, i.e. a maximum ceiling on earned annual 
income equivalent to basic amount (Engelstad, 1992:89).      
 
1.4 Individual Pension Arrangements 
Individual pension insurance is also supplementary to the national old-age pension, though 
less widespread and common than occupational pensions. In 1992 individual pension 
insurance only constituted 2 per cent of earned pension rights, which may be due to the 
generous coverage and levels of the collective pension schemes. Individual pension 
insurances must comply with public regulations in order to be tax deductible (Daatland, 
1997:20). 
 
Individual pensions are neither affected by nor coordinated with national or labour market 
pensions. There are several different arrangements, but traditionally members commit to pay 
fixed annual premiums in return for fixed pensions payments after the age of 67, usually over 
a ten years period. It is also possible to pay at convenience when one’s financial situation 
allows, rather than commit to fixed annual sums. Individual pension arrengements generally 
offers the possibility of retiring at the age of 64. By buying a pension certificate, 
“pensjonsbevis”, a certain payment, which can be further extended by private contributions, is 
secured upon retirement. Insurance companies and banks provide individual pension 
arrangements and their popularity is increasing. Initially individual pension arrangements 
were associated with favourable rates and taxes. You no longer save tax, but upon buying 
individual pension insurance the net tax is partly postponed. Some of the pension payment is, 
however, subjected to double taxation because upon payment a national insurance tax will 
have to be paid too (Engelstad, 1992:84).   
 
Denmark 
1.0 An Introduction to the Danish Pension System 
The intention of the pension system in Denmark is to ensure security in terms of pensions for 
all citizens and enable pensioners to maintain an income level during retirement that 
reasonably reflects their pre-retirement level, cf. the level of compensation. It is generally 
regarded that the income of pensioners should provide them the opportunity to maintain a 
standard of living not far from their accustomed mode of living during their working years. 
The flat-rate national pension provides a minimum of economic security in old age, whereas 
the demand for pension supplements is primarily met by private pension arrangements. The 
compensation level is ensured through the combined benefits of national pensions, labour 
market pensions and individual savings respectively (Regeringen, 2000:5). 
 
The national pension is separate from and independent of previous labour market affiliation. 
Work-related pensions include the public ATP scheme and labour market pensions, which are 
both contribution-defined and funded. The relative prevalence of funded pension schemes 
implies that pressure on public finance due to demographic changes is lower in Denmark than 
countries with “pure” pay-as-you-go system (ibid:6). 
 
The pension system in Denmark can be considered a three-pillar system with the national old-
age pensions, labour market pensions and individual private schemes constituting separate 
pillars. The ATP scheme is, however, sometimes considered a pillar on its own221, illustrated 
in table 1.The national old-age pension, first pillar, still remains the single most important 
component in the overall pension system. Participation in the ATP scheme is becoming more 
common, and in the future almost every old-age pensioner will receive ATP-benefits. 
Nevertheless, ATP-benefits have only recently reached a noticeable pension level. Relatively 
few people currently receive old-age pension benefits from labour market pension scheme, 
but due to the establishment of several new labour market pension schemes and subsequent 
growing membership figures, labour market pension schemes are estimated to increase in 
importance. Still, it will take several decades before the new labour market pension schemes 
affect the overall pension system as they are contribution-defined and hence take a long time 
to mature and attain significant impact (ATP, 1995:4). 
                                                 
221 Described as a three-pillar system, the ATP scheme (in addition to Sp and SAP) is not regarded as a separate 
pillar but as a “hybrid” of the first and second pillar, i.e. stat-funded pensions, and labour market pensions 
respectively. (Cf. Regeringen, 2000 and Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a). 
 Universal coverage under all pillars is not expected in the future. Rather, changes are likely to 
entail more people experiencing a multi-pillar system as a reality than at present. In the longer 
term everybody will continue receiving a state-funded old-age pension and most will receive 
ATP-benefits. Whereas at least half of the pensioner will be covered by labour market pension 
schemes, only a few will receive individual, private pensions (table 1).  
 
Whereas the national pension is separate from and independent of previous labour market 
affiliation, the implementation of the ATP scheme introduced a differentiation between the 
majority of the wage earners and the rest of the population. This differentiation is further 
cemented by the growing membership of labour market pension schemes. The Danish pension 
system is characterised by having two different labour market based supplementary pension 
schemes complementing each other.  Hence, the future pension system will have more 
individualised pensions and the pension to “top-up”222 the national old-age pension, will 
increasingly be determined by participation in the labour market, income level, membership 
of pension schemes etc (ibid:5). Due to the multi-pillar feature of the pension system, the 
issue in Danish pension policy is how these schemes interact and how they are to be weighted.    
 
                                                 
222 The Danish pension system is referred to as a “top-up” system because benefits from the various pillars are 
not mutually exclusive but are rather put on top of each other (ATP, 1995:6). 
Table 1: The four pillars in the Danish pension system 
 State-funded 
old-age pension 
      ATP  Labour market 
pension schemes 
Individual, 
private schemes 
Coverage Universal All wage earners Wage earners 
covered by 
collective 
agreements 
At the initiative 
of the 
beneficiary 
Purpose Provision of 
fundamental 
security 
Provision of 
fundamental 
security 
Maintenance of 
income level 
Maintenance of 
income level 
Financing Taxation Contributions by 
employers and 
wage earners 
Contributions by 
employer and 
wage earner 
The individual 
Contributions  A fixed amount 
according to 
extent of 
employment  
A certain 
percentage of 
wages 
Relatively 
modest 
Benefits 
available from 
The 67th 
birthday 
The 67th 
birthday 
The 60th 
birthday 
The 60th 
birthday 
Current 
membership 
figures223  
    100 %      60%    15-18%   10-12% 
Estimated future 
membership 
figures  
     100%      92-95%      55-56%    15-20% 
Source: ATP, 1995:6 
 
1.1 Historical Background 
In 1891 Denmark passed an act224 establishing old-age pension to the deserving needy not 
already covered by the poor relief, making Denmark one of the first countries introducing a 
public old-age pension arrangement (Regeringen, 2000:27). Henceforth the Danish old-age 
pension system is financed trough general taxes, generally includes every citizen and benefits 
are graduated according to supplementary income. 
 
The act of 1891 included in principal everyone over the age of 60 who could not support 
themselves. In 1922 the initial alms principle is replaced by the principle of law, abolishing 
the original right of the municipalities to estimate benefits on discretion. In addition the old 
age benefit was reduced according to the income of the recipient. The national pension is 
introduced in 1957, generally including every citizen regardless of income. The previous 
terms of income regulations are nevertheless sustained, although a minimum amount is 
                                                 
223 Percentage of pensioners currently receiving benefits from the various pillars. 
224 “Lov om alderdomsunderstøttelse til værdige trængende uden for fattigvæsenet”. 
provided for all irrespective of income. With the act in 1964 the full national pension is 
established, implying a gradually modification of the income regulations. As of April 1970 
basic amount is no longer adjusted according to income. The act also introduced a 
supplementary income-dependent pension, on the grounds that the non-graduation of basic 
amount would only benefit pensioners with additional income225. From 1970 everyone who 
actually retires from the labour market, i.e. no longer has independently earned income, is 
from the age of 67 entitled a fixed basic amount. From its introduction in 1957, the old-age 
pension benefits have been divided into a steadily more earnings-unrelated basic amount 
topped up by earnings-related supplements (ibid:29).  
 
In 1982 and 1993 the graduation of basic amount was re-adjusted and accordingly the basic 
amount is phased out when income from work, but not capital income, reaches a certain 
amount. The stated reason for this alteration was that recipients with relatively high additional 
income have not actually retired from the labour force and hence should not be entitled to full 
basic pension226. With the tax reform in 1994, the personal deduction for recipients of national 
pension was reduced and pensioners are now taxed according to the same rules as those 
applying to other taxpayers, as compared to Norway where tax rules especially favour 
pensioners. To compensate a subsequent reduction of their net income, the supplementary 
pension was simultaneously increased (ibid). 
 
The standard age of retirement, i.e. the qualifying age for pension benefits, is currently 67 
years in both Denmark and Norway. Denmark on the other hand, decided in 1999 to lower the 
age to 65 with effect from 2004, cf. ch. VI.  
 
                                                 
225In the period 1972 to 1975 the graduation of the supplementary pension is modified. 
226 The fact that basic amount was independent of other income until 1993 may reflect the policy of those years 
of trying to combat unemployment by reducing the supply of labour (Bingley et al., 2001:16). 
1.2 The Public Pension System 
The current public pension system includes the national pension and the pension supplements 
ATP, SP and SAP. The national pension is provided independently of previous relation to the 
labour market, whereas labour market affiliation is of great importance to the latter. DMP, the 
temporary pension fund and LD227, the wage earners famine fund, are temporary 
arrangements currently being winded up and will subsequently not be addressed. The civil 
service pension scheme will be considered a labour market pension scheme, although it shares 
some of the features of the public pension schemes. ATP and SP are defined contributions 
pension arrangements established by law, cf. public pensions. Due to the fact that they are 
based on contributions and savings, their pension payments depend on the number of years of 
contribution, which also apply labour market pensions (ibid:25). Members renounce current 
personal consumption until retirement in order to obtain a higher level of compensation than 
the national pension would otherwise provide.   
 
The average total income for pensioners is relatively high, partly due to property return and 
additional pension supplements. Currently, the disposable income for pensioners amounts to 
somewhere between 60 and 70 per cent of previously earned income (Regeringen, 2000:8). 
Nevertheless, not all pensioners have additional pension supplements and in general the 
national pension constitutes the most important source of income for pensioners. And for the 
time being the additional pension supplement arrangements only constitute a significant 
aspect of the economic situation of 30-40 per cent of the well off pensioners.  
 
1.2.1 The National Pension 
The national pension aims at securing an income for everybody aged 67228  or older in order 
to prevent and minimize the risk of poverty in old age. The level of compensation for low-
income earners is high, approximately 70 per cent, whereas the equivalent for people with 
higher income is “only” about 42 per cent (ibid:26). In other words the old-age pension 
favours the most needy pensioner. Nevertheless it constitutes a fundamental pension income 
to be topped up by various supplementary incomes. The upper- and middle-bracket income 
                                                 
227 DMP is the so-called Den midlertidige Pensionsopsparing and LD refers to Lønmodtagernes Dyrtidsfond 
(Regeringen, 2000:36). 
228 In 2004 the standard age of retirement, and the age of eligibility, will be reduced to 65 years. Henceforth, the 
age criterion is changed to 65 for everybody younger than 60 years in 1999. 
groups may undertake additional arrangements, i.e. labour market pensions and individual 
savings in order to obtain a higher level of compensation. 
 
As in Norway, 40 years of residence is required to obtain full old-age pension. Any shorter 
and the pension will be reduced accordingly. In principle everybody receives the same 
amount, although benefits are graduated according to marital status and additional earnings, 
whereas previous labour market affiliation is of less importance. Basic amount is graduated 
according to income from personal work exceeding a certain amount229, whereas the 
supplementary pension is reduced if the total income230 of the pensioner and his or her 
spouse/cohabitant, is above a certain limit (Søndergaard, 1999:300).  
 
Benefits are annually adjusted according to wages in the private sector. In 2002 basic amount 
and the supplementary pension combined amounted DKK 105 400 for a single pensioner and 
DKK 77 200 for couples (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a, appendix 2). The national 
pension should been seen in conjunction with a number of other subsidies and benefits of 
which recipients may be eligible to, notably support for heating expenses, health allowance 
and personal allowance and especially favourable rules regarding housing benefits and tax on 
owner-occupied dwellings respectively.  
 
1.2.2 ATP 
An Additional Labour Market Pension, the ATP, was established in 1964, with the purpose of 
providing a pension supplement for all wage earners. Contribution is mandatory for all wage 
earners between the ages of 16 and 66231 working more than nine hours a week (Regeringen, 
2000:36). During the 1990s the scheme was extended to include beneficiaries of transfer 
income like unemployment benefit, sickness and maternity benefits. In addition pre-
retirement and part-time pensioners and recipients of post employment wage may enter the 
scheme as voluntary members. In 1998 ATP has 4,1 million members, whereof approximately 
448 000 pensioners. Because the scheme now also covers people with only a rare affiliation to 
the labour market, it is estimated that it in time will cover nearly 98 per cent of all old-age 
pensioners. 
 
                                                 
229 DKK 223,200 at the 2002-leve (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a, appendix 2). 
230That is general income, not only income from personal work.   
231 64 years for people turning 60 after July the 1st 1939. 
The ATP is a fully funded, contribution-defined, premium-reserve scheme. The flat rate 
contributions depend on the number of working hours and not the size of income. Wage 
earners pay one third of the full contribution, and employers the remaining two thirds. 
Recipients of transfer income pay only one third, compared to voluntary members who pay 50 
per cent of the contribution. The annual contribution varies between DKK 1.500 and 2.700. 
The public Danish supplementary pension is distinct from the schemes in the other Nordic 
countries, Norway included, and has never become as important source of income for 
pensioners as it has in the neighbouring countries. The scheme was expanded in 1991 with the 
introduction of a special pension saving scheme, the SP, and it is estimated that their 
combined significance will increase in time (ibid:33). 
 
In July 2001 the highest ATP benefit approximates DKK 20 3000 annually, constituting 20 
per cent of the national pension (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a,appendix 2). It is, 
nevertheless estimated that the ATP in the future will constitute roughly 50 per cent of basic 
amount232, 40 per cent when retiring at the age of 65. The ATP payments are age neutral in 
the sense that payments do not depend on when contributions are made. To illustrate, a 
contribution of DKK 400 entitles an annual life-benefit of DKK 100, irrespective of age of the 
contributor. Thus, the yielded interest of contributions from young members is relatively low, 
whereas contributions from older members may give a substantial return. This aspect of age 
neutrality entails redistribution across member groups, which makes the scheme less robust to 
demographic changes (ibid:37). 
 
Due to developments within the Danish pension policy, the status of the ATP scheme is 
expected to change. It will remain the most important supplementary pension scheme both in 
terms of extent and benefits, although with a higher social accentuation. This is primarily due 
to the fact that contributions are not related to income but levied on a number of transfer 
incomes. The ATP scheme will especially be of importance to all low-income groups and 
groups with less stable employment conditions and wage earner groups not covered by labour 
market pension schemes (ATP, 1995:28). As opposed to labour market pension schemes, ATP 
mitigates social differentiation because it implies a higher basic pension which in general is 
unaffected by the factors causing differentiation. In a way, the ATP-benefits will also be of 
particular importance to groups with a low retirement age. The fact that early retirement 
                                                 
232I.e. DKK 25 000  in 2000.  
generally leads to lower pension benefits under both labour market pension schemes and the 
ATP, makes individual benefits more important. 
 
1.2.3 SP 
The SP is a so-called Special Pension Scheme introduced in 1999. Contributions are 
mandatory for all employees and recipients of transfer payments between the ages 17 to 66, 
cf. ATP, and constitute 1 per cent of wages. The accumulated benefits are paid as a 10-year 
annuity from the age of 67, 65 from 2004, and is subjected to taxation (NOSOSCO, 
2002:127). Initially payments from the SP provided claimants an average payment rather than 
a payment depending on preceding contributions. Thus the SP had a redistribution aspect 
based on the accumulated amount of work rather than individual earnings. This practise is 
changed by an amendment adopted in 2002 with effect from contributions paid for 2001 
onwards. The amendment implies that contributions in full will be added to the contributor’s 
own savings and as a consequence redistribution no longer takes place (Ministry of Social 
Affairs, 2002a,appendix 2).    
 
The ATP and SP are defined-contributions pension arrangements established by law. Due to 
the fact that they are funded and based on contributions, their pension payments depend on 
the number of years of contribution, which is also the case for labour market pensions 
(Regeringen, 2000:25). Whereas labour market pension benefits also depend on the individual 
earnings history throughout the working life, this is not the case with the ATP and SP 
schemes.   
 
1.2.4 SAP 
The public labour market-like supplementary pension scheme for recipients of anticipatory 
pension is a part of the anticipatory pension reform entering into force January 2003. The 
scheme is described in chapter VI. 
 
1.3 Labour Market Pension Schemes 
In contrast to the statutory public pension schemes, the labour market pension schemes are 
based on agreements by the social partners or in individual enterprises. Like the ATP, these 
arrangements are generally fully funded, contribution-defined, premium-reserve scheme and 
the employees/employers pay contributions as a percentage of wages. Pension benefits vary 
according to the size of the contributions and its yielding interests. There is an actuarial 
correlation between contributions made and benefits attained and benefits reflect the (lifelong) 
extent of employment and the related level of income. Today a significant and increasing part 
of pension expenditure is privately financed (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a, appendix 2). 
 
In Denmark labour market pensions date back to the Danish Constitution of 1849 whereas the 
civil servant pension system has been in force since 1919. During the 1950s and 1960s labour 
market pension schemes were established for other groups of employees in public sector as 
well as for academics in both private and public sector. Nevertheless, in 1985 only a third of 
the population participates in labour market pension arrangements, whereas two thirds are 
only covered by the national pension and ATP-benefits. Hence LO presents a motion for 
pension reform, which in the period 1989 to 1993 results in the establishment of several new 
pension arrangements in both public and private sector (Regeringen, 2000:34). The new 
schemes double the number of employees covered, and currently almost all public and most 
private employees are included. Labour market pensions are still developing, hence the 
differences in contributions across various sectors233.  The contribution percentage of older 
labour market schemes is approximately 12-16 per cent whereas a rise to 9 per cent up to 
2004 is agreed for most of the new schemes (Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a,appendix 2).  
 
Most labour market pension schemes are either industry- or profession-wide, whereas some 
cover the employees of one single firm or enterprise only. In either case the schemes will only 
include the wage earners who are covered by the various kinds of agreement, to whom the 
scheme is compulsory (ATP, 1995:16). 
 
Generally the structure of the labour market pension arrangements are defined contributions 
with 3 per cent of earnings from the worker and 6 per cent from the employer. The schemes 
are collective and mandatory. The former implies that individuals may secure benefits 
independent of individual risk, while the latter ensure high prevalence. Most, if not all, of the 
arrangements offer pre-retirement before the standard age of retirement, generally from the 
age of 60 with an actuarially reduction depending on the specific age (Bingley et.al., 2001:5).    
 
                                                 
233 The contributions expressed in percentages in new arrangements, like industrial arrangements, are generally 
lower than the equivalent of old arrangements, e.g. the arrangement for engineers.        
 
There are currently about 1,6 million contributors to labour market pension schemes. The 
stress on funded arrangements is reflected in the extension of the labour market schemes and 
the fact that contributions have increased (Regeringen, 2000:26). Estimations imply that the 
number of claimants receiving significant labour market pension in the future will increase.  
 
In the long run the growing membership figures of labour market pension schemes are likely 
to effect the overall pension system. An increasing number of pensioners will receive 
considerable supplementary pensions and in consequence fewer will experience a drastic fall 
in their disposable income when they retire. On the other hand, pension income will 
increasingly depend on previous attachment to the labour market, which may cause 
considerable social differentiation (ATP, 1995:22). Labour market pension schemes only 
cover jobs that fall under the collective wage agreement and arrangements concluded, which 
may result in a differentiation of the social security available for those who are respectively 
“inside” and “outside” these schemes. Due to the fact that the various schemes were 
introduced over a relatively long period and that benefits depend on the total amount 
contributed, there will be differences between young and old schemes. In turn this may cause 
significant differences among pensioners even within the same age cohorts. Under a maturing 
scheme, benefits payable to young employees upon retirement will exceed payments to older 
colleagues who of course by then have been retired for some time. Periods of absence from 
the labour market due to unemployment, maternity, sickness etc. will further cause 
differentiation within labour market pension schemes. Because pension rights are only 
accrued on the basis of pay received from employment covered by the pension agreements, 
other income will not contribute to the accumulation of pension rights (ibid:24).   
 
1.3.1 Civil Service Pension Scheme 
Occupational pensions for employees in public sector has been stipulated in the constitution 
from 1849, as compared to labour market pensions, which are established by agreements. The 
pension scheme for civil servants in governmental service laid down in the Public Servants 
Act, whereas the equivalent for local authority officers is laid down in pension regulations. 
Civil service pensions further differ from labour market pension schemes by being a public 
tax-financed, i.e. pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit scheme unrelated to the building of funds 
(Ministry of Social Affairs, 2002a, appendix 2). Payments are estimated according to years of 
service upon retirement and the pensionable salary upon retirement. It is the only pension 
scheme in Denmark related to labour market affiliation not based on prior savings. Most local 
authorities and some counties have hedged their commitments by taking out insurance in 
Municipal Pension Insurance Company limited, KP, to which they pay premiums. In return 
the payments from KP cover their expenditure on civil service pensions (c.f. Norway 1.3.1). 
 
In January 2002 roughly 75 000 claimants received public employee pension (ibid). It is, 
however, estimated that its importance for state-employed will decrease, as state-employed 
public employees increasingly will be covered by schemes defined and financed by 
contributions, which will be more consistent with the flexible and individual wages of the 
public sector.    
  
1.4 Individual Pension Arrangements 
Banks, insurance- and pension institutions provide individual pension arrangements. The 
schemes differ considerably and their membership figures are high. Currently well over 1,1 
million people contribute to such individual arrangements (Regeringen, 2000:26). The 
average contribution is relatively modest, but so are the rights accrued. Like the labour market 
pension schemes, benefits can generally be obtained from the 60th birthday (Table 1).   
 
 
 
